Data Protection Law and Emotion

Abstract

Data protection law is often positioned as a regulatory solution to the risks posed by computational systems. This is logical given the pervasive data processing that underpins much of the technology we rely on daily. Despite the widespread adoption of data protection laws, however, there are those who remain very sceptical about their capacity to regulate these risks. Much of this criticism focuses on the role of us, the ‘data subjects’. For instance, it has been demonstrated repeatedly that we lack the capacity to act in our own best interests and, what is more, that our decisions have negative impacts on others. It is hard to dispute these points. Our decision-making limitations seem to be the inevitable by-product of the technological, social, and economic reality. The problems with data protection law also seem baked in through notions such as consent and the subjective control rights provided for in these frameworks and also the reliance on those processing our data to do so fairly. Despite these valid concerns, this book argues that the critiques of the instrumental role of control fail to recognize that its effectiveness is often more difficult to discern than the more critical literature would suggest, but it also emphasizes the importance of the conceptual value of subjective control. These points are analysed (and, indeed, exposed) by exploring data protection law through the lens of the insights provided by law and emotion scholarship.