Political crises in Northeast Asia: an anatomy of the Taiwan and Korean crises

Abstract

This paper looks at two recent international crises in Northeast Asia: that across the Taiwan Strait in 1995–96 involving China, Taiwan and the US; and the nuclear missile crisis involving North Korea and the US (and largely indirectly, South Korea). Its objective is to analyse to what extent these situations were crises in the sense of posing a high risk of military conflict and a threat to the basic values of the countries involved. The paper argues that in both cases the main purpose of the two countries (China and North Korea) initiating the events that were encompassed in the perception of crisis, was to gain the specific attention of the US. In China’s case this was to counter the belief that the US had moved politically towards Taiwan; in North Korea’s case, to achieve direct US links, free of South Korean intermediation, for its strategic, political and economic purposes. These purposes were recognised at best in only a limited way and this led to overreactions by the parties involved. Consequently, the crisis aspects of the two events were exaggerated to a degree and there was a substantial element of theatre in both cases. There are specific lessons to be learnt from the management of these crises that are relevant to what in both cases are likely to remain problematic relationships. The paper also seeks to draw some more general conclusions relevant to the handling of other crisis events.