The criticism of sculpture

Abstract

These chapters deal with some of the problems involved in the definition of sculpture, and with the so-called 'essence' and the ontological status of aesthetic objects in general and of sculptures in particular. Had there been a little less ground to cover it would have been convenient to place all this introductory material in a single chapter: as it is, the unwieldiness is somewhat reduced by dividing the matter roughly between the questions (Chapter I) 'How should we use the word "sculpture"'l' and (Chapter II) 'Are sculptures objects of such a nature that some kinds of criticism are necessarily and evidently inept or misdirected since they either do not presuppose that nature or do presuppose some other nature?' It is argued that sculptures form a Wittgensteinian 'family'; that the concept of sculpture is open to the future, and that the question what is the ontological status of a work of sculpture is a bogus one. In particular, the essentialist ontology of an Idealist such as Collingwood is rejected; and it is maintained that it is not replaceable by any simple Materialist ontology since the word 'sculpture' is properly used of - at least - the following kinds of thing: material objects; types of which material objects may be regarded as tokens; objects not only simpliciter but as seen in relation to a cultural and historical context; and of the movements of material objects and of their temporal changes, as in the cases of the mobile and of 'autodestructive' art. There is much here that is too philosophically fundamental to argue ab initio, and must be taken rather as a declaration of the general standpoint adopted than as a systematic defence of presuppositions which, whether entirely valid or not, are nowadays both familiar and respectable. Turning from aesthetic objects to their appraisal, it is suggested that there is a kind of remark - an aesthetic remark - which exercises the aesthetic sensibility of a critic who has adopted an aesthetic attitude to an appropriate object. These ideas are evidently connected, but may be elucidated piecemeal: the aesthetic remark is not foundational to later argument, but is merely the first to receive attention. It is held that although there are conspicuous aesthetic terms (graceful, elegant, etc.) which are almost invariably used to make aesthetic remarks, this is not a necessary state of affairs. Aesthetic remarks may be made without employing any explicitly aesthetic terms, and it is at any rate not logically impossible to use 'aesthetic' terms for other than aesthetic purposes. Aesthetic remarks, it is maintained, are such that necessary and sufficient conditions for their correct application cannot be specified. It is incidentally pointed out that Frank Sibley, the author of one of the most illuminating recent papers on this topic, errs in making this claim for aesthetic terms instead of for aesthetic remarks. The use of such aesthetic terms as 'pretty' and 'gaudy' is ordinarily taught through ostended paradigms; for which reason, in a culturally homogeneous society, it often seems that there is a well established correct use in spite of the freedom from the regimen of necessary and sufficient conditions. For this reason, it is argued, a study of explicitly aesthetic terms does not greatly help us to grasp what is peculiarly aesthetic about aesthetic remarks; since they share their application-condition freedom with certain other kinds of term, and moreover their firm anchorage in paradigms during the learning process makes for relatively easy agreement about their use. What is peculiarly aesthetic about aesthetic remarks, it is suggested, is their function of drawing attention to some aspect or feature of an object of sense-perception to which only an aesthetically sensitive person would, in the context, respond. This may well be a commonplace natural feature of the object, the mere discrimination of which calls for no special sensitivity, although the choice of this feature for remark rather than another is, under the circumstances, a demonstration of aesthetic sensibility. An attempt is made to survey the much disputed boundaries between the domain of the aesthetic, the moral, the economic, etc. Traditional attempts to find a sharp criterion of demarcation are criticized, particularly those which rely upon a special quasi-physiological mode of 'aesthetic' perception. This notion is related to the core concept of 'aesthetic disinterestedness' deriving from Kant, and to the logically independent idea of the 'innocent eye' by means of which Ruskin introduced a Berkeleyan strand to twine with the Kantian into the thread of recent aesthetic theory in which an introspectively discerned aesthetic response is postulated. Clive Bell's theory of the 'aesthetic emotion' is taken as typical, and is subjected to an assault which makes use of arguments derived from Wittgenstein's rejection of private languages. It is suggested that there is, in the nature of things, no simple or conclusive way of distinguishing aesthetic remarks from others, but that marginal cases must be argued on their merits. In defence of this view a paradigmatic situation is set up, in which a professional art critic makes an exemplary aesthetic remark about a universally acknowledged work of sculpture in an appropriate place and upon a suitable occasion. The main elements of this total situation are then severally varied in such a way as to become unparadigmatic or even contra-paradigmatic, while the remaining bulk of the considerations remain unchanged. The question whether, in each case, the words uttered constitute an aesthetic remark in the new situation is then seen to be arguable in different ways according to the set of the circumstances, and to resist general solution a priori. It is a corollary of the indeterminate character of aesthetic concepts that they are to some extent historically mutable. The traditional view of so-called 'judgments of aesthetic value', it is claimed, is that they attribute a single homogeneous property or character - aesthetic excellence - to suitable objects. This view is challenged, it being argued that the notion of aesthetic excellence is not - to use a mathematical analogy - linear but multi-dimensional: that whatever may be attributed to an object which is judged to be 'consununate' is not simply and literally somewhat more or less of what is attributed to it when it is said to be 'marvellous' or 'negligible' or 'superb". Hare's view that ' ... it is the purpose of the word "good" and other value words to be used for teaching standards' is challenged in as much as he maintains (but, I think, need not maintain) that it would be inconsistent ' ...to apply the word "good" to one picture, if I refuse to apply it to another picture which I agree to be in all other respects exactly similar ...'· The honorific imputation of aesthetic originality, at least, it is argued, shows Hare's doctrine to be inadequate. Show more