Australia and Allied strategy in the Pacific, 1941-1946
Date
1980
Authors
Horner, David Murray
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Abstract
This thesis is an analysis of Australian political and military strategy during and after the Second World War. In 1941-42 Australia was faced with a particularly difficult situation, for at a time of
great national danger she was beset with a change of government, a change of major alliance partners and a change of geopolitical strategy.
The ensuing problems had to be resolved by a small group of political and military leaders and public servants.
They had to operate within close limitations. First, the country had a small population and weak economy, and was largely unprepared for war. Second, strategic decisions had to be made in a framework of
coalition war with Britain and America. Third, Australia lacked its own intelligence and diplomatic services. Fourth, attitudes of reliance upon British advice in particular, and external advice in general, were deeply ingrained. Fifth, partly as a result of the above considerations
Australian decision-planners lacked experience in matters of strategy
and foreign policy. Australia's experience during the Second World War revealed a lack
of a sophisticated and coherent approach to national strategic decision making.
The Prime Minister, John Curtin, deferred to the Allied Commander-in-Chief, General Douglas MacArthur, on questions which
should have been decided by the Australian government alone. The attempts of the Australian Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Thomas Blarney to advocate a policy designed to serve Australia's national interests
were often ignored by the government. And because the government both lacked experience of military affairs and distrusted the military, it relied heavily upon the guidance of the civilian Secretary of the Department of Defence, Sir Frederick Shedden. Nevertheless, during the war Australia made important advances in
her capacity to make independent strategic decisions and to secure an independent voice and role in allied strategy. An indigenous intelligence organisation was developed, the Department of External Affairs was
expanded, and the Australian armed services achieved a high international reputation on the battlefield. Finally, Australia secured leadership of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan. The Second
World War was a major turning point in Australia's evolution as an independent nation. An important part of that evolution was the development of Australia's capacity to formulate its own national strategic and foreign policies and to undertake independent military action in support of those policies. Australia's experience during the Second World War provides vital
lessons for the present. The principal lesson is the need for adequate organisational machinery for strategic decision-making; and political and military leaders and public servants must be trained and prepared to deal with politico-strategic problems. There are, however, other
important lessons; accurate intelligence is crucial, mobilisation procedures need to be examined, principles need to be established and officers trained for inter-allied cooperation, and the Australian forces
need to possess the ability to operate independently. Nevertheless, despite changes in science and technology and in the world balance of power, strategic decision-making still relies primarily upon the
judgement of individuals. Although there were shortcomings in strategic decision-making in the Second World War, in the long term Australia's interests did not suffer greatly because of them. If similar shortcomings are displayed in the future, the nation may not be so fortunate.
Description
Keywords
Citation
Collections
Source
Type
Thesis (PhD)
Book Title
Entity type
Access Statement
License Rights
DOI
10.25911/5d74e42a45ea0