Competing over America in the Cold War: Australia-Indonesia Relations, 1945-1978

Abstract

One contention prevailing in the literature about the Cold War is the ability of 'small and middle' or 'lesser' powers to exercise policy independence from great powers. The independence or strategic autonomy of lesser powers often succumbed to the Cold War among the great powers, making lesser powers acting like proxies of the latter. If independence was the priority, lesser powers were naturally inclined to keep the great powers at bay. Not quite was the case with these two lesser powers: Indonesia and Australia. The two countries desired the great powers to play a substantial role in the management of Australia-Indonesia relations during its formative period of 1945-1978. Why was this the case? And, how did the great powers influence the relationship between Australia and Indonesia? Drawing its primary analysis from Indonesian and Australian archives, this study argues that Australian and Indonesian leaders felt they could not meaningfully influence or alter each other's policies without great power intervention. These archives shed light to such intervention during the four continuous episodes of 'the Indonesian Revolution' in 1945-1978. This Revolution concerned Indonesia's struggles for independence from colonialism, in one form or another. While ideologically driven by anti-colonialism, the Revolution spearheaded Indonesian territorial claims and geopolitical influence beyond its borders. Looking menacingly expansionist, the Revolution stoked Australia's opposition to keep it in check, if not stall it altogether. Only by getting the support from one or more great powers did Indonesian and Australian leaders feel capable to affect the course of the Revolution. Due to their peripheral geostrategic location in the Cold War, however, Australia and Indonesia found the United States disinterested in the Indonesian Revolution, albeit it was also the most influential as it controlled the seas in maritime Southeast Asia. As shown in the four episodes, Washington's unreliable yet largely benign image prevailed in the minds of Indonesian and Australian leaders, making it the top great power of choice for both. Desiring the United States to play a substantial role in the Revolution, Indonesian and Australian leaders exercised the 'U.S.-first' and 'pro-U.S.' strategies, respectively. The aims were to compel the United States to either support Indonesia and its Revolution, or help Australia to check and even stop it. Although Indonesian and Australian strategies only met chequered success, they managed to get U.S. intervention in each episode, demonstrating the independence of lesser powers. Unlike Australia's strategy whose choices were limited to the United States and Britain, that of Indonesia was flexible enough to align with the communist Soviet Union and/or China in addition to the West. Consequently, Indonesia exercised relatively more leverage over the United States than did Australia in the four episodes. While they were competitive, Indonesian and Australian strategies brought stability to their bilateral relations. Neither Indonesian nor Australian leaders ever pursued their interests in the Revolution beyond what U.S. leaders supported or accepted. Show more