Power and Dependency: the Ambiguous Reality and Norms of the Rich in China

Abstract

I adopt a multi disciplinary approach spanning anthropology, sociology, philosophy, history, and political science.

Confucianism was the official ideology legitimizing authority in traditional China, but the central philosophy is Legalism. Qin Hui describes the Chinese past as "Legalism masquerading as Confucianism" where power is absolute, defining the cultural and political situation in China. I use the entrepreneurs as a prism to explain Chinese politics and culture. China's first capitalist experiments with a market economy was introduced in the early 1980s, and I follow the ups and downs of the entrepreneurs since then. They are used as both the vehicle of wealth and as a scapegoat of trouble for the CCP; praised as heroes and blamed for alleged "original sins".

I use Van Gennep's concept "Liminality" in a wider meaning as it has expanded into wider social and political theory. Victor Turner described liminality as "a state of betwixt and between". The Chinese entrepreneurs can be seen, not as a class, but as being in a liminal state, betwixt and between power and dependency. Hidden and unwritten norms regulate this situation. Such norms represent the hidden agenda of the powerful. The entrepreneurs must be skillful at maneuvering through such a system of hidden norms.

I interviewed forty wealthy entrepreneurs. I use ethnomethodology as a way to describe the "unequal social encounters" my interviewees were experiencing in their state of liminality. Anxiety and insecurity often dominated. Strategies of caution became central. Issues of law, nationalism, democracy, family and gender, citizenship and residency, class, poverty, and money worship were part of their narrative. Today's "red elites" do not allow their arbitrary power to be caged by bureaucratic rules. The Chinese system does not follow Weberian rationality as "red elites" can "soften up" the process through cultivating informal relations and loyalty to cement the effectiveness of their political rule. I link this to James March's theory of "organized anarchy".

The entrepreneurs are both demonized and idealized. They are used by political power as negative or positive models whenever necessary.

"The nomenklatura system" is an upward accountability system, causing the pervasiveness of informal institutions, where informal social relations dominate. Chinese bureaucracy is about personal loyalty, trust, and patron-client relationships. Weber explained the "charisma of office", contrasting it to "original charisma". In China, the "original charisma" of Maoism has changed into "routinized charisma". This form of charismatic authority is based on legitimization through economic reforms rather than ideology.

The financial clique (jinrong bang) describes the financial technocracy in charge of the Chinese financial system. This clique constitutes a complicated web of connections through family lineages as well as economic expertise. They form an opaque web of connections difficult to challenge by the party leadership. I term this situation an "emperor's paranoia".

Where there is power, there is resistance. I discuss Scott's "hidden and public transcripts". The entrepreneurs often juggle different transcripts because of their state of liminality between power and dependency. They are unlikely to initiate attacks on the power system and cynical in their confrontations and collusions with power. I also discuss the norms of cynicism in China as a systemic or structural cynicism rather than a moral issue as such.

Scott's concept of "political electricity" forms my argument about potential sudden change. I end my thesis discussing the potential breakdown scenarios and the constant winds of change. Show more