## CENTRE FOR TAX SYSTEM INTEGRITY

Preliminary findings from 'The what's fair and what's unfair survey about justice issues in the Australian tax context'


# PRELIMINARY FINDINGS FROM 'THE WHAT'S FAIR AND WHAT'S UNFAIR SURVEY ABOUT JUSTICE ISSUES IN THE AUSTRALIAN TAX CONTEXT' 

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## THE CENTRE FOR TAX SYSTEM INTEGRITY WORKING PAPERS

The Centre for Tax System Integrity (CTSI) is a specialised research unit set up as a partnership between the Australian National University (ANU) and the Australian Taxation Office (Tax Office) to extend our understanding of how and why cooperation and contestation occur within the tax system.

This series of working papers is designed to bring the research of the Centre for Tax System Integrity to as wide an audience as possible and to promote discussion among researchers, academics and practitioners both nationally and internationally on taxation compliance.

The working papers are selected with three criteria in mind: (1) to share knowledge, experience and preliminary findings from research projects; (2) to provide an outlet for policy focused research and discussion papers; and (3) to give ready access to previews of papers destined for publication in academic journals, edited collections, or research monographs.

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## Contents

Abstract ..... vii
Introduction ..... 1
Part 1: Survey Methodology ..... 2
Sampling method ..... 3
Distribution and follow-up of non-response ..... 4
Response rate ..... 6
Data processing ..... 7
Item non-response ..... 7
Possible confounding factor-Response time ..... 7
Sample representativeness ..... 8
Part 2: Preliminary Findings ..... 13
Section 1: A fair share of tax ..... 13
Section 2: Tax-funded benefits ..... 13
Section 3: Reducing tax ..... 17
Section 4: Your views on the Tax Office ..... 19
Section 5: Penalties and cases of tax evasion ..... 21
Views of a tax evader ..... 24
Shame management ..... 24
Social domination ..... 26
Section 6: Dealing with tax evasion ..... 27
Section 7: Your views on tax schemes ..... 29
Section 8: You and the tax system ..... 31
Section 9: Taxpaying behaviour ..... 33
Lodgment ..... 34
Tax minimisation ..... 34
Cash income ..... 35
Tax agents ..... 35
Section 10: Background information ..... 37
Part 3: Description of Codebook ..... 38
References ..... 38
Codebook ..... 43


#### Abstract

Between November 2002 and March 2003, researchers at the Centre for Tax System Integrity conducted a national tax survey of 4000 Australian taxpayers. Responses were obtained from a representative sample of 965 taxpayers. Specific issues of interest to the survey researchers were Australian taxpayers' perceptions of fairness and justice in the area of tax, the fairness of penalties and law enforcement processes, the emotions involved in such justice sentiments; and perceptions of tax evaders and alleged rule-breakers such as tax scheme investors. This report discusses the methodology of the survey process, a descriptive analysis of some of the more important findings from the survey, and a codebook that details the frequencies, means and standard deviations to each question of the survey.


# Preliminary findings from 'The what's fair and what's unfair survey about justice issues in the Australian tax context' 

Michael Wenzel, Kristina Murphy, Eliza Ahmed and Malcolm Mearns ${ }^{1}$

## INTRODUCTION

The Centre for Tax System Integrity is a research partnership between the Australian National University and the Australian Taxation Office (Tax Office). One of its main objectives is to advance our understanding of tax compliance and the processes involved towards the promotion of integrity in our tax system. The Centre applies various research methods, from in-depth interviews with taxpayers to experimental techniques and standardised surveys.

During 2000, Dr Valerie Braithwaite from the Centre for Tax System Integrity conducted a large-scale survey of the general population (see Braithwaite, Reinhart, Mearns \& Graham, 2001). The survey tapped into various tax-related issues and proved highly instructive to how Australian taxpayers viewed the Tax Office and our tax system. One of the major findings showed that justice and fairness are of major concern to Australian taxpayers (Wenzel, 2002; in press). Similarly, in a recent interview and survey project by Dr Kristina Murphy, perceptions of justice and fairness proved critical for people who invested in aggressive tax planning schemes (see Murphy, 2003; Murphy \& Byng, 2002a). These previous surveys further indicated that perceptions of injustice were related to certain forms of non-compliance, above and beyond concerns of how unfavourable taxpayers think the tax system is to them personally; that is, justice and fairness were not found to be mere rationalisations for one's pursuit of self-interest.

The previous research conducted by the Centre for Tax System Integrity, however, studied rather general perceptions of justice and fairness. Justice is in fact a multi-facetted phenomenon and requires much more in-depth and detailed research attention. 'The what's fair and what's unfair survey about justice issues in the Australian tax context' (Wenzel, Ahmed \& Murphy, 2002) - also known simply as the Justice Survey - was therefore

[^0]developed to investigate perceptions of justice in much more detail than what has ever been done before in the area of tax. The study investigated in more detail:

- perceptions of fairness and justice in the area of tax;
- more specifically, the fairness of penalties and law enforcement processes;
- emotions involved in such justice sentiments; and
- perceptions of tax evaders and alleged rule-breakers such as tax scheme investors.

This research will ultimately provide us with insights into the more specific concerns people have about justice and their relative importance for tax morality. This knowledge will also promise to be invaluable for developing measures and strategies to re-gain public support for the tax system and for promoting the integrity of the tax system.

Before proceeding any further, it may be worthwhile to first provide the reader with an outline of the structure this report is going to take. The report will be divided into three parts. Part 1 sets out to describe the methodology used to undertake the Justice Survey; specifically, the method of sampling, follow-up processes, response rates, sample representativeness, data processing, missing data, and possible confounding factors that may affect the data. Part 2 of the report then goes on to summarise some of the main findings from the survey. Finally, Part 3 will present a codebook of the findings which details the breakdown of responses to each question in the survey.

## PART 1: SURVEY METHODOLOGY

The Justice Survey was managed by Datacol Research Pty. Ltd. on behalf of researchers at the Centre for Tax System Integrity. Survey data were collected over a five month period between November 2002 to March 2003. Surveys were posted to home addresses and nonrespondents were followed up using a number of subsequent mailings between December and March. Completed and returned surveys were also sent by post using a reply-paid envelope. No incentives for completion were offered.

## Sampling method

The Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 specifies that rolls of electors will be kept and that they will be available for public inspection. This provides a convenient sampling frame for conducting surveys of the adult population. The rolls are available to the public in microfiche form. The public microfiche produced on 31 January 2002 was used as the sampling frame for the present research.

The Australian electoral rolls contain all people aged over 18 years who are Australian citizens or who are not Australian citizens but who were British subjects before 1984. The rolls exclude foreign citizens, prisoners serving terms of over five years, persons convicted of treason, Australians living overseas permanently, and persons of unsound mind. The rolls available to the public contain the full name and address of electors and their electorate but do not contain any other demographic information such as age, sex or occupation.

In January 2002, there were approximately 12.8 million enrolled voters on Australian electoral rolls. For the purposes of the present study, a random sample of 4000 electors was drawn using probability proportional to size sampling within each state and territory. For example, as can be seen in Table 1 over the page, $18.5 \%$ of all the people on the roll resided in Queensland. A total of 739 Queenslanders were therefore drawn at random for the purposes of the present study. The same method was used for all other states.

To generate the random sample within each state and territory the total enrolled electors were counted, allocated a unique number derived from their position on the microfiche, and then randomly sampled. Each selected position was then found on the microfiche and the name and address were entered into the survey management database.

Table 1: State distribution of voters and how the sample was drawn

|  | Population |  | Sampled |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| State | $\mathbf{N}$ | $\mathbf{\%}$ | $\mathbf{N}$ | $\mathbf{\%}$ |
| NSW | 4275333 | 33.2 | 1328 | 33.2 |
| VIC | 3276728 | 25.5 | 1018 | 25.5 |
| QLD | 2376989 | 18.5 | 739 | 18.5 |
| SA | 1052560 | 8.2 | 327 | 8.2 |
| WA | 1222031 | 9.5 | 380 | 9.5 |
| TAS | 333433 | 2.6 | 104 | 2.6 |
| ACT | 223177 | 1.7 | 69 | 1.7 |
| NT | 112979 | 0.8 | 35 | 0.8 |
| Total | 12873230 | 100.0 | 4000 | 100.0 |

## Distribution and follow-up of non-response

The survey process was modelled on the Dillman Total Design Method (Dillman, 1978), which involved following up non-respondents over a period of time (that is, sending out reminder letters). This method was used for previous Centre for Tax System Integrity surveys, as well as by a number of other major academic mail surveys conducted recently in Australia (for example, Bean, Gow \& McAllister, 1998; Kelly \& Evans, 1998).

The survey process first involved sending a pre-letter to each person in the sample on 11 October 2002. The pre-letter explained the intent of the study; specifically that the researchers from the Australian National University were interested in investigating the fairness and equity of the tax system in Australia. The pre-letter also guaranteed participants strict confidentiality of responses, and referred potential respondents to a 1800 free call number should they have any questions about the study. Respondents were also informed that they would be receiving a survey and a reply-paid envelope in the mail in the coming weeks. On the $1^{\text {st }}$ and $4^{\text {th }}$ of November 2002, 3832 potential respondents who had not opted out after receiving the pre-letter were sent the survey package. The survey package comprised a covering letter reminding the participants of the purpose of the study, the questionnaire and a reply-paid envelope. No date was nominated for the return of
questionnaires and survey recipients who agreed to participate were asked to return their completed questionnaires to the Australian National University in the reply-paid envelope ${ }^{2}$.

The follow-up of non-respondents after these first two mailings was accomplished using an ID number that was attached to each survey booklet, which was in turn linked to the sample name at Datacol. As each survey booklet was returned, the ID number was marked off by staff at Datacol. At the time of the next mailing any sample point not marked off was sent another survey reminder ${ }^{3}$.

For the follow up mail-outs the sample group was divided in half and a randomised trial was conducted to evaluate whether or not there would be an observable difference in the effectiveness of sending reminder letters versus reminder cards. Following an interval of 11 days from the mail-out of the initial survey ( 15 November 2002), 3407 taxpayers were sent a reminder card $(\mathrm{N}=1697)$ or reminder letter $(\mathrm{N}=1710)$ encouraging them to have their say and to respond as soon as possible.

Following a slow response, on the $4^{\text {th }}$ and $6^{\text {th }}$ of December 2002 a second reminder card or letter was posted to the remaining non-respondents. A second questionnaire was then posted to 2567 non-respondents on 17 December 2002. This mailing package again comprised a cover letter, a copy of the questionnaire and a reply-paid envelope. Two weeks later (30 December 2002), the remaining 2368 non-respondents were posted a final reminder card or letter. Given the length of time to complete the survey was estimated to be 1.5 hours, this process of following up non-respondents aimed to ensure a reasonable response rate for such a long survey. By 31 March 2003, a total of 965 completed surveys had been received. No difference was observed between the follow up by card or letter.

Throughout the survey administration period, the 1800 number was maintained by Datacol Research Pty Ltd to handle inquiries about the survey and to record the details of people who did not wish to or were incapable of participating. The most common reason for the

[^1]recipient of the survey to call the 1800 number was to explicitly refuse to participate in the survey. Other common reasons for not participating related to the recipient being incapable of completing the survey due to old age, illness or not being able to speak English. Respondents who telephoned the 1800 free call number indicating they had lost or misplaced their questionnaire were also sent another one.

## Response rate

As noted by Mearns and Braithwaite (2001, p. 5), 'response rate is typically related to the size of the questionnaire and to the mode of delivery'. Given the size of the Justice Survey, a mail-out survey was considered the cheapest and most effective option. After six mailings, the 28-page Justice Survey, containing 333 variables, achieved an unadjusted response rate of $24.1 \%$. When adjusted for out-of-scope taxpayers who had died, who had moved address, or who were otherwise incapable of completing the questionnaire, a response rate of $29.4 \%$ was obtained ${ }^{4}$. As can be seen in Table 2, approximately $17.9 \%$ of people sampled were deceased, incapable or did not reside at the address the survey was sent to, and $6.7 \%$ informed Datacol that they would not be completing the survey (that is, refusals).

Table 2: Number and percentage of responses to the Justice Survey, classified by type

| Class of response | Number | Unadjusted <br> percentage | Percentage <br> in scope |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Drawn sample | 4000 | 100.0 |  |
| Out-of-scope (return to sender, deceased, and | 716 | 17.9 |  |
| so on) | 3284 | 82.1 | 100.0 |
| In-scope | 268 | 6.7 | 8.2 |
| Explicit refusals | 965 | 24.1 | 29.4 |
| Completed survey |  |  |  |

[^2]
## Data processing

Questionnaires that were more than half completed were sent for data entry. Data entry was done manually by data processing operators at Datacol Research Pty Ltd and the data set was single-punched ${ }^{5}$. Following data entry, the quantitative data were examined closely by Datacol to ensure that there were no out-of-range values and that all variables and values were labelled. This cleaned data file was then passed on to researchers at the Centre for Tax System Integrity in May 2003 for rechecking and analysis.

## Item non-response

Item non-response or missing data in the Justice Survey has been quite low. For example, the missing data on the age and sex variables were $4.7 \%$ and $2.1 \%$ respectively. Typically, the percent missing on the attitudinal variables throughout the survey have been between $1 \%$ and $10 \%$, with the vast majority being under $3 \%$. As expected, the amount of missing data was higher in the tax behaviour questions. This has been the same finding in previous surveys conducted by the Centre for Tax System Integrity. Further, it should also be noted that $84.5 \%$ of respondents said they had never been fined or penalised by the Tax Office. Thus, they could not answer a subset of questions about the perceived fairness of the penalties they received.

## Possible confounding factor - Response time

From the time that respondents first received their surveys to the time that the final completed survey was returned to researchers at the Australian National University, a period of five months had elapsed. The question of whether early responders are different from late responders is therefore an interesting methodological question. If there are differences any future analysis of the data needs to take these differences into account. To explore this question, a regression analysis was performed using the date in which respondents returned their completed surveys as the variable of interest. In order to determine whether late respondents were different demographically from early responders,

[^3]several demographic variables were used to predict date of return; they were sex, age, level of education, work status, family income, personal income and marital status.

Table 3: Regression analysis to predict the date of return of completed survey

| Predictor | Regression coefficient (metric) | Standard error of coefficient | Standardised coefficient <br> ( $\beta$ ) | T | Sig T ${ }^{(a)}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Sex | 0.298 | 1.586 | 0.007 | 0.188 | 0.851 |
| Age | -0.184 | 0.058 | -0.126 | -3.158 | 0.002 |
| Level of education | -0.461 | 0.437 | -0.039 | -1.055 | 0.292 |
| Marital status | 0.937 | 1.070 | 0.032 | 0.876 | 0.381 |
| Work status | -0.947 | 0.511 | -0.074 | -1.853 | 0.064 |
| Family income | 0.036 | 0.023 | 0.075 | 1.551 | 0.121 |
| Personal income | -0.048 | 0.029 | -0.084 | -1.668 | 0.096 |
| (Constant) | 37.513 | 4.740 |  | 7.914 | 0.000 |
| R |  | 0.172 |  |  |  |
| $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ |  | 0.030 |  |  |  |
| Adjusted R ${ }^{2}$ |  | 0.021 |  |  |  |
| Standard error of estimate |  | 20.601 |  |  |  |
| $d f$ |  | 7, 842 |  |  |  |

As can be seen in Table 3, the only significant predictor of 'date of return' was the age of the respondent. Like in the other surveys conducted by the Centre for Tax System Integrity (Mearns \& Braithwaite, 2001; Murphy \& Byng, 2002b), younger respondents were more likely to return their surveys at a later date. Other than 'age of respondent', no additional variables in the regression analysis were significantly related to 'date of return', indicating that there were no substantial differences between early and late responders.

## Sample representativeness

One way of judging how representative a survey is of the general population is to compare the survey's demographic variables answered by respondents with population data. A set
of tables from the 2001 Australian Census - that included only persons aged 18 years and over - were obtained from the Australian Bureau of Statistics for this purpose. While it is acknowledged that some of the people who completed the 2001 Census may not have been registered to vote, their effect on distributions of variables of interest such as age, sex, education and state of residence were expected to be minimal and were therefore not of concern.

As can be seen in Table 4, the sample of taxpayers who responded to the Justice Survey differed significantly from the distribution of males and females in the Australian population. It was found that male respondents were over-represented and female respondents were under-represented in the Justice Survey.

Table 4: Distribution of males and females in the Justice Survey and 2001 Census

| Sample group | Sample <br> proportion | Census <br> proportion | Significantly <br> different |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Absolute <br> Difference |  |  |  |
| Male | 54.2 | 48.7 | Yes | 5.5 |
| Female | 45.8 | 51.3 | Yes | -5.5 |
| Total | $\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0}$ |  |  |
| 1 Y if |  |  |  |  |

1. Yes if Chi square $(\mathrm{df}=1)>3.841, \mathrm{p}<0.05$

When comparing the state distribution of returned surveys (that is, the sample) with the population figures, it was found that in general they did not differ significantly from each other (see Table 5). The exception was for NSW, where people from this state were underrepresented. All other states were represented appropriately.

Table 5: State distribution in the Justice Survey and 2001 Census

| Sample group | Sample <br> number | Sample <br> proportion | Census <br> proportion | Significantly <br> different $^{1}$ | Absolute <br> Difference |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| NSW | 280 | 30.1 | 33.6 | Yes | -3.5 |
| VIC | 252 | 27.1 | 24.7 | No | 2.4 |
| QLD | 164 | 17.6 | 19.0 | No | -1.4 |
| SA | 87 | 9.3 | 7.9 | No | 1.4 |
| WA | 97 | 10.4 | 9.6 | No | 0.8 |
| TAS | 26 | 2.8 | 2.5 | No | 0.3 |
| NT | 5 | 0.6 | 1.1 | No | -0.5 |
| ACT | 20 | 2.1 | 1.6 | No | 0.5 |
| Total | $\mathbf{9 3 1}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0}$ |  |  |

Note: The returns total excludes 34 cases for which the ID number had been removed and for which state of residence is unknown.

1. Yes if Chi square $(\mathrm{df}=1)>3.841, \mathrm{p}<0.05$.

When examining the age distribution of respondents, it can be seen in Table 6 that the Justice Survey tends to under-represent people younger than 40 years of age, tends to overrepresent those between the age of 40 and 65 , and tends to under-represents those over the age of 65 . These trends are not unexpected, however, as they are usually found in many Australian surveys (for example, see Mearns \& Braithwaite, 2001).

Table 6: Distribution of age groups in the Justice Survey and 2001 Census

| Sample group | Sample <br> proportion | Census <br> proportion | Significantly <br> different $^{1}$ | Absolute <br> Difference $^{\prime}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $18-24$ | 6.1 | 12.5 | Yes | -6.4 |
| $25-29$ | 4.8 | 9.4 | Yes | -4.6 |
| $30-34$ | 7.7 | 10.0 | Yes | -2.3 |
| $35-39$ | 7.3 | 10.1 | Yes | -2.8 |
| $40-44$ | 13.6 | 10.2 | Yes | 3.4 |
| $45-49$ | 14.1 | 9.4 | Yes | 4.7 |
| $50-54$ | 11.9 | 8.9 | Yes | 3.0 |
| $55-59$ | 11.7 | 6.9 | Yes | 4.8 |
| $60-64$ | 8.4 | 5.6 | Yes | 2.8 |
| Over 65 | 14.4 | 17.0 | Yes | -2.6 |
| Total | $\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0}$ |  |  |
| 1. Yes if Chi square $(\mathrm{df}=1)>3.841, \mathrm{p}<0.05$ |  |  |  |  |

On inspection of 2001 Census data (see Table 7), it can be seen that the proportion of people living in Australia who have completed some form of post-secondary education is $42.8 \%$. The Justice Survey has therefore tended to over-represent this figure, with $52.5 \%$ of survey respondents indicating they have a post-secondary (that is, greater than Year 12) qualification. This finding is again consistent with the finding of many other Australian surveys and lends support to the view that mail surveys are more likely to be completed by those with greater levels of education.

Table 7: Distribution of educational level in the Justice Survey and 2001 Census

| Sample group | Sample <br> proportion | Census <br> proportion | Significantly <br> different $^{\mathbf{1}}$ | Absolute <br> Difference |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| No post-secondary education | 47.5 | 57.2 | Yes | -9.7 |
| Post-secondary education | 52.5 | 42.8 | Yes | 9.7 |
| Total | $\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0}$ |  |  |

1. Yes if Chi square $(\mathrm{df}=1)>3.841, \mathrm{p}<0.05$

In terms of the employment status of Justice Survey respondents, it can be seen in Table 8 that the survey tends to over-represent those in full-time employment and tends to underrepresent those in part-time employment. Those who were unemployed were correctly represented.

Table 8: Distribution of employment status in the Justice Survey and 2001 Census

| Sample group | Sample <br> proportion | Census <br> proportion | Significantly <br> different ${ }^{1}$ | Absolute <br> Difference |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Working full-time | 67.6 | 63.1 | Yes | 4.5 |
| Working part-time | 25.8 | 29.6 | Yes | -3.8 |
| Unemployed | 6.6 | 7.3 | No | -0.7 |
| Total | $\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0}$ |  |  |
| 1. Yes if Chi square $(\mathrm{df}=1)>3.841, \mathrm{p}<0.05$ |  |  |  |  |

Finally, Table 9 shows that the Justice Survey correctly represented non-indigenous Australians as well as those from an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander background.

Table 9: Distribution of indigenous status in the Justice Survey and 2001 Census

| Sample group | Sample <br> proportion | Census <br> proportion | Significantly <br> different $^{1}$ | Absolute <br> Difference |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander | 1.2 | 1.6 | No | -0.4 |
| Non-indigenous | 98.8 | 98.4 | No | 0.4 |
| Total | $\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0}$ |  |  |

1. Yes if Chi square $(\mathrm{df}=1)>3.841, \mathrm{p}<0.05$

So while the figures presented in Tables 4 to 9 above suggest that there are some significant differences between the Justice Survey sample and the Australian population, departures from the 2001 Census distributions are relatively small in all cases. For example, the largest departure from Census data can be found in the educational status of Justice Survey respondents (an absolute difference of 9.7\%). These relatively minor differences are unlikely to do much harm when conducting multivariate statistics and are therefore not considered to be a significant problem. As discussed by Mearns and

Braithwaite (2001, p. 10), if population estimates are required, statistical weighting techniques 'can be employed to adjust for over- and under- representations of groups'.

## PART 2: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS

The Justice Survey consisted of ten different sections, each designed to measure different aspects of taxpayers' attitudes and opinions towards the Tax Office and Australia's tax system. This section of the report highlights some of the more important findings from each of these sections. It should be noted that the data obtained from the one open-ended question presented at the back of the survey will not be analysed in the present report ${ }^{6}$. It should also be noted that the results presented in this report are preliminary and in descriptive form only and have not taken into account any of the biases between the sample and population data. In-depth analyses of the results will commence in the near future for those who are interested in a more detailed discussion of the findings.

## Section 1: A fair share of tax

One of the first questions that comes to people's mind when they think about the fairness of a tax system concerns the fairness of tax burdens and the relative contributions they and various taxpayer groups are asked to make to the revenue. Here, as with most other questions of fairness in the tax arena, we can distinguish between an individual, group and system level of fairness perception (Wenzel, 2003; in press). In other words, how fair is the perceived tax burden for the individual, for relevant groups and social categories which they are part of, and across the whole system?

Results from Section 1 of the Justice Survey show that $61.9 \%$ of respondents thought they personally were asked to pay an unfairly high amount of tax (that is, their response was beyond the 'fair' midpoint of the scale). This figure dropped to $43.4 \%$ and $37.1 \%$, respectively, when they more specifically compared their own tax burden to that of other people of the same income level or of the same occupational group. Thus, there was a somewhat lower level of perceived 'horizontal unfairness' (Kinsey, Grasmick \& Smith,
1991); that is, unfairness in comparison with others of similar societal groups. In contrast, when asked generally about people of their income level or their occupational group, then the figures were up again to $58.4 \%$ and $56.9 \%$ who thought the tax burdens of these two groups were unfairly high. There was a strong perception that the tax burden for their societal ingroups overall were rather unfair compared to other groups.

In another set of questions (Section 1.6), it was established which societal groups were considered unfairly burdened by tax and which ones were relatively advantaged. Table 10 shows a clear poor-rich divide; that is, the perception of 'vertical unfairness' (Kinsey et al., 1991). CEOs, company managers, judges and barristers, and doctors were perceived to pay less than their fair share, while small business owners, trades people, farm labourers and factory workers were considered to pay more than their fair share of tax.

Table 10: Mean levels of perceived fairness of tax burdens for different groups ( $1=$ much less than fair share, $4=$ fair share, $7=$ much more than fair share)

| Societal group | Valid N | Mean | Std. Deviation |
| :--- | :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Chief executives of large corporations | 952 | 2.35 | 1.63 |
| Owners-managers of large companies | 951 | 2.68 | 1.54 |
| Senior judges and barristers | 938 | 2.73 | 1.50 |
| Doctors in general practice (GPs) | 940 | 3.53 | 1.44 |
| Small business owners | 949 | 4.42 | 1.47 |
| Trades people | 945 | 4.45 | 1.37 |
| Farm labourers | 943 | 4.89 | 1.32 |
| Unskilled factory workers | 948 | 4.99 | 1.25 |

Consistent with this is the further finding that, while $77.8 \%$ of respondents thought that taxes in Australia are generally too high, the tax-free income threshold of $\$ 6000$ tended to be considered too low by $58.0 \%$ of respondents.

[^4]For a further set of questions, respondents were reminded of the marginal tax rates for the (then) four brackets of taxable income (see Table 11); $68.7 \%$ of respondents indicated that they considered these tax rates rather unfair (that is, ratings lower than scale midpoint). They were then asked which tax rates they would find fair for the same income brackets. The results show a preference, overall, for lower tax rates, but also for clear progressivity in tax rates. The greatest reduction for tax rates was suggested for the middle-income levels.

Table 11: Suggested tax rates

| Tax brackets | Actual rates | Suggested rates <br> Median |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Between $\$ 6000$ and $\$ 20000$ | $17 \%$ | $10 \%$ | $10.84 \%$ |
| Between $\$ 20000$ and $\$ 50000$ | $30 \%$ | $20 \%$ | $20.76 \%$ |
| Between $\$ 50000$ and \$60 000 | $42 \%$ | $30 \%$ | $30.20 \%$ |
| Over \$60 000 | $47 \%$ | $40 \%$ | $38.29 \%$ |

However, it should be noted that respondents seemed to have used easily accessible figures ( $10,20,30,40 \%$ ) and it is unclear how much thought they put into their responses. To check for this, the question was basically rephrased in terms of average tax rates. Respondents were given the (then) current average tax rates and the tax payable in dollars for four levels of income; $62.4 \%$ of respondents found these tax rates unfair (that is, ratings lower than scale midpoint). They were then asked to suggest what amounts of payable tax would be fair for these four income levels (see Table 12). Again, the suggested tax payable was overall lower than the actual tax payable, but still maintained clear progressivity. Moreover, there seemed to be again a preference for even numbers (when we translate the dollar figures into average tax rates we receive 10, 15, 20 and $25 \%$ ).

To compare these responses with the earlier question, we can translate the suggested tax payable into marginal tax rates for the earlier tax brackets (see Table 12). This results in $14.3 \%$ for income between $\$ 6000$ and $\$ 20000,20.0 \%$ for income between $\$ 20000$ and $\$ 50000$, and $40 \%$ for income over $\$ 50000$. For low income levels, the implied tax rate is
thus somewhat higher than the former, explicit suggestion of $10 \%$. The implied tax rates for the middle and high income brackets are fairly consistent with the explicit suggestion, except for the implied highest tax rate being applied at a lower level (that is, the third highest income bracket, beginning with $\$ 50000$ ).

Table 12: Suggested tax payable at four income levels

| Income | Actual tax payable | Suggested rates <br> Median |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\$ 20000$ | $\$ 2380(12 \%)$ | $\$ 2000(10 \%)$ | $\$ 1778$ |
| $\$ 40000$ | $\$ 8380(21 \%)$ | $\$ 6000(15 \%)$ | $\$ 6260$ |
| $\$ 60000$ | $\$ 15580(26 \%)$ | $\$ 12000(20 \%)$ | $\$ 12648$ |
| $\$ 80000$ | $\$ 24980(31 \%)$ | $\$ 20000(25 \%)$ | $\$ 21414$ |

## Section 2: Tax-funded benefits

A second issue of fairness in the tax system concerns the perception of whether people get a fair deal for their taxes in terms of tax-funded government services and public goods. Section 2 of the Justice Survey was therefore designed to measure respondents' satisfaction with the tax system. For example, in Section 2.7 respondents were asked about where in government spending they would like to see greater or less expenditure. As can be seen in Table 13, it was found that respondents were most likely to want to see greater expenditure in the areas of education ( $81 \%$ said they wanted more spent), healthcare (83.3\%), infrastructure ( $64.3 \%$ ), policing ( $62.5 \%$ ), and industry development ( $55.5 \%$ ). Fewer than half the sample wanted to see more money spent on defence ( $50 \%$ ), preventing illegal immigration (47.2\%), employment (42\%), welfare (34.5\%) or the arts (11.1\%). In fact, it was found that $57.2 \%$ of respondents said they wanted less money spent on the arts, and $36.5 \%$ said they wanted less spent on welfare.

Table 13: Percentage of respondents who believed more, less or the same amount of tax dollars should be spent in the following areas

| Area of Spending | Percentage of Respondents |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Less should <br> be spent | Keep spending <br> as it is | More should <br> be spent |
| Education | 3.2 | 15.8 | 81.0 |
| Defence | 19.4 | 30.7 | 50.0 |
| Health care | 3.9 | 12.8 | 83.3 |
| Infrastructure (roads, transport) | 5.5 | 30.1 | 64.3 |
| Policing | 7.7 | 29.9 | 62.5 |
| Preventing illegal immigration | 22.0 | 30.8 | 47.2 |
| Welfare | 36.5 | 29.1 | 34.5 |
| Employment | 19.8 | 38.1 | 42.0 |
| The arts (film, music, dance) | 57.2 | 31.7 | 11.1 |
| Industry development | 11.8 | 32.7 | 55.5 |

Survey respondents were also asked relative to the tax they paid, whether the tax-funded benefits they received were beneficial to them personally or to their occupational groups, or whether they were instead more beneficial to other groups. It was found that $75.2 \%$ of respondents did not feel they personally benefited from the tax dollars they contributed, and $71.6 \%$ believed their occupational groups did not get their tax dollars worth of public services or government benefits (that is, ratings below the scale midpoint). Instead, respondents felt that the tax they and their occupational groups paid, mainly benefited other people and groups ( $66.6 \%$ and $65.5 \%$ believed this respectively).

## Section 3: Reducing tax

While official tax rates as discussed in Section 1 above say something about tax burdens across groups and social strata of taxpayers, these rates may only exist on paper, as taxpayers have opportunities to reduce their taxable incomes through more or less aggressive strategies of tax minimisation. Differential access to options of tax minimisation may therefore impact on effective tax burdens and raise another issue of tax fairness
(Wenzel, 2003). This issue can be considered again at the three levels of justice, namely the fairness of the position of the individual, fairness for the group to which the respondent belongs, and fairness across various societal groups. Table 14 gives the mean levels of fairness in terms of opportunities to legally reduce tax for a variety of societal groups, the occupation group of the respondent and the respondent personally.

Table 14: Mean levels of perceived fairness of opportunities to legally reduce tax ( $1=$ much too few, $4=$ fair, $7=$ much too many)

| Target | Valid N | Mean | Std. Deviation |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Chief executives of large corporations | 949 | 6.13 | 1.20 |
| Owner-managers of large companies | 952 | 5.78 | 1.30 |
| Senior judges and barristers | 941 | 5.71 | 1.26 |
| Doctors in general practice (GPs) | 935 | 4.78 | 1.33 |
| Small business owners | 950 | 3.88 | 1.52 |
| Trades people | 950 | 3.61 | 1.51 |
| Respondent's own occupational group | 944 | 2.90 | 1.29 |
| Respondent personally | 954 | 2.81 | 1.35 |
| Farm labourers | 945 | 2.66 | 1.32 |
| Unskilled factory workers | 952 | 2.45 | 1.22 |

Mirroring the results for tax burdens presented in Section 1, the data in Table 14 above show that wealthy people were considered to have too many opportunities to reduce their taxes. However, the self-employed and cash-in-hand taxpayers now appear to clearly constitute a middle group that was perceived to have a fair amount of opportunities to reduce tax, while again ordinary or less educated wage and salary earners were considered disadvantaged in that they had few opportunities to reduce their tax. Respondents tended to count themselves personally, and their occupational group, in that group of the disadvantaged.

## Section 4: Your views on the Tax Office

Next to issues of distributive fairness (that is, the material fairness of outcomes) of the previous sections, procedural fairness may also be of importance to taxpayers and their willingness to comply with the tax system (Murphy, 2003; Stalans \& Lind, 1997; Wenzel, 2002). Perceptions of procedural fairness of the Tax Office include questions such as:

- whether the tax authority treats taxpayers with respect (respect);
- how much say the tax authority gives taxpayers (voice); and
- how well the tax authority explains its decisions and decision-making processes to taxpayers (information).

Another procedural justice issue concerns the complexity of the tax system and how costly the procedures are for taxpayers to comply (thus, there are also distributive implications in terms of compliance costs). In Section 4 of the Justice Survey, we attempted to address these issues again systematically from the perspectives of the individual, the respondent's (occupational) group, and taxpayers generally. To simplify the data for this overview, items from section 4.1 were combined (averaged) to form various scales according to apriori considerations ${ }^{7}$. Table 15 shows the mean endorsement of the various procedural justice aspects from the three perspectives; individual, group and society (all taxpayers). However, these means need to be interpreted with caution, as the concepts were measured by different items that are not strictly comparable.

It appears from this analysis that, generally, the ratings for the Tax Office in terms of its procedural fairness are fairly low. All aspects, except respect toward the individual, are significantly below the scale midpoint (4). Respect, in fact, received the best marks of all the procedural justice aspects, while complexity/costliness got the worst ratings, and voice ratings were in-between. Ratings for informational justice (that is, thorough explanations and justifications for the Tax Office's actions and decisions) vary to the greatest degree between the three targets; they were considered relatively more positive for the respondent's group and more negative for society as a whole. Indeed, another remarkable

[^5]result is that the procedural justice ratings are generally lowest for taxpayers at the societal level, rather than for respondents personally or their own interest groups.

Table 15: Mean levels of perceived procedural fairness ( 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree)

| Procedural justice aspect | $\mathbf{N}$ | Mean | Std. Deviation |
| :--- | ---: | :--- | :---: |
| Respect - individual | 956 | 4.07 | 1.22 |
| Respect - group | 942 | 3.88 | 1.13 |
| Information - group | 948 | 3.79 | 1.05 |
| Voice - group | 948 | 3.76 | 1.09 |
| Respect - society | 956 | 3.71 | 1.21 |
| Information - individual | 951 | 3.67 | 1.21 |
| Voice - individual | 953 | 3.62 | 1.12 |
| Voice - society | 959 | 3.39 | 1.14 |
| Complexity - group | 944 | 3.34 | 1.44 |
| Information - society | 954 | 3.34 | 1.14 |
| Complexity - individual | 952 | 3.33 | 1.43 |
| Complexity - society | 957 | 2.73 | 1.27 |

Another set of questions in Section 4.3 of the Justice Survey addressed respondents' personal experiences with the Tax Office more explicitly. They asked respondents to rate their encounters with the Tax Office and the quality of its service on a scale from 1 (very negative) to 7 (very positive). It was found that between $31.4 \%$ (correctness of information received) and $73 \%$ of respondents (face-to-face contacts with Tax Officers) indicated that they had no experience with the respective service.

Of those who did have relevant personal experience, however, they rated the eight aspects of Tax Office service quality on average as neutral to slightly positive. The exception was for call centre waiting times, which received rather negative marks (see Table 16). The Tax Office website received the most positive ratings (of the $33.7 \%$ of respondents who had experience with it). Against much anecdotal wisdom, the correctness of information was
also rated rather positively. Likewise, client service and face-to-face contacts were considered rather positively. Call centre advice and letters from the Tax Office were considered to be rather average.

Table 16: Mean ratings of personally experienced service quality (1 = negative, 7 = positive)

| Service aspect | $\mathbf{N}$ | Mean | Std. Deviation |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Tax Office website | 312 | $4.50^{* * *}$ | 1.59 |
| Correctness of information received | 641 | $4.45^{* * *}$ | 1.58 |
| Tax Office client service | 467 | $4.44^{* * *}$ | 1.68 |
| Face-to-face contacts with Tax Office officers | 252 | $4.35^{* *}$ | 1.78 |
| Access to information | 584 | $4.16^{* *}$ | 1.60 |
| Call centre advice | 505 | 4.11 | 1.70 |
| Letters from the Tax Office | 589 | 4.07 | 1.57 |
| Call centre waiting times | 509 | $3.13^{* * *}$ | 1.66 |

${ }_{* * * *}$ Note: Starred means differ significantly from the midpoint of the scale (4) at ${ }^{*} p<0.05,{ }^{* *} p<0.01$, and ${ }^{* * *} p<0.001$.

## Section 5: Penalties and cases of tax evasion

A further category of fairness issue pertains to the use of penalties and other measures against rule violations; their appropriateness, severity and consistency. In Section 5 of the Justice Survey, we first asked respondents whether the Tax Office had ever penalised them. Of the 150 participants who responded 'Yes', $31.3 \%$ said they found the penalty absolutely unfair, and the ratings of $61.3 \%$ of respondents fell below the midpoint of the scale (ranging from unfair to fair). The underlying concern for this view is not clear-cut. Perceived severity of the penalty seems to be part of the problem, as $63.7 \%$ tended to regard the penalty as too severe ( $18.8 \%$ found the penalty clearly unduly severe); however, $30.9 \%$ of respondents found the severity of the penalty fair. Likewise, $29.7 \%$ thought the reasons for the penalty were totally clear (and a majority of $57.4 \%$ tended to perceive the reasons as clear), but there were also around $34 \%$ of respondents who tended to regard the reasons as unclear. Further, $32 \%$ of respondents claimed the Tax Office did not attempt to explain in plain English their decision to penalise them; and $25.8 \%$ claimed it took the Tax

Office too long to make that decision. A considerable $34.9 \%$ said they challenged the Tax Office's decision (even though it is not clear what their challenge involved). Interestingly, the act of challenging the Tax Office's penalty decision was positively correlated with the perceived unfairness of the penalty ( $r=0.30, p<0.000$ ), however not so with any of the more specific concerns (severity, explanation, delay).

Respondents were also asked to rate the perceived severity of penalties usually imposed on their occupational group and other societal groups (Section 5.3). Interestingly, and different from the earlier discussion of perceived tax burdens, the severity of penalties was considered less unfair for respondents' occupational group as a whole ( $37.8 \%$ tended to regard penalties as too severe). This remains true when we focus only on respondents who had experienced a penalty themselves, of whom $54 \%$ tended to regard the group's penalties as too severe (compared to $63.3 \%$ for their own personal penalty). Also, the vertical unfairness of penalties is somewhat less clear-cut than for tax burdens, as can be seen in Table 17 (however, note that societal group is here confounded with the tax offence with which it is typically related). Even though large corporations and company directors were perceived to get away with too soft penalties for their profit-shifting or underreporting of bonus payments, penalties for welfare recipients who underdeclare their government payments were also considered too mild.

Table 17: Mean levels of perceived fairness of penalties for different societal groups and offences ( $1=$ unduly mild, $4=$ fair, $7=$ unduly severe)

| Target | N | Mean | Std. Deviation |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Large corporation shifting profits abroad | 912 | 2.35 | 1.59 |
| Company director underreporting bonus payments | 908 | 2.60 | 1.57 |
| Welfare recipient underdeclaring government payments | 910 | 3.47 | 1.72 |
| Business owner holding back payment of tax debts | 897 | 3.67 | 1.40 |
| Academic exaggerating deduction claims | 897 | 3.77 | 1.22 |
| Tradesperson underreporting cash earnings | 903 | 3.96 | 1.26 |
| Retiree underdeclaring investment income | 907 | 4.31 | 1.41 |
| Student part-time worker failing to lodge tax return | 909 | 4.33 | 1.43 |

As to the question of how a company director who manipulated the company's books to reduce tax illegally should be punished (Section 5.4), a majority found a monetary fine appropriate ( $59.6 \%$ very appropriate). While recommendations for and against prison sentence were quite evenly spread ( $22.8 \%$ very appropriate, $20.4 \%$ not appropriate at all) and the same was true for a compulsory education program ( $24 \%$ and $24.9 \%$, respectively) - there was some endorsement of community service ( $30.8 \%$ very appropriate). The single most frequently suggested monetary fine (modal response) was $\$ 200000$, which matched the value of the offence (this fine was supposed to be in addition to the back-payment of the tax). The median suggested fine was $\$ 120000$ (about $50 \%$ of responses were lower and about $50 \%$ were higher). The modal and median suggested prison penalty was six months.

If we compare these findings with the hypothetical case of a tradesperson making deals with customers to be paid in cash (Section 5.6), so as to not declare the profits for tax purposes, there was a similar preference for a monetary fine ( $44.7 \%$ of respondents indicated this would be very appropriate). There was obviously greater opposition to a prison fine ( $46.8 \%$ responding not appropriate at all) than in the previous case, while there was some acceptance of community service and compulsory education programs ( $24.4 \%$ and $24.5 \%$, respectively). Similar to the case of the company director, the modal suggested fine was $\$ 10000$ (equivalent to the value of the offence), while the median suggested fine
was half of that, $\$ 5000$. The modal and median suggested prison sentence, if it came to that, was one month.

## Views of a tax evader

Section 5.7 of the Justice Survey measured taxpayers' psychological reactions to a repeated case of tax evasion; the case where the tradesperson was working for cash payments and was subsequently penalised for their tax evasion (Section 5.6). In particular, 12 items in this section assessed taxpayers' judgments as well as their feelings about the evasion, the evader and the fact that the evader was given a penalty. The items were based on previous works that have been done in Australia (Feather, 1998; 1999) for offences committed by drug smugglers, police and public citizens. It was found that most taxpayers were opposed to the view that the Tax Office was to blame for the evader's receiving the penalty (71\%), and that the evader should be excused from the penalty ( $80 \%$ ). Not surprisingly, therefore, most survey respondents favoured the penalty imposed upon the evader. For example,

- $59 \%$ supported that the evasion was a serious offence;
- $66 \%$ approved of the evader receiving the penalty;
- $74 \%$ supported that the evader should accept personal responsibility for receiving the penalty;
- $73 \%$ viewed that the evader knew the probable consequences of the evasion; and
- $15 \%$ did not feel angry about the fact that the evader received the penalty.


## Shame management

Section 5.8 of the survey assessed respondents' use of different shame management strategies in the taxation context. Shame management refers to the strategies one uses to deal with shame feelings following a wrong-doing. There are adaptive and maladaptive ways of managing shame. If we acknowledge shame over a wrong-doing through taking responsibility and making amends, it is adaptive. If we fail to acknowledge shame and deny it instead, it is maladaptive. Shame displacement and shame avoidance are both maladaptive strategies to handle shame. These three shame management strategies were measured through 12 questions in Section 5.8 (qq. 1 to 12). The questions were based on

Ahmed's original work (2001) with an extension of the concept of shame avoidance (see Ahmed, in preparation; Ahmed \& Braithwaite, forthcoming).

In order to measure these shame management strategies, taxpayers were asked to imagine that they themselves had been caught and heavily penalised for a repeated case of tax evasion. They were then presented with 12 shame-related reactions which they rated in terms of their relevance to them using seven categories from 1 (not likely) to 7 (very likely). Based on previous works, three separate scales were constructed from these questions:

1. Shame acknowledgement: This scale represents adaptive shame management whereby a person acknowledges wrong-doing, takes responsibility for the wrongdoing, and seeks to make amends (six items: qq. 1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 11).
2. Shame displacement: This scale represents a shame management strategy which indicates an inability to manage shame adaptively: without blaming and hitting out at others (four items: qq. 5, 6, 8, 9).
3. Shame avoidance: This scale also represents a maladaptive shame management strategy whereby the wrong-doer expresses rejection of a decision imposed by an authority (two items: qq. 7 and 12).

Table 18 presents the key descriptive findings of these three shame management scales. It is encouraging to know that most people were likely to acknowledge shame and were unlikely to avoid shame after having received a penalty for their tax evasion. It is of note that both shame displacement and shame avoidance were maladaptive strategies but shame avoidance had a lower mean $(M=2.52)$ compared to shame displacement $(M=3.20)$. The explanation lies in the shame management theory itself. According to the theory, shame avoidance is an intense form of maladaptive shame management, which is different from shame displacement in the following way: shame displacement represents projecting blame onto the authority whereas shame avoidance represents a reaction of dismissiveness to the legal breach and to the authority. Therefore, shame avoidance seems to be a more crucial risk factor for dissociation from the tax system. From the result, it is reassuring that taxpayers opt to use the shame avoidance strategy less often than the strategy of shame displacement. Factors that contribute to shame acknowledgement, shame displacement,
and shame avoidance, and the role these shame management strategies play in tax evasion will be discussed in future working papers.

Table 18: Mean ratings of shame management scales

| Shame management strategies | N | Mean | SD |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Shame Acknowledgement | 938 | 5.20 | 1.52 |
| Shame Displacement | 938 | 3.20 | 1.48 |
| Shame Avoidance | 934 | 2.52 | 1.46 |

Note: Scores on a 1 (not likely to feel this way) to 7 (very likely to feel this way) scale

## Social domination

The next set of questions in Section 5.8 (qq. 13 to 18) was designed to assess taxpayers' social domination strategy (Ahmed \& Braithwaite, 2003) in reaction to being penalised for an act of repeated tax evasion. The social domination strategy in this context is understood as an attempt to retrieve one's wounded self following being penalised by the Tax Office. If sanctions from the Tax Office threaten evaders' sense of self, they may perceive others (for example, the Tax Office) antagonistically, and devalue them as a way to achieve their respect and admiration. In this survey, it is hypothesised that when penalised for tax evasion, compliance is an unlikely outcome if people's self is threatened, especially if a maladaptive reaction results from this.

Taxpayers were presented with 6 questions (a sample item: Feel that only you should be in control of your personal finances and taxation), and responses were made on a 7-point scale from 1 (not likely) to 7 (very likely). To construct the measure of social domination, items were averaged. Surprisingly, it was found that the measure had a mean only slightly below the average point on the scale $(M=3.21 ; S D=1.35 ; N=937)$, indicating that behaving in accordance with the social domination strategy in the taxation context was not thought to be that socially undesirable.

## Section 6: Dealing with tax evasion

The issue of how to deal with tax evasion was then also more broadly conceived in Section 6 of the Justice Survey. For example, in Section 6.1, a number of questions were asked that concerned the primary purpose of penalties and other responses to tax evasion. Among potential regulatory goals we tried to capture two possible views about the restitution of justice, namely whether justice was served when the offender was punished, or whether justice required that the offender understood the wrong-doing and endorsed the values of the tax system (each notion was measured by three items and scores were averaged across items). Interestingly, when combining responses to three punitive justice questions (qq. 6, 8 and 11) it was found that punishment per se was apparently not sufficient ( $M=4.65$; scores on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale); what respondents rather sought was the offender's acceptance of responsibility, moral learning and endorsement of relevant values $(M=5.34)$, which was measured through combining the responses given to the three respective questions (qq. 2, 4, and 10).

Section 6.2 of the survey was also designed to get information on what kinds of policy interventions taxpayers preferred to control tax evasion. While some items in this section were adapted from the Life at School Survey (Ahmed, 1996; http://crj.anu.edu.au/school.html), others were newly developed. Taxpayers were presented with a list of strategies (for example, through education and persuasion, dialogue, incentives, shaming, enforcement) that can be undertaken to deal with tax evasion, and were asked to indicate how strongly they agreed or disagreed with each for dealing with tax evasion.

The percentage of taxpayers who agreed or strongly agreed with each option is given in Table 19. As can be seen, $78 \%$ of the taxpayers equally favoured two strategies to control tax evasion. These are: (1) Through discussions first, and then stricter enforcement of rules if the tax evasion problem is not resolved; and (2) Through ensuring that evaders become more competent in dealing with their taxes legally. Among other strategies, they favoured a dialogic approach (through discussions involving Tax Office personnel, taxpayers and tax agents to sort out problems; 71\%) over a punitive approach (through enforcing strict
rules and disciplining the guilty; 63\%) leaving the incentive approach (providing incentives for paying the correct amount of tax; $68 \%$ ) in between. Interestingly, $50 \%$ of taxpayers favoured shaming through exposing people who cheat the tax system (for example, publishing names of tax evaders in the Tax Office's annual report).

Table 19: Respondents' views on the desirability of strategies to control tax evasion

| Strategies to control tax evasion | N | Percentage <br> who agreed |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Through discussions first, and then stricter enforcement of <br> rules if the tax evasion problem is not resolved | 944 | $78 \%$ |
| Through ensuring that evaders become more competent in <br> dealing with their taxes legally | 939 | $78 \%$ |
| Through discussions involving Tax Office personnel, taxpayers <br> and tax agents to sort out problems | 944 | $71 \%$ |
| Through providing incentives for paying the correct amount of <br> tax | 940 | $68 \%$ |
| Through informing and encouraging taxpayers to comply <br> voluntarily | 941 | $66 \%$ |
| Through enforcing strict rules and disciplining the guilty <br> Through exposing people who cheat the tax system (for <br> example, publishing names of tax evaders in the annual report) | 943 | 642 |
| Through increasing connections between the evaders and <br> community members | 925 | $50 \%$ |

In Section 6.3, six items were posed to measure the degree to which taxpayers prioritised needs and feelings of tax evaders in order to reduce tax evasion. These items differ from those of the previous section in an important way. In Section 6.2, the focus was on the extent to which taxpayers supported dialogic as opposed to punitive approaches to deal with the problem of tax evasion. In Section 6.3, taxpayers were asked to indicate how effective they considered each statement to be for reducing tax evasion. Two of the more important findings from this section revealed that the majority of taxpayers wanted evaders to receive a thorough $(66 \%)$ and honest ( $69 \%$ ) explanation for the Tax Office's decision.

Questions presented in Section 6.4 of the survey were designed to capture taxpayers' perceptions about whether tax evaders' deserve respectful treatment, deserve learning opportunities about tax obligations, deserve to be treated with dignity and so on. It was found that $80 \%$ of respondents agreed that tax evaders deserve to be given the opportunity to learn about their tax obligations, $62 \%$ supported the idea that tax evaders deserve to have their rights respected, and $53 \%$ wanted evaders to be treated with dignity. Less than half of the sample supported the idea that consideration should be given to tax evaders' personal needs and well-being (47\%), respectful treatment (43\%), or personal feelings (37\%).

Finally, Section 6.5 of the Justice Survey presented taxpayers with a range of questions designed to assess their more general attitudes toward taxpaying behaviour and tax evasion. It is reassuring to find that $87 \%$ of respondents felt disappointed that some people did not pay their correct amount of tax, and that $72 \%$ acknowledged the harmful consequences of not paying tax for governing the country. Survey respondents were also asked about their duty as a citizen. It was found that $67 \%$ of taxpayers viewed that not paying the correct amount of taxes was a violation of one's duty as a citizen, and $76 \%$ favoured the view that they should comply with the tax system because it was the law. Interestingly, $62 \%$ believed that tax evaders were to blame for their tax evasion. Findings from other statements confirmed that $23 \%$ of the taxpayers blamed the Tax Office for peoples' tax evasion, $12 \%$ were not concerned about whether paying tax benefited the country, and only $10 \%$ perceived that citizens had the right to choose not to comply with the tax system.

## Section 7: Your views on tax schemes

In 1998 action was taken by the Tax Office against tens of thousands of Australian taxpayers who had invested in mass-marketed tax schemes during the 1990s. The Tax Office claims that investors became involved in tax schemes for the dominant purpose of avoiding tax, and because of that the anti-avoidance provisions of Part IVA of the Australian Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 applied. The Tax Office moved to disallow scheme related tax deductions that had been claimed up to six years earlier. Scheme
investors, however, claim that the schemes they invested in had been sold to them, sometimes by their accountants or financial planners, as a means by which they could legally minimise the tax they were required to pay while still being involved in a viable long-term investment (see Murphy, 2003). Since investors believed they had done nothing wrong, the majority initially defied the Tax Office's demands that they pay back scheme related tax debts.

Section 7 of the Justice Survey was designed in order to get the public's view towards the schemes situation; specifically, whether they thought the Tax Office's decision to penalise scheme investors was fair and just. For example, in Section 7.3, it was found that $59.5 \%$ of the general population felt the Tax Office's decision to pursue investors up to six years after they invested in schemes was rather unfair (that is, response below the scale midpoint), while $14.9 \%$ had no opinion, and $25.6 \%$ thought it fair. Further, $67 \%$ of respondents felt that the Tax Office should have only penalised investors who got involved in schemes after 1998. In addition, it was found that $72.3 \%$ of Justice Survey respondents believed that investors should not be punished if they were advised by their tax agents to invest in schemes. Instead, they believed that the tax agents who advised their clients to invest in schemes, as well as the promoters of tax schemes, should be held accountable for getting taxpayers into tax schemes; $64.2 \%$ felt tax agents should have been fined and $74 \%$ believed the promoters should have been fined.

It was also explained to survey respondents in Section 7.4 that scheme investors had successfully lobbied the government to abolish the penalty and interest component owed on their scheme related tax debts. In February 2002, the Tax Office announced that for investors who had been the victims of aggressive marketing and bad advice, the penalty and interest component of their scheme related tax debt would not have to be paid. However, this was contingent on taxpayers entering into an arrangement with the Tax Office to settle their outstanding scheme-related tax debt. Justice Survey respondents were asked their views of the Tax Office's decision to waive penalties in this situation. It was found that the majority of respondents ( $59.2 \%$ ) believed that the Tax Office's decision to waive interest and penalties was right, with only $29.4 \%$ believing the Tax Office should have stood its ground. Further, only $26.5 \%$ believed the decision would make the Tax

Office look weak. It should be noted, however, that the majority of respondents (59.9\%) did indicate that the decision would have made them feel angry if they had had a different tax debt for which interest and penalties still had to be paid. They also believed that the Tax Office's decision to waive interest and penalties for scheme related tax debts would make other groups more likely to challenge the Tax Office ( $62.5 \%$ believed this).

Overall, however, the findings from Section 7 of the Justice Survey indicate that (a) the general population of Australians were generally supportive of the Tax Office's moves to abolish the interest and penalty component of scheme related tax debts, and (b) they were supportive of promoter penalties being used to hold unscrupulous promoters and tax agents accountable for their bad advice.

## Section 8: You and the tax system

In Section 8 of the Justice Survey, respondents were asked how they located themselves in relation to the tax system, in terms of their self-definition, their tax ethics, perceptions of legitimacy of the tax system and justifications for tax evasion. One block of questions tried to assess five different social identities that respondents could adopt in the context of taxation (each measured by three identical indicators - Sections 8.1 to 8.3 - which were thus averaged for a summary score per identity). It turned out that taxpayers saw themselves primarily as honest taxpayers $(M=6.17$; on a scale from $1=$ not at all to $7=$ very much $)$, only then as individuals $(M=5.88)$ and, third, as members of the Australian community ( $M=5.58$ ). Levels of identification with less inclusive groups such as their income group and their occupational group were considerably lower $(M s=4.33$ and 4.17, respectively).

Another set of questions (Sections 8.4 and 8.5) explains somewhat why the honest taxpayer identity was so prominent in people's minds. These questions asked about people's personal ethics regarding taxpaying and the perceived ethics of the majority of other people. In line with previous research (for example, Wenzel, 2001; 2002b), respondents regarded themselves as more ethical when it comes to paying tax than most other people. For instance, $51.3 \%$ of the respondents thought 'very much' that one should
honestly declare all income on one's tax return, but only $11.7 \%$ believed that other people thought the same. Thus, there was a clear self-other discrepancy in terms of perceived tax ethics, which might contribute to respondents' seemingly distinctive identity as honest taxpayers.

Respondents' claim of their own integrity not only contrasts with the lack of integrity that they suspect in other taxpayers, but also with the lack of integrity they attribute to the tax system itself. Namely, a number of questions tapping into the perceived legitimacy of the tax system (Section 8.6) showed that respondents tended to disagree with statements such as 'our tax system is fair', 'the Tax Office treats all societal groups equally', or 'the Tax Office is an institution that represents what Australian people believe in' $(61.8 \%, 61.9 \%$ and $52.7 \%$ of respondents with ratings lower than the scale midpoint, respectively). While respondents think of themselves as honest taxpayers holding tax ethical views, they think other taxpayers are less ethical and they regard the tax system as rather unfair.

In the face of these findings, it would be of interest to identify what justifications would turn respondents - who see themselves largely as honest taxpayers - into tax evaders. A number of statements were provided in Section 8.7 of the survey that constituted possible reasons for tax evasion if respondents 'were to ever evade tax'. The most endorsed justifications selected were perceptions of low tax system integrity such as the wealthy getting away with paying little tax, feeling personally disadvantaged, and the government being seen to waste tax revenue. Financial need and looking after one's interest were also possible excuses. It is somewhat reassuring however that the majority of respondents seemed to be less inclined to evade tax out of mere defiance or game-playing (see Table 20).

Table 20: Mean levels of perceived justifications for evading tax ( $1=$ strongly disagree, $7=$ strongly agree)

| Justification | N | Mean Std. Deviation |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Irritated about the rich paying hardly any tax | 939 | 5.27 | 1.94 |
| Financial need | 936 | 5.20 | 1.68 |
| Compensation for being unfairly disadvantaged | 932 | 4.55 | 1.89 |
| Look after my own interests first | 928 | 4.37 | 1.82 |
| Government wastes my taxes anyway | 935 | 4.31 | 1.92 |
| It's rational to try and get most out of any situation | 929 | 3.64 | 1.90 |
| Expressing protest against injustices in tax system | 932 | 3.52 | 1.98 |
| Bad experience with Tax Office - want to get even | 925 | 2.74 | 1.72 |
| Defy the powers of the Tax Office | 934 | 2.53 | 1.65 |
| See it as game against the Tax Office | 932 | 2.29 | 1.58 |
| Would enjoy tricking the Tax Office | 934 | 2.26 | 1.53 |

Finally, we were interested in where taxpayers get their tax information from and what kind of information they get (Sections 8.8 and 8.9). The data showed that respondents received most information from the media (TV, radio, newspaper; $M=3.59$ on scale from $1=$ none to $7=\mathrm{a}$ lot $)$ and tax practitioners $(M=3.52)$. Interestingly, respondents received relatively little information from family $(M=2.90)$ and friends/neighbours $(M=2.67)$. Most information from their main source was about how to fill in the tax return ( $M=4.33$ ), while relatively little information was obtained about more suspect issues such as what the Tax Office is not able to detect $(M=2.17)$ or about people outwitting the Tax Office ( $M=2.33$ ).

## Section 9: Taxpaying behaviour

Section 9 of the Justice Survey measured the degree to which taxpayers do the right thing or not by using a number of different measures of compliance behaviour.

## Lodgment

When questioned about lodgment of tax returns, it was found that $72.6 \%$ of respondents had lodged their most recent tax return in the 2001/2002 ${ }^{8}$. A further $17.8 \%$ had lodged their previous year's tax return (for the 2000/2001 financial year). When asked whether they had lodged their most recent tax return electronically, $58.5 \%$ indicated that they had, $27.5 \%$ indicated that they had not, and $14 \%$ indicated that they did not know.

## Tax minimisation

When questioned about their most recently lodged income tax return, $87.9 \%$ of the respondents said they had not exaggerated the amount of deductions or rebates claimed. Further, $81.8 \%$ said they were absolutely confident that all deductions and rebates claimed were legitimate, $11 \%$ said they were unsure about some of them, $0.9 \%$ were unsure about a lot of them, and $6.3 \%$ said they did not have a clue as someone else prepared their return for them.

Respondents were also asked about their tax minimisation strategies. Approximately 20\% of respondents said they had looked at several different ways to minimise tax in preparing for their most recent tax return, and $17.4 \%$ reported that they had put 'quite a bit' or 'a lot' of effort into doing so. When examining the types of minimisation strategies respondents said they used in their most recent tax returns (Section 9.12), 24.3\% said they had used superannuation planning, $15 \%$ had used negative gearing of property or shares, and $10.8 \%$ had used salary packaging. All of these strategies have been considered by the Tax Office to be legitimate forms of tax minimisation. When questioned about whether they had been able to minimise tax through more risky ventures in their most recent tax returns, $3 \%$ of respondents said they had done so using employee share arrangements, $1.1 \%$ had done so using schemes to convert income into capital gains, $1 \%$ said they had done so using tax schemes (for example, film schemes, agricultural schemes), fewer than $1 \%$ said they had done so with warrants or leveraged investments, and fewer than $1 \%$ had minimised their tax through off-shore havens or other international tax planning.

[^6]
## Cash income

Section 9 of the Justice Survey also asked respondents about their cash income behaviour. While $23.1 \%$ of respondents indicated that they did get paid income in cash, only $5.5 \%$ of these respondents indicated that they got paid more than $50 \%$ of their income in cash. For those who did get paid in cash they were asked the following question: 'How much of your cash income did you declare in your most recent income tax return?' It was found that only $72.5 \%$ of respondents said they declared all of their cash income; $12.4 \%$ said they declared none of it.

## Tax agents

Finally, Section 9 of the Justice Survey asked respondents about their use of tax agents. It was found that $74.5 \%$ of survey respondents used a tax agent, and the main reason cited for using one was that the tax system was too complex ( $51.7 \%$ selected this option). A further $19.5 \%$ indicated they used a tax agent to legitimately minimise tax, $20 \%$ said they feared making a mistake, $7.8 \%$ said it was because they had insufficient time to prepare their own return, and fewer than $1 \%$ indicated they used a tax agent to avoid tax.

Given our interest in the mass marketed schemes issue presented in Section 7 of this report (especially the claims made by many scheme investors that they invested in schemes because of the advice given to them by their tax agents), Section 9.15 of the Justice Survey presented respondents with a hypothetical scenario ${ }^{9}$. The scenario was designed to assess how much taxpayers from the general population are likely to accept their tax agent's advice even if they know the advice is legally questionable. The scenario asked respondents to imagine that the tax law surrounding one of their deductible expenses was ambiguous. Respondents were then asked to imagine that their tax agent told them if they claimed the deduction there would be a low probability that their tax return would be audited, and that if they were audited, the penalty would be mild.

Using a 5-point scale, respondents were first asked to indicate whether they would agree or disagree with their tax agent's advice not to claim the ambiguous deduction ( $1=$ definitely
no to $5=$ definitely yes). They were then asked whether they would agree or disagree with their tax agent's advice to claim the ambiguous deduction. The agreement to retain the services of the tax agent based on their advice (not claim vs. claim) was also examined. Table 21 shows respondents' mean responses to each of the four questions as a function of the tax agent's recommendations.

Table 21: Respondents' mean agreement scores with the tax agents' recommendation. Standard deviations are given in brackets.

| Tax agent's recommendation | Agreement with advice | Retain agent |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Not to claim deduction | $4.15(1.06)$ | $4.13(1.01)$ |
| Claim deduction | $3.20(1.23)$ | $3.39(1.20)$ |

Note: Scores on a 1 (definitely no) to 5 (definitely yes) scale

When considering whether respondents would agree with their tax agent's advice, it can be seen in Table 21 that both scores ( $M=4.15$ and 3.20, respectively) fell above the midpoint on the 5-point scale. While respondents were significantly more likely to agree with their agent's advice not to claim $(M=4.15)$ than to claim $(M=3.20)$ the ambiguous deduction, $t=17.30, p<0.001$, the findings still indicate that respondents generally tend to agree with their tax agent's recommendation, irrespective of whether the recommendation was to claim or not to claim the deduction.

Taxpayers were also asked whether they would retain the services of their tax agent based on the advice they were given. While respondents were significantly more likely to retain the services of the agent if the advice given was not to claim $(M=4.13)$ than to claim ( $M=3.39$ ), $t=16.52, p<0.001$, the fact that both mean scores were again above the midpoint on the 5 -point scale indicates that they would generally retain their agent irrespective of the advice given.

Taken together with the claims made by many tax scheme investors, that they got the idea to invest in schemes from their tax agent, the findings obtained here have serious

[^7]implications, as they suggest that tax agents do have a significant amount of influence over taxpayers' decisions to comply with tax laws. With this in mind, it would be wise for government to consider developing guidelines that place some onus of responsibility on the professionals who assist taxpayers to prepare their tax returns.

## Section 10: Background information

The final section of the Justice Survey contained socio-demographic questions. These items were used to compare the sample with population estimates made available by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (see Part 1 of this report). The data obtained in this section of the survey will also be used in the future to compare subgroups within the sample to find out whether different socio-demographic background variables affect how one sees, evaluates and behaves towards the Tax Office, the tax system and other taxpayers.

In summary, it was found that $54.2 \%$ of the respondents to the survey were male and $45.8 \%$ were female. The overall average age of respondents was 48.48 years old. The average age for male respondents was 50.39 years, with male respondents ranging from 20 to 88 years of age, and the average age of female respondents was 46.19 years, with female respondents ranging from 18 to 84 years of age. Most of the respondents were married ( $73.5 \%$ ). Another $8.7 \%$ had been married but were now divorced or separated, $2.7 \%$ were widowed and $15 \%$ had never been married. English was the main language spoken by respondents ( $92.6 \%$ ), and $1.2 \%$ of respondents were found to identify as an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander.

Very few respondents had limited schooling, with fewer than $5 \%$ indicating they had no schooling or only primary level. A total of $72.2 \%$ of respondents had achieved at least a Year 12 certificate and $27.3 \%$ indicated they held a bachelor degree or higher qualification ( $7.3 \%$ had attained a postgraduate qualification). When examining labour force status it was found that most respondents were working - $47.6 \%$ worked full time and $18.2 \%$ worked part time, $19.5 \%$ were retired and the remaining $14.8 \%$ were either unemployed, keeping house or studying.

Finally, the average personal income was reported to be approximately $\$ 36000$ (Median = $\$ 30000$ ) and the average family income was reported to be approximately $\$ 58000$ (Median $=\$ 50000)$. Not surprisingly, it was also found that female respondents had lower income levels than male respondents. While men averaged about $\$ 46000$ per annum, women earned around $\$ 25000$. This divergence was not as great, however, in family income levels, with family income for male respondents averaging \$61 000 and for female respondents averaging approximately $\$ 54000$.

## PART 3: DESCRIPTION OF CODEBOOK

As noted earlier, Part 3 of this report presents a codebook of the findings from the Justice Survey. The codebook is presented after the reference section. The codebook presents the reader with all of the questions used in the survey, as well as detailing the breakdown of responses to each of these questions. For example, the number of respondents answering each question is provided, along with the way in which they responded to each question (for example, how many circled the 'strongly agree' option, how many circled the 'strongly disagree' option, and so on), and the number of respondents who refused to answer a specific question. Also presented are the means and standard deviations for every question presented in the survey. The layout of the questions presented in the codebook are also presented in an identical manner as the surveys that were posted to respondents.

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## 1. A Fair Share of Tax

$1.1\{\mathbf{P 1 Q 1 1 \}}$ Think about yourself personally and the taxes you need to pay. Are you asked to pay ...

$1.2\{\mathbf{P 1 Q 1 2}\}$ Compared to people in Australia who earn about the same as you, are you asked to pay ...

. 3 \{P1Q13\} Compared to other people of your occupational group, are you asked to pay ...

|  |  | Much less than your fair share |  |  |  | Your fair share |  | Much more than your fair share |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 4.54 | n | 2 | 5 | 17 | 566 | 214 | 81 | 53 | [938] | (27) |
| Std Dev | 0.93 | \% | 0.2 | 0.5 | 1.8 | 60.3 | 22.8 | 8.6 | 5.7 | [100.0] | (2.8) |

1.4 \{P1Q14\} People of your income-level, are they asked to pay...

$1.5\{\mathbf{P 1 Q 1 5}\}$ People of your occupational group, are they asked to pay...

1.6 Now think of the following groups. Are they asked to pay their fair share of tax in your view?

1. $\{\mathbf{P 1 Q 1 6 1 \}}$ Owner-managers of large companies.......................................
Mean 2.68

Std Dev 1.55
2. $\{\mathbf{P 1 Q 1 6 2 \}}$ Senior judges and barristers .........................................

## Mean 2.73

Std Dev 1.50
 Mean 4.99
Std Dev 1.25

 $\begin{array}{ll}\text { Mean } & 4.89 \\ \text { Std Dev } & 132\end{array}$
 Mean 3.53
Std Dev 1.44


| Total Valid | Missing Data |
| :---: | :---: |
| $[\mathbf{9 5 1 ]}$ | $\mathbf{( 1 4 )}$ |
| $[\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0}]$ | $\mathbf{( 1 . 5 )}$ |


| Total Valid | Missing Data |
| :---: | :---: |
| $[\mathbf{9 3 8}]$ | $(\mathbf{2 7 )}$ |
| $[\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0 ]}$ | $(\mathbf{2 8})$ |

(2.8)


7. $\{\mathbf{P 2 Q 1 6 7 \}}$ Chief executives of large corporations

| Much less |  |  | Fair share |  |  | Much more |  |  | Missing Data |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid |  |
| n | 403 | 217 | 134 | 92 | 41 | 30 | 35 | [952] | (13) |
| \% | 42.3 | 22.8 | 14.1 | 9.7 | 4.3 | 3.2 | 3.7 | [100.0] | (1.3) |


|  |  |  | ch 1 |  |  | r sha |  |  | ch m |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 |  | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |
| 8. $\{\mathbf{P 2 Q}$ | Sm |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 4.42 | n | 27 | 65 | 136 | 292 | 216 | 112 | 101 | [949] | (16) |
| Std Dev | 1.47 | \% | 2.8 | 6.8 | 14.3 | 30.8 | 22.8 | 11.8 | 10.6 | [100.0] | (1.7) |

1.7 \{P2Q17\} Taxes in Australia are generally...

$1.8\{\mathbf{P 2 Q 1 8}\}$ The tax-free income threshold of $\$ 6,000$ is...

1.9 Currently, taxpayers in Australia pay:

- $0 \%$ on every dollar earned up to $\$ 6,000$;
- $17 \%$ on every dollar earned between $\$ 6,000$ and $\$ 20,000$;
- $30 \%$ on every dollar earned between $\$ 20,000$ and $\$ 50,000$;
- $42 \%$ on every dollar earned between $\$ 50,000$ and $\$ 60,000$ and ;
- $47 \%$ on every dollar earned beyond $\$ 60,000$ per year.
a) $\{\mathbf{P} 2 Q 19 \mathrm{~A}\}$ Overall, these shares of the tax burden are...


All income between $\$ 6,000$ and $\$ 20,000$ :
All income between $\$ 20,001$ and $\$ 50,000$ :
All income between $\$ 50,001$ and $\$ 60,000$ :
All income over $\$ 60,000$ :
$\qquad$ \%
$\qquad$ \%
$\qquad$
$\qquad$ \%
1.10 Taking into account the tax-free threshold, a person with a $\$ 20,000$ income currently pays $\$ 2,380$ tax (or $12 \%$ of income), a person with a $\$ 40,000$ income pays $\$ 8,380$ tax $(21 \%)$, a person with a $\$ 60,000$ income pays $\$ 15,580$ tax $(26 \%)$ and a person with an $\$ 80,000$ income pays $\$ 24,980$ tax ( $31 \%$ ).
a) $\{P 2 Q 110 A\}$ Overall, these shares of the tax burden are...

|  |  |  | y un |  |  |  |  |  | tely |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  | I | 1 | । | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 3.21 | n | 122 | 131 | 293 | 183 | 85 | 41 | 20 | [875] | (90) |
| Std Dev | 1.43 | \% | 13.9 | 15.0 | 33.5 | 20.9 | 9.7 | 4.7 | 2.3 | [100.0] | (9.3) |

[^8]
## See Appendix Two

\$20,000 income: $\qquad$ $\operatorname{tax}$
\$40,000 income: $\qquad$ $\operatorname{tax}$
\$60,000 income: $\qquad$ tax
\$80,000 income: $\qquad$
2.1 \{P3Q21\} Relative to the taxes you pay, do you think the tax-
 Mean $\quad 3.10$
Std Dev 1.18
2.2 \{P3Q22\} Do you think you personally get your tax dollars' worth of public services and government benefits?
Mean 2.77
Std Dev 1.45
2.3 \{P3Q23\} Do you think the tax you personally pay mainly benefits other people?

## Std Dev 1.68

$2.4\{\mathbf{P 3 Q 2 4 \}}$ Relative to the taxes people in your occupational group pay, do you think the tax-funded services from which they $\begin{array}{ll}\text { benefit are } & \text {......... } \\ \text { Mean } & \mathbf{3 . 1 6}\end{array}$
Std Dev 1.13
$2.5\{\mathbf{P 3 Q 2 5}\}$ Do you think people in your occupational group get their tax dollars' worth of public services and government benefits?
Mean 2.96
Std Dev 1.38
2.6 \{P3Q26\} Do you think people in your occupational group pay mainly for other groups' benefits?
Mean 4.90
Std Dev 1.60

|  | Much less than fair $\qquad$ | 1 | 1 | $\stackrel{\text { Fair }}{1}$ | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| n | 101 | 169 | 300 | 312 | 33 | 18 | 9 | [942] | (23) |
| \% | 10.7 | 17.9 | 31.8 | 33.1 | 3.5 | 1.9 | 1.0 | [100.0] | (2.4) |


| Not at all |  |  |  | Absolutely |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| n | 202 | 247 | 268 | 126 | 57 | 29 | 25 | [954] | (11) |
| \% | 21.2 | 25.9 | 28.1 | 13.2 | 6.0 | 3.0 | 2.6 | [100.0] | (1.1) |


|  | tat a | 1 | \| | 1 | Absolutely |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| n | 49 | 44 | 80 | 144 | 226 | 199 | 208 | [950] | (15) |
| \% | 5.2 | 4.6 | 8.4 | 15.2 | 23.8 | 20.9 | 21.9 | [100.0] | (1.6) |


|  | Much less than fair L |  | 」 | Fair | 1 |  | $\begin{array}{ll} \text { ch } n \\ \text { an } \end{array}$ |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| n | 66 | 179 | 340 | 272 | 47 | 21 | 7 | [932] | (33) |
| \% | 7.1 | 19.2 | 36.5 | 29.2 | 5.0 | 2.3 | 0.8 | [100.0] | (3.4) |



2.7 The government spends taxpayers' money in many different areas. For each area listed below, do you think the government should be spending less money, keeping things as they are, or spending more money?

Mean 5.55
Std Dev 1.19

Std Dev 1.49


| Mean | 5.71 |
| :--- | :--- |
| Std Dev | 1.22 |

4. $\{\mathbf{P 3 Q 2 7 4 \}}$
Mean
5.05 Std Dev 1.21
5. $\{\mathbf{P 3 Q 2 7 5}\}$ Policing
Mean 4.97
Std Dev 1.26

Mean 4.63
Std Dev 1.70



## 3. REDUCING TAX

3.1 \{P4Q31\} Personally, do you think you have too few, a fair amount, or too many opportunities to legally reduce your tax? .......... Mean 2.81
Std Dev 1.35
$3.2\{\mathbf{P 4 Q 3 2}\}$ With regards to your occupational group, do you think they have too few, a fair amount, or too many opportunities to legally reduce their tax?
Mean 2.90
Std Dev 1.29

| Much too few |  |  |  | Fair |  | Much too many |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | + |  |  | 1 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| n | 221 | 172 | 217 | 286 | 34 | 13 | 11 | [954] | (11) |
| \% | 23.2 | 18.0 | 22.7 | 30.0 | 3.6 | 1.4 | 1.2 | [100.0] | (1.1) |


| Much too few |  |  | Fair |  |  | Much too many |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | 1 | $\stackrel{1}{1}$ | 1 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Dat |
| n | 175 | 187 | 223 | 298 | 45 | 7 | 9 | [944] | (21) |
| \% | 18.5 | 19.8 | 23.6 | 31.6 | 4.8 | 0.7 | 1.0 | [100.0] | (2.2) |

3.3 Do the following groups have too few, a fair amount or too many opportunities to legally reduce their tax?
 Mean 5.78


| Much too few |  |  | Fair |  |  | Much too many |  |  | Missing Data |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | 1 | I | 1 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid |  |
| n | 9 | 3 | 21 | 146 | 188 | 245 | 329 | [941] | (24) |
| \% | 1.0 | 0.3 | 2.2 | 15.5 | 20.0 | 26.0 | 35.0 | [100.0] | (2.5) |


| Much too few |  |  | Fair |  |  | Much too many |  |  | Missing Data |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | 1 | - | 1 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid |  |
| n | 270 | 240 | 225 | 189 | 19 | 4 | 5 | [952] | (13) |
| \% | 28.4 | 25.2 | 23.6 | 19.9 | 2.0 | 0.4 | 0.5 | [100.0] | (1.3) |


| Much too few |  |  | Fair |  |  | Much too many |  |  | Missing Data |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | , | , | 1 | $\stackrel{1}{1}$ | 1 | , |  |  |  |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid |  |
| n | 110 | 108 | 180 | 330 | 124 | 60 | 38 | [950] | (15) |
| \% | 11.6 | 11.4 | 18.9 | 34.7 | 13.1 | 6.3 | 4.0 | [100.0] | (1.6) |


| Much too few |  |  | Fair |  |  | Much too many |  |  | Missing Data |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | 1 |  | 1 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid |  |
| n | 250 | 186 | 227 | 226 | 41 | 8 | 7 | [945] | (20) |
| \% | 26.5 | 19.7 | 24.0 | 23.9 | 4.3 | 0.8 | 0.7 | [100.0] | (2.1) |


| 6. $\{$ P5Q336\} Doctors in general practice (G) |  | Much too few |  |  | Fair |  |  | Much too many |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |  | , |  |  |
|  |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 4.78 | n | 19 | 15 | 72 | 328 | 229 | 153 | 119 | [935] | (30) |
| Std Dev | 1.33 | \% | 2.0 | 1.6 | 7.7 | 35.1 | 24.5 | 16.4 | 12.7 | [100.0] | (3.1) |
|  |  | Much too few |  |  | Fair |  |  | Much too many |  |  |  |
| 7. $\{\mathbf{P 5 Q 3 3 7}\}$ Chief executives of large corporations |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 6.13 | n | 10 | 3 | 18 | 82 | 96 | 240 | 500 | [949] | (16) |
| Std Dev | 1.20 | \% | 1.1 | 0.3 | 1.9 | 8.6 | 10.1 | 25.3 | 52.7 | [100.0] | (1.7) |
|  |  | Much too few |  |  | Fair |  |  | Much too many |  |  |  |
| 8. $\{\mathbf{P 5 Q 3 3 8}\}$ Small business owners |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 3.88 | n | 73 | 89 | 203 | 286 | 161 | 85 | 53 | [950] | (15) |
| Std Dev | 1.52 | \% | 7.7 | 9.4 | 21.4 | 30.1 | 16.9 | 8.9 | 5.6 | [100.0] | (1.6) |

## 4. Your Views on the Tax Office

4.1 Below are statements that describe ways people see the Tax Office. Indicate how much you disagree or agree with the statement.

|  |  |  | Strongly disagree $\qquad$ | 1 |  | 1 |  | 1 | Strongly agree $\qquad$ |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1. $\{\mathbf{P 5 Q 4 1 1 \}}$ The Tax Office shows respect for my rights ............... |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 3.89 | n | 84 | 61 | 169 | 380 | 128 | 68 | 57 | [947] | (18) |
| Std Dev | 1.48 | \% | 8.9 | 6.4 | 17.8 | 40.1 | 13.5 | 7.2 | 6.0 | [100.0] | (1.9) |
|  |  |  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |  |  |
| 2. $\{\mathbf{P 5 Q 4 1 2 \}}$ The Tax Office does not listen to my point of view .... |  |  | 1 | , | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 3.76 | n | 86 | 112 | 167 | 337 | 104 | 69 | 62 | [937] | (28) |
| Std Dev | 1.56 | \% | 9.2 | 12.0 | 17.8 | 36.0 | 11.1 | 7.4 | 6.6 | [100.0] | (2.9) |
| 3. $\{\mathbf{P} \mathbf{5 Q 4 1 3}\}$ The Tax Office has processes in place to maintain the rights of all taxpayers |  |  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |  |  |
|  |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 3.89 | n | 85 | 71 | 164 | 350 | 134 | 77 | 56 | [937] | (28) |
| Std Dev | 1.51 | \% | 9.1 | 7.6 | 17.5 | 37.4 | 14.3 | 8.2 | 6.0 | [100.0] | (2.9) |
| 4. $\{\mathbf{P 5 Q 4 1 4 \}}$ The Tax Office listens to the views of some groups of taxpayers more than others |  |  | L | 1 |  | 1 |  | 1 | ل |  |  |
|  |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 4.99 | n | 33 | 30 | 66 | 221 | 211 | 198 | 185 | [944] | (21) |
| Std Dev | 1.53 | \% | 3.5 | 3.2 | 7.0 | 23.4 | 22.4 | 21.0 | 19.6 | [100.0] | (2.2) |
| 5. $\{\mathbf{P 5 Q 4 1 5 \}}$ I feel my occupational group can express its opinion directly to the Tax Office when necessary |  |  | L | 1 |  | 1 |  | 1 | ل |  |  |
|  |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 3.61 | n | 115 | 123 | 167 | 308 | 108 | 64 | 53 | [938] | (27) |
| Std Dev | 1.60 | \% | 12.3 | 13.1 | 17.8 | 32.8 | 11.5 | 6.8 | 5.7 | [100.0] | (2.8) |
| 6. $\{\mathbf{P 5 Q 4 1 6}\}$ The Tax Office provides the public with thorough explanations of its decisions and processes |  |  | L | 1 |  | 1 |  | 1 | 1 |  |  |
|  |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 3.23 | n | 164 | 175 | 231 | 190 | 86 | 53 | 49 | [948] | (17) |
| Std Dev | 1.65 | \% | 17.3 | 18.5 | 24.4 | 20.0 | 9.1 | 5.6 | 5.2 | [100.0] | (1.8) |
| 7. $\{\mathbf{P 5 Q 4 1 7}\}$ The Tax Office seems to withhold important information from my occupational group |  |  | L | 1 |  | 1 |  | 1 | - |  |  |
|  |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 3.76 | n | 83 | 104 | 176 | 353 | 95 | 58 | 65 | [934] | (31) |
| Std Dev | 1.53 | \% | 8.9 | 11.1 | 18.8 | 37.8 | 10.2 | 6.2 | 7.0 | [100.0] | (3.2) |
| 8. $\{\mathbf{P 5 Q 4 1 8 \}}$ I personally feel that I am treated politely by theTax Office ........................................................................ |  |  | L | 1 |  | 1 |  | 1 | ل |  |  |
|  |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Tax Office <br> Mean $4.46$ |  |  | 43 | 31 | 99 | 382 | 152 | 136 | 100 | [943] | (22) |
| Std Dev | 1.46 | \% | 4.6 | 3.3 | 10.5 | 40.5 | 16.1 | 14.4 | 10.6 | [100.0] | (2.3) |
| 9. $\{\mathbf{P 5 Q 4 1 9 \}}$ All taxpayers alike can express their opinions directly to the Tax Office when they want to |  |  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 |  | 1 | 1 |  |  |
|  |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 4.08 | n | 93 | 93 | 127 | 291 | 120 | 124 | 99 | [947] | (18) |
| Std Dev | 1.73 | \% | 9.8 | 9.8 | 13.4 | 30.7 | 12.7 | 13.1 | 10.5 | [100.0] | (1.9) |
| 10. $\{\mathbf{P 5 Q 4 1 1 0}\}$ The Tax Office is open in its communications with me |  |  | L |  |  | 1 |  | 1 | 」 |  |  |
|  |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 3.94 | n | 82 | 86 | 148 | 352 | 103 | 88 | 77 | [936] | (29) |
| Std Dev | 1.59 | \% | 8.8 | 9.2 | 15.8 | 37.6 | 11.0 | 9.4 | 8.2 | [100.0] | (3.0) |



26．$\{\mathbf{P 7 Q 4 1 2 6 \}}$ The Tax Office treats me with respect and
Mean 3.8
Std Dev $\quad 1.40$

27．$\{\mathbf{P 7 Q 4 1 2 7}\}$ It is very costly for my occupational group to
comply with the tax system．

| Mean | 4.51 | n |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Std Dev | 1.57 | \％ |

28．$\{\mathbf{P 7 Q 4 1 2 8}\}$ My occupational group is treated politely by the
$\begin{array}{ll}\text { Tax Office ．．．．．．．．} \\ \text { Mean } & \mathbf{4 . 0 5}\end{array}$
$\begin{array}{ll}\text { Mean } & 4.05 \\ \text { Std Dev } & 1.31\end{array}$

29．$\{\mathbf{P 7 Q 4 1 2 9 \}}$ The tax system is generally too complex．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．
Mean 5.69
Std Dev 1.52
30．$\{\mathbf{P 7 Q 4 1 3 0}\}$ The Tax Office is more open in its
$\begin{array}{ll}\text { communications with some groups of taxpayers than with others．．．．．．．} \\ \text { Mean } & 4.91\end{array}$

31．$\{\mathbf{P 7 Q 4 1 3 1}\}$ The Tax Office seems to withhold important information from me
Mean 4.06
Std Dev 1.48
32．$\{\mathbf{P 7 Q 4 1 3 2}\}$ All taxpayers are treated politely by the Tax
$\begin{array}{ll}\text { Office．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．} \\ \text { Mean } & \mathbf{3 . 7 4} \\ \text { Std Dev } & \mathbf{1 . 4 2}\end{array}$
33．$\{\mathbf{P} \mathbf{7 Q 4 1 3 3}\}$ The Tax Office gives my occupational group the chance to have their say in tax matters
Mean 3.52
Std Dev 1.44

| Strongly <br> disagree |
| :--- |
| 1 |

n
$\%$


|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |  |
|  | $\mathbf{n}$ | $\mathbf{3 6}$ | $\mathbf{5 4}$ | $\mathbf{1 2 9}$ | $\mathbf{2 8 2}$ | $\mathbf{1 7 3}$ | $\mathbf{1 2 8}$ |
| \％ | $\mathbf{3 . 9}$ | $\mathbf{5 . 8}$ | $\mathbf{1 3 . 8}$ | $\mathbf{3 0 . 2}$ | $\mathbf{1 8 . 5}$ | $\mathbf{1 3 . 7}$ | $\mathbf{1 4}$ |


| $\llcorner$ | $\perp$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| $\mathbf{5 0}$ | $\mathbf{4 8}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 3}$ | $\mathbf{4 8 9}$ | $\mathbf{1 1 2}$ | $\mathbf{7 3}$ | $\mathbf{4 7}$ |
| $\mathbf{5 . 4}$ | $\mathbf{5 . 2}$ | $\mathbf{1 1 . 2}$ | $\mathbf{5 3 . 0}$ | $\mathbf{1 2 . 1}$ | $\mathbf{7 . 9}$ | $\mathbf{5 . 1}$ |


|  | 1 | 」 | 」 | 1 | 1 | 」 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 30 | 16 | 37 | 101 | 159 | 213 | 393 |
| 2 | 1.7 | 3.9 | 10.6 | 16.8 | 22.4 | 41. |


| $L$ |  |  | $\mid$ | $\mid$ | $\mid$ |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 26 | 23 | 55 | 300 | $\mathbf{1 9 4}$ | $\mathbf{1 5 8}$ | $\mathbf{1 7 2}$ |


| $\llcorner$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 52 | $\mathbf{7 6}$ | $\mathbf{1 4 6}$ | $\mathbf{3 7 2}$ | $\mathbf{1 3 3}$ | $\mathbf{6 8}$ | $\mathbf{7 9}$ |
| $\mathbf{5 . 6}$ | $\mathbf{8 . 2}$ | $\mathbf{1 5 . 8}$ | $\mathbf{4 0 . 2}$ | $\mathbf{1 4 . 4}$ | $\mathbf{7 . 3}$ | $\mathbf{8 . 5}$ |


| Total Valid | Missing Data |
| :---: | :---: |
| $[\mathbf{9 2 6}]$ | $\mathbf{( 3 9 )}$ |
| $[\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0}]$ | $\mathbf{( 4 . 0 )}$ |


| Total Valid | Missing Data |
| :---: | :---: |
| $[\mathbf{9 2 9 ]}$ | $\mathbf{( 3 6 )}$ |
| $[\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0}]$ | $\mathbf{( 3 . 7 )}$ |


| Total Valid | Missing Data |
| :---: | :---: |
| $[\mathbf{9 2 3}]$ | $\mathbf{( 4 2 )}$ |
| $[\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0}]$ | $\mathbf{( 4 . 4 )}$ |


| Total Valid | Missing Data |
| :---: | :---: |
| $[\mathbf{9 3 1}]$ | $(\mathbf{3 4})$ |
| $[\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0}]$ | $\mathbf{( 3 . 5 )}$ |


| Total Valid | Missing Data |
| :---: | :---: |
| $[\mathbf{9 3 3}]$ | $\mathbf{( 3 2 )}$ |
| $[\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0}]$ | $\mathbf{( 3 . 3 )}$ |


| Total Valid | Missing Data |
| :---: | :---: |
| $[\mathbf{9 2 2}]$ | $\mathbf{( 4 3 )}$ |
| $[\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0}]$ | $\mathbf{( 4 . 5 )}$ |


| Total Valid | Missing Data |
| :---: | :---: |
| $[\mathbf{9 4 9 ]}$ | $(\mathbf{1 6 )}$ |
| $[\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0}]$ | $\mathbf{( 1 . 7 )}$ |


| Total Valid | Missing Data |
| :---: | :---: |
| $[\mathbf{9 2 8 ]}$ | $(\mathbf{3 7})$ |
| $[\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0}]$ | $\mathbf{( 3 . 8})$ |


| $\llcorner$ | $ل$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| $\mathbf{1 0 4}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 6}$ | $\mathbf{1 9 8}$ | $\mathbf{3 5 4}$ | $\mathbf{8 0}$ | $\mathbf{4 6}$ | $\mathbf{3 5}$ |
| $\mathbf{1 1 . 3}$ | $\mathbf{1 1 . 5}$ | $\mathbf{2 1 . 5}$ | $\mathbf{3 8 . 4}$ | $\mathbf{8 . 7}$ | $\mathbf{5 . 0}$ | $\mathbf{3 . 8}$ |

4．2 The following questions relate to the power that you perceive the Tax Office as having．To what extent do you disagree or agree with the following：

1．$\{\mathbf{P} 7 \mathbf{Q 4 2 1}\}$ The Tax Office can＇t do much if a large business decides to defy it
Mean
Std Dev 2.08
2．$\{\mathbf{P} 7 \mathbf{Q 4 2 2}\}$ The Tax Office can＇t do much if a small business decides to defy it
$\begin{array}{ll}\text { Mean } & 2.53 \\ \text { Std }\end{array}$
Std Dev 1.57

3．$\{\mathbf{P 7 Q 4 2 3}\}$ The Tax Office can＇t do much if a wealthy person decides to defy it
Mean $\quad 4.27$

P7Q424\} The Tax Office can't do much if an ordinary wage and salary earner decides to defy it
$\begin{array}{ll}\text { Mean } & 2.15\end{array}$
Std Dev 1.51

5．$\{\mathbf{P 7 Q 4 2 5}\}$ The Tax Office can＇t do much if my occupational
$\qquad$

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { group decides to defy } \\
& \mathbf{M e a n}
\end{aligned}
$$

Std Dev 1.48

6．$\{\mathbf{P 7 Q 4 2 6}\}$ The Tax Office can＇t do much if other occupational groups decide to defy it
Mean 2.78
Std Dev 1.54


|  | Strongly disagree L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Strongly agree － |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| n | 150 | 141 | 119 | 116 | 130 | 143 | 152 | ［951］ | （14） |
| \％ | 15.8 | 14.8 | 12.5 | 12.2 | 13.7 | 15.0 | 16.0 | ［100．0］ | （1．5） |
|  | L |  | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | $\downarrow$ |  |  |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| n | 318 | 230 | 180 | 112 | 50 | 31 | 29 | ［950］ | （15） |
| \％ | 33.5 | 24.2 | 18.9 | 11.8 | 5.3 | 3.3 | 3.1 | ［100．0］ | （1．6） |
|  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ل |  |  |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| n | 148 | 119 | 95 | 97 | 132 | 176 | 183 | ［950］ | （15） |
| \％ | 15.6 | 12.5 | 10.0 | 10.2 | 13.9 | 18.5 | 19.3 | ［100．0］ | （1．6） |
|  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |  |  |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| n | 444 | 228 | 124 | 82 | 20 | 22 | 30 | ［950］ | （15） |
| \％ | 46.7 | 24.0 | 13.1 | 8.6 | 2.1 | 2.3 | 3.2 | ［100．0］ | （1．6） |



|  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { rong } \\ & \text { sagr } \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |  |  | rong gree |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 7. $\{\mathbf{P 8 Q}$ | \} The |  |  | 1 |  | 1 | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |
| taxpayer | ides to |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 2.67 | n | 317 | 222 | 131 | 129 | 63 | 44 | 40 | [946] | (19) |
| Std Dev | 1.72 | \% | 33.5 | 23.5 | 13.8 | 13.6 | 6.7 | 4.7 | 4.2 | [100.0] | (2.0) |

4.3 Think about your own personal experiences with the Tax Office. Have you had any experience with the following? If so, how would you evaluate your experience?

1. $\{\mathbf{P 8 Q 4 3 1}\}$ ATO client service

|  |  | Very negative |  |  | 1 |  |  | Very positiv |  | Have no experience with this |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 0 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 4.44 | n | 27 | 38 | 54 | 132 | 85 | 61 | 70 | 469 | [936] | (29) |
| Std Dev | 1.68 | \% | 2.9 | 4.1 | 5.8 | 14.1 | 9.1 | 6.5 | 7.5 | 50.1 | [100.0] | (3.0) |

The mean and standard deviation calculations exclude the respondents who had no experience with the service.
2. $\{\mathbf{P 8 Q 4 3 2}\}$ Call centre waiting times

| Mean | $\mathbf{3 . 1 3}$ | $\mathbf{n}$ | 99 | 112 | 94 | 98 | $\mathbf{5 7}$ | $\mathbf{3 1}$ | $\mathbf{1 8}$ | 429 | [938] |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Std Dev | 1.66 | $\%$ | 10.6 | 11.9 | 10.0 | $\mathbf{1 0 . 4}$ | $\mathbf{6 . 1}$ | $\mathbf{3 . 3}$ | $\mathbf{1 . 9}$ | $\mathbf{4 5 . 7}$ | $[\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0}]$ |

The mean and standard deviation calculations exclude the respondents who had no experience with the service.
3. $\{\mathbf{P 8 Q 4 3 3}\}$ Call centre advice?

4. $\{\mathbf{P 8 Q 4 3 4 \}}$ The ATO web site?


The mean and standard deviation calculations exclude the respondents who had no experience with the service.
5. $\{\mathbf{P 8 Q 4 3 5}\}$ Letters from the ATO?


The mean and standard deviation calculations exclude the respondents who had no experience with the service.
6. $\{\mathbf{P 8 Q 4 3 6}\}$ Face-to-face contacts with ATO officers?

|  |  | Very negative |  |  | 1 | 1 | 1 | Very positiv |  | Have no experience with this |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  | 1 |  |  | 1 | $\xrightarrow{\square}$ |  |  |
|  |  |  | 1 | 2 |  | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 0 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 4.35 | n | 21 | 20 | 32 | 67 | 41 | 30 | 41 | 681 | [933] | (32) |
| Std Dev | 1.78 | \% | 2.3 | 2.1 | 3.4 | 7.2 | 4.4 | 3.2 | 4.4 | 73.0 | [100.0] | (3.3) |

The mean and standard deviation calculations exclude the respondents who had no experience with the service.
7. \{P8Q437\} Access to information?

|  |  | Very negative |  |  |  |  |  | Very positive |  | Have no experience with this |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | 1 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 5 | $\frac{1}{6}$ | 7 | 0 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 4.16 | n | 41 | 46 | 94 | 177 | 106 | 64 | 56 | 351 | [935] | (30) |
| Std Dev | 1.60 | \% | 4.4 | 4.9 | 10.1 | 18.9 | 11.3 | 6.8 | 6.0 | 37.5 | [100.0] | (3.1) |

The mean and standard deviation calculations exclude the respondents who had no experience with the service.
8. $\{\mathbf{P 8 Q 4 3 8}\}$ Correctness of information received?


The mean and standard deviation calculations exclude the respondents who had no experience with the service.
4.4 What do you think about the idea of the Tax Office consulting more with the community to improve tax administration?



You have now completed one third of the questionnaire! Why not have a coffee break before commencing the next section.

## 5. Penalties and Cases of Tax Evasion

5.1 $\{\mathbf{P 9 Q 5 1 \}}$ Have you ever been fined or penalised in some way by the Tax Office?


| $n$ | $\%$ |
| ---: | ---: |
| 142 | $\mathbf{1 5 . 5}$ |
| 777 | $\mathbf{8 4 . 5}$ |
| $[919]$ | $[100.0]$ |
| $(46)$ | $(4.8)$ |

1. $\{\mathbf{P 9 Q 5 1 1 \}}$ If yes, do you think the Tax Office's decision to penalise you was...

2. $\{\mathbf{P 9 Q 5 1 2 \}}$ Do you think the penalties against you were...

3. $\{\mathbf{P 9 Q 5 1 3}\}$ Were the reasons for the penalty unclear or clear to you?

| Totally unclear |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Totally clear |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Mean | 4.67 | n | 19 | 12 | 20 | 12 | 14 | 27 | 44 |
| Std Dev | 2.17 | \% | 12.8 | 8.1 | 13.5 | 8.1 | 9.5 | 18.2 | 29.7 |
| 4. $\{\mathbf{P 9 Q 5 1 4 \}}$ Did the Tax Office attempt to explain to you in plain English why they had penalised you? |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Yes................................................................................................................................ 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| No ................................................................................................................................ 2 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total Valid Missing Data |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |


| Total Valid | Missing Data |
| :---: | :---: |
| $[\mathbf{1 4 8}]$ | $\mathbf{( 8 1 7 )}$ |
| $[\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0}]$ | $\mathbf{( 8 4 . 7 )}$ |

5. $\{\mathbf{P 9 Q 5 1 5 \}}$ Do you think the Tax Office took too long to decide to penalise you?


| n | $\%$ |
| ---: | ---: |
| 39 | 25.8 |
| 112 | 74.2 |
| $[151]$ | $[100.0]$ |
| $(\mathbf{8 1 4})$ | $(84.4)$ |

6. $\{\mathbf{P 9 Q 5 1 6}\}$ Did you challenge the Tax Office's decision to penalise you?


| n | $\%$ |
| ---: | ---: |
| $\mathbf{5 3}$ | $\mathbf{3 4 . 9}$ |
| $\mathbf{9 9}$ | $\mathbf{6 5 . 1}$ |
| $[152]$ | $[100.0]$ |
| $(813)$ | $(84.2)$ |

5.2 \{P9Q52\} Do you think the penalties the Tax Office usually imposes on your occupational group are...

5.3 Below is a list of possible cases of tax evasion. What is your impression in each case? Does the Tax Office use unduly mild, appropriate or unduly severe measures against...

|  |  | Unduly mild |  |  | $\stackrel{\text { Fair }}{1}$ |  | Unduly severe |  |  |  | Missing Data |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1. $\{\mathbf{P 1 0 Q 5 3 1 \}}$ A tradesperson underreporting cash earnings. |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid |  |
| Mean | 3.96 | n | 43 | 67 | 111 | 460 | 143 | 39 | 40 | [903] | (62) |
| Std Dev | 1.26 | \% | 4.8 | 7.4 | 12.3 | 50.9 | 15.8 | 4.3 | 4.4 | [100.0] | (6.4) |
|  |  | Unduly mild |  |  | 1 | $\stackrel{\text { Fair }}{1}$ |  |  | uly s | vere |  |
| 2. $\{\mathbf{P 1 0 Q 5 3 2 \}}$ An academic exaggerating deduction claims............ |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 3.77 | n | 55 | 69 | 153 | 441 | 127 | 29 | 23 | [897] | (68) |
| Std Dev | 1.22 | \% | 6.1 | 7.7 | 17.1 | 49.2 | 14.2 | 3.2 | 2.6 | [100.0] | (7.0) |
| 3. $\{\mathbf{P 1 0 Q 5 3 3}\}$ A business owner holding back the payment of |  | Unduly mild |  |  | $\perp$ | $\stackrel{\text { Fair }}{1}$ | 1 |  | ${ }^{3}$ |  |  |
| tax debts |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 3.67 | n | 82 | 91 | 166 | 375 | 104 | 44 | 35 | [897] | (68) |
| Std Dev | 1.40 | \% | 9.1 | 10.1 | 18.5 | 41.8 | 11.6 | 4.9 | 3.9 | [100.0] | (7.0) |
|  |  | Unduly mild |  |  | 1 | $\stackrel{\text { Fair }}{1}$ | 1 |  | luly s |  |  |
| 4. $\mathbf{P} 10 \mathrm{Q} 534\}$ A large corporation shifting profits abroad.. |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 2.35 | n | 374 | 220 | 120 | 117 | 28 | 14 | 39 | [912] | (53) |
| Std Dev | 1.59 | \% | 41.0 | 24.1 | 13.2 | 12.8 | 3.1 | 1.5 | 4.3 | [100.0] | (5.5) |
| 5. $\{\mathbf{P 1 0 Q 5 3 5}\}$ A welfare recipient deliberately underdeclaring |  | Unduly mild |  |  | 1 | $\stackrel{\text { Fair }}{1}$ | 1 | Unduly severe |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 3.47 | n | 163 | 123 | 134 | 281 | 95 | 54 | 60 | [910] | (55) |
| Std Dev | 1.72 | \% | 17.9 | 13.5 | 14.7 | 30.9 | 10.4 | 5.9 | 6.6 | [100.0] | (5.7) |
| 6. $\{\mathbf{P 1 0 Q 5 3 6 \}}$ A company director underreporting bonuspayments..................................................................... |  | Unduly mild |  |  | $\perp$ | $\stackrel{\text { Fair }}{1}$ | $\perp$ |  | uly s |  |  |
|  |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 2.60 | n | 288 | 206 | 180 | 140 | 40 | 20 | 34 | [908] | (57) |
| Std Dev | 1.57 | \% | 31.7 | 22.7 | 19.8 | 15.4 | 4.4 | 2.2 | 3.7 | [100.0] | (5.9) |
| 7. $\{\mathbf{P 1 0 Q 5 3 7}\}$ A student part-time worker failing to lodge a tax |  |  | Unduly mild | $\perp$ | 1 | $\stackrel{\text { Fair }}{1}$ | 1 | Unduly severe |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 4.33 | n | 40 | 44 | 102 | 381 | 162 | 94 | 86 | [909] | (56) |
| Std Dev | 1.43 | \% | 4.4 | 4.8 | 11.2 | 41.9 | 17.8 | 10.3 | 9.5 | [100.0] | (5.8) |
|  |  | Unduly mild |  |  | 1 | $\stackrel{\text { Fair }}{1}$ | 1 | Unduly severe |  |  |  |
| 8. $\{\mathbf{P 1 0 Q 5 3 8}\}$ A retiree underdeclaring investment income. |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 4.31 | n | 38 | 48 | 100 | 374 | 183 | 80 | 84 | [907] | (58) |
| Std Dev | 1.41 | \% | 4.2 | 5.3 | 11.0 | 41.2 | 20.2 | 8.8 | 9.3 | [100.0] | (6.0) |

5.4 Imagine the following case: A company director manipulated the company's books and thus illegally reduced taxes by $\$ 200,000$. This is the second time the company director has been caught for such an offence.
The Tax Office would demand that the company director pay back the evaded tax plus interest. In addition, a penalty would be applied. In your opinion, what would be an appropriate penalty?

5. $\{\mathbf{P 1 0 Q 5 4 5}\}$ Imagine the company director was to be fined. In your opinion, what would be an appropriate fine in dollars?

## See Appendix Three

6. $\{\mathbf{P 1 0 Q 5 4 6 \}}$ Imagine the company director was to be sent to prison. In your opinion, what would be an appropriate sentence in months?
$\qquad$
5.5 It has been suggested that the Tax Office seek to establish a more cooperative relationship with large businesses, involving regular contacts where:

- business aspects are discussed;
- risks anticipated;
- problem issues cooperatively settled; and
- mutual assistance provided.

What is your view about this approach?

| 1. $\{\mathbf{P 1 1 Q 5 5 1 \}}$ I would approve of such an approach . |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Mean 5.09 | n | 58 | 30 | 42 | 196 | 189 | 171 | 256 | [942] | (23) |
| Std Dev 1.71 | \% | 6.2 | 3.2 | 4.5 | 20.8 | 20.1 | 18.2 | 27.2 | [100.0] | (2.4) |
| 2. \{P11Q552\} This approach would mean being unfairly soft on |  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ل |  |  |
| large businesses.. |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean 3.74 | n | 134 | 114 | 164 | 241 | 112 | 81 | 93 | [939] | (26) |
| Std Dev 1.80 | \% | 14.3 | 12.1 | 17.5 | 25.7 | 11.9 | 8.6 | 9.9 | [100.0] | (2.7) |
| 3. $\{\mathbf{P 1 1 Q 5 5 3 \}}$ The Tax Office has an ethical obligation to use |  | L | 1 | L | 1 |  | 1 | ل |  |  |
| this approach |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean 4.58 | n | 71 | 43 | 60 | 307 | 164 | 130 | 158 | [933] | (32) |
| Std Dev 1.69 | \% | 7.6 | 4.6 | 6.4 | 32.9 | 17.6 | 13.9 | 16.9 | [100.0] | (3.3) |
| 4. \{P11Q554\} This approach would encourage large businesses |  | L | 1 |  | 1 | 1 | 1 | - |  |  |
| to evade tax... |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean 3.45 | n | 164 | 155 | 182 | 207 | 81 | 47 | 99 | [935] | (30) |
| Std Dev 1.84 | \% | 17.5 | 16.6 | 19.5 | 22.1 | 8.7 | 5.0 | 10.6 | [100.0] | (3.1) |
| 5. \{P11Q555\} This approach would make large business more |  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ل |  |  |
| committed to the tax system................................................... |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean 4.64 | n | 89 | 46 | 58 | 224 | 197 | 158 | 167 | [939] | (26) |
| Std Dev 1.79 | \% | 9.5 | 4.9 | 6.2 | 23.9 | 21.0 | 16.8 | 17.8 | [100.0] | (2.7) |

5.6 Imagine another case: A tradesperson gave "discounts" for customers in return for being paid in cash. Here, the tradesperson was able to reduce tax illegally by $\$ 10,000$. This is the second time the tradesperson has been caught for such an offence.

The Tax Office would demand that the tradesperson pay back the evaded tax plus interest. In addition, a penalty would be applied. In your opinion, what would be an appropriate penalty?

5. $\{\mathbf{P 1 1 Q 5 6 5 \}}$ Imagine the tradesperson were to be fined. In your opinion, what would be an appropriate fine in dollars?
$\qquad$ See Appendix Five
6. \{P11Q566\} Imagine the tradesperson were to be sent to prison. In your opinion, what would be an appropriate sentence in months?
$\qquad$ months

See Appendix Six
5.7 Imagine the tradesperson (X) had to pay a substantial fine or penalty. What is your opinion on the following questions?

|  |  | Not at $\stackrel{a l l}{\square}$ |  |  |  | 1 | Very much - |  |  | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1. $\{\mathbf{P 1 2 Q}$ | 1\} Do |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |  |  |
| Mean | 4.79 | n | 49 | 73 | 94 | 170 | 184 | 150 | 215 | [935] | (30) |
| Std Dev | 1.78 | \% | 5.2 | 7.8 | 10.1 | 18.2 | 19.7 | 16.0 | 23.0 | [100.0] | (3.1) |
| 2. $\{\mathbf{P 1 2 Q 5 7 2 \}}$ Do you think $X$ should accept responsibility for receiving the penalty? |  |  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ل |  |  |
|  |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 5.46 | n | 23 | 28 | 42 | 146 | 180 | 196 | 321 | [936] | (29) |
| Std Dev | 1.54 | \% | 2.5 | 3.0 | 4.5 | 15.6 | 19.2 | 20.9 | 34.3 | [100.0] | (3.0) |
| 3. $\{\mathbf{P 1 2 Q 5 7 3}\}$ Do you think the Tax Office is to blame for X receiving the penalty? |  |  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | , |  |  |
|  |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 2.65 | n | 361 | 180 | 113 | 126 | 57 | 34 | 59 | [930] | (35) |
| Std Dev | 1.83 | \% | 38.8 | 19.4 | 12.2 | 13.5 | 6.1 | 3.7 | 6.3 | [100.0] | (3.6) |
| 4. $\{\mathbf{P 1 2 Q 5 7 4 \}}$ Do you think $X$ knew the probable consequences of his/her evasion? |  |  | L | 1 |  | 1 |  | 1 | - |  |  |
|  |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 5.41 | n | 23 | 35 | 66 | 123 | 172 | 183 | 327 | [929] | (36) |
| Std Dev | 1.61 | \% | 2.5 | 3.8 | 7.1 | 13.2 | 18.5 | 19.7 | 35.2 | [100.0] | (3.7) |
| 5. $\{$ P12Q575\} Do you think $X$ should be excused from the penalty? |  |  | L | 1 |  | 1 |  | 1 | ل |  |  |
|  |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 2.30 | n | 421 | 179 | 145 | 94 | 35 | 29 | 30 | [933] | (32) |
| Std Dev | 1.60 | \% | 45.1 | 19.2 | 15.5 | 10.1 | 3.8 | 3.1 | 3.2 | [100.0] | (3.3) |
|  |  |  | L | 1 |  | 1 |  | 1 | ل |  |  |
| 6. $\{\mathbf{P 1 2 Q 5 7 6 \}}$ Do you think X was negligent for this evasion?........ |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 4.79 | n | 100 | 53 | 68 | 157 | 138 | 160 | 250 | [926] | (39) |
| Std Dev | 1.98 | \% | 10.8 | 5.7 | 7.3 | 17.0 | 14.9 | 17.3 | 27.0 | [100.0] | (4.0) |
| 7. \{P12Q577\} Do you think $X$ was justified in trying to reducetax? .................................................................................. |  |  | L | 1 |  | 1 |  | 1 | ل |  |  |
|  |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 3.34 | n | 242 | 148 | 104 | 170 | 110 | 70 | 86 | [930] | (35) |
| Std Dev | 1.98 | \% | 26.0 | 15.9 | 11.2 | 18.3 | 11.8 | 7.5 | 9.2 | [100.0] | (3.6) |
| 8. $\{\mathbf{P 1 2 Q 5 7 8}\}$ Do you feel angry about the fact that X received the penalty? |  |  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ل |  |  |
|  |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 2.52 | n | 400 | 162 | 100 | 135 | 61 | 41 | 34 | [933] | (32) |
| Std Dev | 1.75 | \% | 42.9 | 17.4 | 10.7 | 14.5 | 6.5 | 4.4 | 3.6 | [100.0] | (3.3) |
| 9. $\{P 12 Q 579\}$ Do you feel pleased about the fact that X received the penalty? |  |  | L | 1 |  | 1 |  | 1 | 」 |  |  |
|  |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 4.17 | n | 136 | 85 | 82 | 227 | 142 | 103 | 158 | [933] | (32) |
| Std Dev | 1.96 | \% | 14.6 | 9.1 | 8.8 | 24.3 | 15.2 | 11.0 | 16.9 | [100.0] | (3.3) |
| 10. $\{P 12 Q 5710\}$ Do you feel sympathetic for $X$ who received the penalty? |  |  | L | । | \| | 1 | 1 | 1 | ل |  |  |
|  |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 3.27 | n | 258 | 137 | 93 | 192 | 121 | 53 | 78 | [932] | (33) |
| Std Dev | 1.94 | \% | 27.7 | 14.7 | 10.0 | 20.6 | 13.0 | 5.7 | 8.4 | [100.0] | (3.4) |
|  |  |  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 」 |  |  |
| 11. $\{\mathbf{P 1 2 Q 5 7 1 1 \}}$ Do you approve of $X$ receiving the penalty? ......... |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 5.10 | n | 54 | 52 | 60 | 147 | 168 | 165 | 285 | [931] | (34) |
| Std Dev | 1.80 | \% | 5.8 | 5.6 | 6.4 | 15.8 | 18.0 | 17.7 | 30.6 | [100.0] | (3.5) |
| 12. $\{\mathbf{P 1 2 Q 5 7 1 2}\}$ Do you think $X$ 's tax evasion is a serious offence? |  |  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |  |  |
|  |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 4.86 | n | 55 | 63 | 87 | 177 | 162 | 150 | 241 | [935] | (30) |
| Std Dev | 1.81 | \% | 5.9 | 6.7 | 9.3 | 18.9 | 17.3 | 16.0 | 25.8 | [100.0] | (3.1) |

5.8 Now please imagine you are this tradesperson and you had to pay a substantial fine or penalty for not declaring cash income. How likely is it that you would...

3. $\{$ P13Q583\} Feel that what you had done was wrong.................... Mean 5.22 Std Dev 1.80
4. $\{\mathbf{P 1 3 Q 5 8 4 \}}$
Mean $\quad 4.85$

Std Dev 1.98
5. $\{\mathbf{P 1 3 Q 5 8 5 \}}$ Feel that you wanted to get even with the Tax
$\begin{array}{ll}\text { Office.................. } \\ \text { Mean } & \mathbf{2 . 9 5} \\ \text { Std Dev } & \mathbf{1 . 9 4}\end{array}$
6. $\{$ P13Q586\} Feel unable to decide whether or not you had
done the wrong th
Mean
$\mathbf{2 . 8 0}$
Std Dev 1.79
7. \{P13Q587\} Feel like saying "so what, I've been asked to pay
$\begin{array}{ll}\text { a fine but } I \text { don't } \\ \text { Mean } & \mathbf{2 . 5 7}\end{array}$
Std Dev 1.77
8. $\{\mathbf{P 1 3 Q 5 8 8}\}$ Feel angry with the Tax Office

Mean 3.68
Std Dev 2.04
9. $\{\mathbf{P 1 3 Q 5 8 9}\}$ Feel bothered by thoughts that you were being
$\begin{array}{lc}\text { unfairly treated by } \\ \text { Mean } & \mathbf{3 . 3 4}\end{array}$
Std Dev 1.91
$\begin{array}{lr}\text { 10. }\{P 13 Q 5810\} \\ \text { Mean } & \mathbf{5 . 3 5} \\ \text { Std Dev } & \mathbf{1 . 7 4}\end{array}$
11. $\{\mathbf{P 1 3 Q 5 8 1 1}\}$ Take personal responsibility for the mistakes
you made ...........
Mean
$\mathbf{5 . 6 5}$
Std Dev 1.54
12. $\{\mathbf{P 1 3 Q 5 8 1 2}\}$ Pretend that nothing had happened.
$\begin{array}{ll}\text { Mean } & 2.47 \\ \text { Std Dev } & 1.68\end{array}$
13. $\{\mathbf{P 1 3 Q 5 8 1 3}\}$ Feel that if you ruled the world it would be a
much better place
Mean $\quad 3.48$
Std Dev
14. $\{\mathbf{P 1 3 Q 5 8 1 4 \}}$ Take the risk and not pay the penalty ....................

Mean $\quad 1.87$
Std Dev 1.42
15. $\{\mathbf{P 1 3 Q 5 8 1 5}\}$ Feel that only you should be in control of your personal finances and taxation.
Mean $\quad 3.35$
16. $\{\mathbf{P 1 3 Q 5 8 1 6}\}$ Feel that you had the right to live your life the
way you want
$\begin{array}{ll}\text { Mean } & 3.46 \\ \end{array}$
Std Dev 1.98
17. $\{\mathbf{P 1 3 Q 5 8 1 7 \}}$ Resent the Tax Office having control over you.....

| Mean | 3.68 |
| :--- | :--- |
| Std Dev | $\mathbf{2 . 0 5}$ |

18. $\{\mathbf{P 1 3 Q 5 8 1 8}\}$ Try to talk your way out of the penalty ................. $\begin{array}{ll}\text { Mean } & 3.45 \\ \text { Std }\end{array}$
Std Dev 2.07

|  | Not likely |  | 1 | 1 | Very likely |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| n | 55 | 48 | 60 | 112 | 177 | 172 | 315 | [939] | (26) |
| \% | 5.9 | 5.1 | 6.4 | 11.9 | 18.8 | 18.3 | 33.5 | [100.0] | (2.7) |
|  |  | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | $\downarrow$ |  |  |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| n | 84 | 67 | 85 | 141 | 127 | 161 | 271 | [936] | (29) |
| \% | 9.0 | 7.2 | 9.1 | 15.1 | 13.6 | 17.2 | 29.0 | [100.0] | (3.0) |
|  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | , |  |  |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| n | 307 | 176 | 115 | 130 | 84 | 49 | 75 | [936] | (29) |
| \% | 32.8 | 18.8 | 12.3 | 13.9 | 9.0 | 5.2 | 8.0 | [100.0] | (3.0) |
|  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |  |  |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| n | 327 | 157 | 100 | 207 | 61 | 30 | 52 | [934] | (31) |
| \% | 35.0 | 16.8 | 10.7 | 22.2 | 6.5 | 3.2 | 5.6 | [100.0] | (3.2) |
|  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | $\downarrow$ |  |  |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| n | 387 | 167 | 104 | 137 | 60 | 39 | 42 | [936] | (29) |
| \% | 41.3 | 17.8 | 11.1 | 14.6 | 6.4 | 4.2 | 4.5 | [100.0] | (3.0) |
|  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ل |  |  |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| n | 206 | 116 | 111 | 169 | 126 | 91 | 119 | [938] | (27) |
| \% | 22.0 | 12.4 | 11.8 | 18.0 | 13.4 | 9.7 | 12.7 | [100.0] | (2.8) |
|  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ل |  |  |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| n | 228 | 141 | 130 | 172 | 122 | 61 | 79 | [933] | (32) |
| \% | 24.4 | 15.1 | 13.9 | 18.4 | 13.1 | 6.5 | 8.5 | [100.0] | (3.3) |
|  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | $\downarrow$ |  |  |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| n | 47 | 40 | 47 | 130 | 153 | 187 | 336 | [940] | (25) |
| \% | 5.0 | 4.3 | 5.0 | 13.8 | 16.3 | 19.9 | 35.7 | [100.0] | (2.6) |
|  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |  |  |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| n | 32 | 20 | 35 | 96 | 157 | 233 | 367 | [940] | (25) |
| \% | 3.4 | 2.1 | 3.7 | 10.2 | 16.7 | 24.8 | 39.0 | [100.0] | (2.6) |
|  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ل |  |  |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| n | 388 | 189 | 104 | 146 | 48 | 25 | 38 | [938] | (27) |
| \% | 41.4 | 20.1 | 11.1 | 15.6 | 5.1 | 2.7 | 4.1 | [100.0] | (2.8) |
|  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - |  |  |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| n | 294 | 124 | 51 | 168 | 66 | 52 | 177 | [932] | (33) |
| \% | 31.5 | 13.3 | 5.5 | 18.0 | 7.1 | 5.6 | 19.0 | [100.0] | (3.4) |
|  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |  |  |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| n | 556 | 192 | 67 | 66 | 19 | 10 | 27 | [937] | (28) |
| \% | 59.3 | 20.5 | 7.2 | 7.0 | 2.0 | 1.1 | 2.9 | [100.0] | (2.9) |
|  | $L$ | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - |  |  |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| n | 231 | 131 | 108 | 241 | 79 | 49 | 93 | [932] | (33) |
| \% | 24.8 | 14.1 | 11.6 | 25.9 | 8.5 | 5.3 | 10.0 | [100.0] | (3.4) |
|  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | $\square$ |  |  |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| n | 217 | 145 | 104 | 201 | 104 | 51 | 111 | [933] | (32) |
| \% | 23.3 | 15.5 | 11.1 | 21.5 | 11.1 | 5.5 | 11.9 | [100.0] | (3.3) |
|  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - |  |  |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| n | 203 | 135 | 90 | 170 | 130 | 91 | 118 | [937] | (28) |
| \% | 21.7 | 14.4 | 9.6 | 18.1 | 13.9 | 9.7 | 12.6 | [100.0] | (2.9) |
|  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - |  |  |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| n | 252 | 131 | 101 | 147 | 115 | 84 | 107 | [937] | (28) |
| \% | 26.9 | 14.0 | 10.8 | 15.7 | 12.3 | 9.0 | 11.4 | [100.0] | (2.9) |

## 6. DEALING With Tax Evasion

6.1 In the following statements, there are some more general positions concerning the issue of law enforcement. Please indicate to what extent you disagree or agree with these views.


1．$\{\mathbf{P 1 5 Q 6 2 1}\}$ Through informing and encouraging taxpayers to comply voluntarily

| Mean | 5.17 |
| :--- | :--- |
| Std Dev | 1.63 |

2．$\{\mathbf{P 1 5 Q 6 2 2}\}$ Through discussions involving Tax Office personnel，taxpayers and tax agents to sort out problems ．．．

| Mean | $\mathbf{5 . 3 2}$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| Std Dev | $\mathbf{1 . 5 0}$ |

3．$\{\mathbf{P 1 5 Q 6 2 3}\}$ Through enforcing strict rules and disciplining the guilty．．

4．$\{\mathbf{P 1 5 Q 6 2 4}\}$ Through discussions first，and then stricter
enforcement of rules if the tax evasion problem is not resolved．．．．．．．．．
Mean 5.51
Std Dev 1.40
\｛P15Q625\} Through exposing people who cheat the tax
system（e．g．，publishing names of tax evaders in the Tax Office
annual report）．．．
Mean $\quad 4.44$
\｛P15Q626\} Through increasing connections between the
evaders and community members
$\begin{array}{ll}\text { Mean } & 4.34\end{array}$
\｛P15Q627\} Through ensuring that evaders become more
competent in dealing with their taxes legally
Mean 5.52
Std Dev 1.41
8．$\{\mathbf{P 1 5 Q 6 2 8}\}$ Through providing incentives for paying the correct amount of tax
Mean 5.62
Std Dev 1.60

|  | Strongly disagree L | 1 | ｜ | 1 |  | 1 | Strongly agree |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| n | 33 | 31 | 72 | 183 | 180 | 170 | 272 |
| \％ | 3.5 | 3.3 | 7.7 | 19.4 | 19.1 | 18.1 | 28.9 |
|  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | － |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| n | 24 | 20 | 48 | 184 | 203 | 190 | 275 |
| \％ | 2.5 | 2.1 | 5.1 | 19.5 | 21.5 | 20.1 | 29.1 |
|  | L | 1 | 」 | 1 | 1 | 」 | ل |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| n | 34 | 40 | 102 | 168 | 212 | 164 | 223 |
| \％ | 3.6 | 4.2 | 10.8 | 17.8 | 22.5 | 17.4 | 23.6 |
|  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 」 |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| n | 18 | 14 | 35 | 139 | 227 | 215 | 296 |
| \％ | 1.9 | 1.5 | 3.7 | 14.7 | 24.0 | 22.8 | 31.4 |


| $L$ | $\mid$ |  | $\mid$ |  | $\mid$ | $ل$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| $\mathbf{1 2 3}$ | $\mathbf{8 5}$ | $\mathbf{9 9}$ | $\mathbf{1 5 8}$ | $\mathbf{1 1 8}$ | $\mathbf{1 4 2}$ | $\mathbf{2 1 7}$ |
| $\mathbf{1 3 . 1}$ | $\mathbf{9 . 0}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 . 5}$ | $\mathbf{1 6 . 8}$ | $\mathbf{1 2 . 5}$ | $\mathbf{1 5 . 1}$ | $\mathbf{2 3 . 0}$ |


| $\llcorner$ | $ل$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| $\mathbf{7 1}$ | $\mathbf{5 9}$ | $\mathbf{1 1 2}$ | $\mathbf{2 7 9}$ | $\mathbf{1 7 9}$ | $\mathbf{9 8}$ | $\mathbf{1 2 7}$ |
| $\mathbf{7 . 7}$ | $\mathbf{6 . 4}$ | $\mathbf{1 2 . 1}$ | $\mathbf{3 0 . 2}$ | $\mathbf{1 9 . 4}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 . 6}$ | $\mathbf{1 3 . 7}$ |


| $L$ | $\mid$ | $\mid$ | $\mid$ | $\mid$ | $\mid$ | $\mid$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| $\mathbf{1 7}$ | $\mathbf{1 6}$ | $\mathbf{3 5}$ | $\mathbf{1 4 3}$ | $\mathbf{2 1 3}$ | $\mathbf{2 1 4}$ | $\mathbf{3 0 1}$ |


| $\%$ | 1.8 | 1.7 | 3.7 | 15.2 | 22.7 | 22.8 | 32.1 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |


| $L$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| $\mathbf{3 4}$ | $\mathbf{2 9}$ | $\mathbf{2 7}$ | $\mathbf{1 1 2}$ | $\mathbf{1 5 2}$ | $\mathbf{1 9 7}$ | $\mathbf{3 8 9}$ |
| $\mathbf{3 . 6}$ | $\mathbf{3 . 1}$ | $\mathbf{2 9}$ | $\mathbf{1 1 9}$ | $\mathbf{1 6 . 2}$ | $\mathbf{2 1 . 0}$ | $\mathbf{4 1 . 4}$ |

［940］$\quad \underset{(25)}{\text { Missing Data }}$
［100．0］（2．6）

6．3 How effective do you think the following items would be in reducing tax evasion？

1．$\{\mathbf{P 1 5 Q 6 3 1}\}$ Evaders acknowledge their wrongdoing ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． Mean 3.99 Std Dev 1.95

2．$\{\mathbf{P 1 5 Q 6 3 2}\}$ Evaders acknowledge their accountability for the
Wrongdoing
M．．．．．．
$\mathbf{4 . 4 5}$
Std Dev 1.88
3．$\{\mathbf{P 1 5 Q 6 3 3}\}$ Evaders receive a thorough explanation for the
Tax Office＇s deci
Mean
$\mathbf{5 . 0 4}$
Std Dev 1.76
4．$\{\mathbf{P 1 5 Q 6 3 4}\}$ Evaders receive an honest explanation for the Tax
Office＇s decision
Mean 5.24
Std Dev 1.71

5．$\{\mathbf{P 1 5 Q 6 3 5}\}$ Evaders are granted forgiveness by the Tax office．． $\begin{array}{ll}\text { Mean } & 3.08 \\ \text { Std Dev } & \mathbf{1 . 9 2}\end{array}$

6．$\{\mathbf{P 1 5 Q 6 3 6}\}$ Evaders feel that they received forgiveness from the Tax Office
Mean 3.31
Std Dev 1.95

|  | Not at all effective L | 1 | 1 | ， | 1 | 1 | Very effective |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| n | 134 | 121 | 112 | 198 | 143 | 94 | 139 |
| \％ | 14.2 | 12.9 | 11.9 | 21.0 | 15.2 | 10.0 | 14.8 |

$\mathbf{n}$
$\%$

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| n | $\mathbf{5 6}$ | $\mathbf{4 3}$ | $\mathbf{6 6}$ | $\mathbf{1 5 8}$ | $\mathbf{1 9 1}$ | $\mathbf{1 7 1}$ | $\mathbf{2 5 6}$ |
| \％ | $\mathbf{6 . 0}$ | $\mathbf{4 . 6}$ | $\mathbf{7 . 0}$ | $\mathbf{1 6 . 8}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 . 3}$ | $\mathbf{1 8 . 2}$ | $\mathbf{2 7 . 2}$ |




| $[941]$ | $(24)$ |
| :---: | :---: |
| $[100.0]$ | $(2.5)$ |


| Total Valid | Missing Data |
| :---: | :---: |
| $[\mathbf{9 4 2}]$ | $\mathbf{( 2 3 )}$ |
| $[\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0}]$ | $\mathbf{( 2 . 4 )}$ |


| Total Valid | Missing Data |
| :---: | :---: |
| $[\mathbf{9 4 1}]$ | $\mathbf{( 2 4 )}$ |
| $[\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0}]$ | $\mathbf{( 2 . 5 )}$ |

Total Valid Missing Data
［944］（21）
Total Valid Missing Data

| $[941]$ | $(24)$ |
| :---: | :---: |
| $[100.0]$ | $(25)$ |

Total Valid Missing Data
［939］（26）
6.4 To what extent do you agree that tax evaders deserve...

1. $\{$ P16Q641 $\}$
Respectful treatment.....................................................................
Mean
Std Dev
1.81 2. $\{\mathbf{P 1 6 Q 6 4 2}\}$ Consideration of their personal feelings ..................... Mean 4.01 Std Dev 1.77

Mean $\quad 4.70$

Std Dev 1.73
4. $\{\mathbf{P 1 6 Q 6 4 4}\}$ Consideration of their personal needs and well-
being ...................
Mean
Std Dev 1.78
5. $\{\mathbf{P 1 6 Q 6 4 5}\}$ To have their rights respected

Mean 5.02
Std Dev 1.73
6. $\{$ P16Q646\} Opportunities for learning about their tax
obligations .........
Mean
$\mathbf{5 . 6 6}$
Std Dev 1.38
6.5 What do you think about the following statements?

| \} Tax evaders are to blame for their evasion... |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| Mean | 5.03 |
| Std Dev | 1.63 |
| 2. $\{P 16 \mathrm{Q}$ evasion. | $2\}$ Th |
| Mean | 3.27 |
| Std Dev | 1.75 |

3. $\{\mathbf{P 1 6 Q 6 5 3}\}$ Tax evaders understand their tax obligations well ....
Mean 4.60

Std Dev 1.71
4. $\{\mathbf{P 1 6 Q 6 5 4 \}}$ Tax evaders are reckless in committing tax
evasion................
Mean
$\mathbf{4 . 7 4}$

Std Dev 1.61
5. $\{\mathbf{P 1 6 Q 6 5 5 \}}$ Tax evaders know their tax rights .............................

| Mean | 4.59 |
| :--- | :--- |
| Std Dev | 1.65 |

6. $\{\mathbf{P 1 6 Q 6 5 6 \}}$ People who do not pay the correct amount of
$\begin{array}{lr}\text { taxes harm societ } \\ \text { Mean } & \mathbf{5 . 3 3} \\ \text { Std Dev } & \mathbf{1 . 6 2}\end{array}$
7. $\{P 16 Q 657\}$ The harm caused to the community through tax
evasion is regretab
Mean
$\mathbf{5 . 0 3}$
Std Dev 1.63
8. $\{\mathbf{P 1 6 Q 6 5 8}\}$ It makes it difficult to govern the country when
people don't pay their correct amount of tax.
$\begin{array}{ll}\text { Mean } & 5.37\end{array}$
Std Dev 1.62

|  | at a | 1 |  |  |  |  | $\xrightarrow{\text { much }}$ |  | Missing Data <br> (24) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid <br> [941] <br> [100.0] |  |
| n | 103 | 54 | 119 | 259 | 146 | 121 | 139 |  |  |
| \% | 10.9 | 5.7 | 12.6 | 27.5 | 15.5 | 12.9 | 14.8 |  | (2.5) |
|  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ل |  |  |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid [939] <br> [100.0] | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Missing Data } \\ & \mathbf{( 2 6 )} \\ & \mathbf{( 2 . 7 )} \end{aligned}$ |
| n | 116 | 75 | 142 | 258 | 153 | 89 | 106 |  |  |
| \% | 12.4 | 8.0 | 15.1 | 27.5 | 16.3 | 9.5 | 11.3 |  |  |
|  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ل |  |  |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | $\begin{gathered} \text { Total Valid } \\ {[\mathbf{9 3 8}]} \\ {[\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0}]} \end{gathered}$ | Missing Data <br> (27) <br> (2.8) |
| n | 68 | 39 | 71 | 264 | 170 | 134 | 192 |  |  |
| \% | 7.2 | 4.2 | 7.6 | 28.1 | 18.1 | 14.3 | 20.5 |  |  |
|  | L | , | 1 | 1 |  | 1 | ل |  |  |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | $\begin{gathered} \text { Total Valid } \\ {[\mathbf{9 3 6 ]}} \\ {[\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0}]} \end{gathered}$ | Missing Data <br> (29) <br> (3.0) |
| n | 85 | 61 | 99 | 251 | 178 | 108 | 154 |  |  |
| \% | 9.1 | 6.5 | 10.6 | 26.8 | 19.0 | 11.5 | 16.5 |  |  |
|  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 |  | 1 | - |  |  |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | $\begin{gathered} \text { Total Valid } \\ {[\mathbf{9 4 0 ]}} \\ {[\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0 ]}} \end{gathered}$ | Missing Data <br> (25) <br> (2.6) |
| n | 57 | 28 | 65 | 211 | 163 | 162 | 254 |  |  |
| \% | 6.1 | 3.0 | 6.9 | 22.4 | 17.3 | 17.2 | 27.0 |  |  |
|  | L | , | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ل |  |  |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | $\begin{gathered} \text { Total Valid } \\ {[\mathbf{9 3 8}]} \\ {[\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0}]} \end{gathered}$ | Missing Data <br> (27) |
| n | 16 | 15 | 17 | 139 | 194 | 211 | 346 |  |  |
| \% | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 14.8 | 20.7 | 22.5 | 36.9 |  | (2.8) |

$\left.\begin{array}{cccccccccc} & \begin{array}{c}\text { Strongly } \\ \text { disagree }\end{array} & & & & & & & & \text { Strongly } \\ \text { agree }\end{array}\right]$

| 9. $\{$ P17Q659\} It is disappointing that some people do not paytheir correct amount of tax $\ldots$................................................. |  |  | isagree |  |  |  |  | agree |  |  | Data |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid |  |
| Mean | 5.95 | n | 3 | 6 | 26 | 89 | 169 | 232 | 416 | [941] | (24) |
| Std Dev | 1.20 | \% | 0.3 | 0.6 | 2.8 | 9.5 | 18.0 | 24.7 | 44.2 | [100.0] | (2.5) |
| 10. $\{\mathbf{P 1 7 Q 6 5 1 0 \}}$ I am not really concerned about whether mypaying tax benefits the country as a whole .......................... |  |  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ل |  |  |
|  |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 2.51 | n | 349 | 212 | 138 | 126 | 53 | 23 | 38 | [939] | (26) |
| Std Dev | 1.65 | \% | 37.2 | 22.6 | 14.7 | 13.4 | 5.6 | 2.4 | 4.0 | [100.0] | (2.7) |
| 11. $\{\mathbf{P 1 7 Q 6 5 1 1 \}}$ It is important that people don't harm our society as evaders do |  |  | L | 1 |  | 1 |  | 1 | ل |  |  |
|  |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 5.23 | n | 22 | 24 | 52 | 220 | 184 | 164 | 267 | [933] | (32) |
| Std Dev | 1.53 | \% | 2.4 | 2.6 | 5.6 | 23.6 | 19.7 | 17.6 | 28.6 | [100.0] | (3.3) |
| 12. $\{\mathbf{P 1 7 Q 6 5 1 2 \}}$ We should comply with the tax system becauseit is the law ............................................................................ |  |  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ل |  |  |
|  |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 5.56 | n | 21 | 13 | 38 | 154 | 173 | 204 | 336 | [939] | (26) |
| Std Dev | 1.47 | \% | 2.2 | 1.4 | 4.0 | 16.4 | 18.4 | 21.7 | 35.8 | [100.0] | (2.7) |
| 13. $\{\mathbf{P 1 7 Q 6 5 1 3}\}$ Citizens have the right to choose not to comply with the tax system. |  |  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ل |  |  |
|  |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 2.23 | n | 475 | 168 | 102 | 102 | 32 | 21 | 41 | [941] | (24) |
| Std Dev | 1.66 | \% | 50.5 | 17.9 | 10.8 | 10.8 | 3.4 | 2.2 | 4.4 | [100.0] | (2.5) |
| 14. $\{$ P17Q6514\} Not paying the correct amount of taxes violates one's duty as a citizen |  |  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - |  |  |
|  |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 5.21 | n | 42 | 36 | 68 | 164 | 154 | 176 | 299 | [939] | (26) |
| Std Dev | 1.72 | \% | 4.5 | 3.8 | 7.2 | 17.5 | 16.4 | 18.7 | 31.8 | [100.0] | (2.7) |

6.6 Imagine yourself in the following situation: You have been paid $\$ 5000$ in cash for work that you have done outside your regular job. You don't declare it on your tax return.

1. $\{\mathbf{P 1 7 Q 6 6 1 \}}$ The chances that you will get caught are ................... Mean 3.66
Std Dev 1.89
2. $\{\mathbf{P 1 7 Q 6 6 2}\}$ If you got caught, how much of a problem would the consequences be for you? .
Mean 5.48
Std Dev 1.46
3. $\{\mathbf{P 1 7 Q 6 6 3}\}$ Would you feel embarrassed?
$\begin{array}{ll}\text { Mean } & 5.45 \\ \text { Std Dev } & 1.75\end{array}$
4. $\{$ P17Q664 $\}$ Would you feel guilty?..............................................

| Mean | $\mathbf{5 . 3 2}$ |
| :--- | ---: |
| Std Dev | $\mathbf{1 . 8 1}$ |


6.7 Imagine yourself in another situation: You have claimed $\$ 5000$ as work deductions when the expenses have nothing to do with work.

|  | Very low |  |  | 1 | 1 | Very high |  |  |  | Missing Data |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1. $\{\mathbf{P 1 7 Q 6 7 1 \}}$ The chances that you will get caught are .... |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid |  |
| Mean 4.76 | n | 50 | 45 | 98 | 207 | 201 | 168 | 170 | [939] | (26) |
| Std Dev 1.66 | \% | 5.3 | 4.8 | 10.4 | 22.0 | 21.4 | 17.9 | 18.1 | [100.0] | (2.7) |
| 2. $\{\mathbf{P 1 7 Q 6 7 2}\}$ If you got caught, how much of a problem would | Not at all |  | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ery mı |  |  |
| the consequences be for you? |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean 5.55 | n | 14 | 22 | 34 | 118 | 225 | 225 | 302 | [940] | (25) |
| Std Dev 1.39 | \% | 1.5 | 2.3 | 3.6 | 12.6 | 23.9 | 23.9 | 32.1 | [100.0] | (2.6) |
|  | Not at all |  |  | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ery mu |  |  |
| 3. $\{\mathbf{P 1 7 Q 6 7 3 \}}$ Would you feel embarrassed?. |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean 5.58 | n | 38 | 25 | 30 | 89 | 193 | 204 | 359 | [938] | (27) |
| Std Dev 1.59 | \% | 4.1 | 2.7 | 3.2 | 9.5 | 20.6 | 21.7 | 38.3 | [100.0] | (2.8) |
|  | Not at all | $\stackrel{4}{4}$ | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ery mı |  |  |
| 4. \{P17Q674\} Would you feel guilty?.................................. |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean 5.53 | n | 39 | 24 | 47 | 98 | 169 | 204 | 358 | [939] | (26) |
| Std Dev 1.63 | \% | 4.2 | 2.6 | 5.0 | 10.4 | 18.0 | 21.7 | 38.1 | [100.0] | (2.7) |

## 7. Your Views on Tax Schemes

7.1 Below are some statements that relate to tax effective schemes. A tax effective scheme is an artificial arrangement that is entered into by a taxpayer in order to obtain a contrived tax benefit. For instance, for a small outlay (say $\$ 400$ ) it may provide deductions of $\$ 10,000$. How much do you agree with the following statements?

1. $\{\mathbf{P 1 8 Q 7 1 1 \}}$ It's alright to $g o$ in for a tax scheme ................................... Mean 3.33
Std Dev 1.86
\{P18Q712\} I would not touch any tax scheme or shelter like an agricultural scheme that did not have a Product Ruling from the Tax Office to say it was OK.

## Mean 5.81 <br> Std Dev 1.49

3. $\{\mathbf{P 1 8 Q 7 1 3}\}$ I would not touch any tax scheme or shelter like
an agricultural scheme that did not have a credible lawyer's
opinion to say it was OK

| $\llcorner$ | $\perp$ |  |  |  | $\perp$ |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| $\mathbf{5 7}$ | $\mathbf{2 8}$ | $\mathbf{4 5}$ | $\mathbf{1 7 5}$ | $\mathbf{1 1 2}$ | $\mathbf{1 6 0}$ | $\mathbf{3 4 8}$ |
| $\mathbf{6 . 2}$ | $\mathbf{3 . 0}$ | $\mathbf{4 . 9}$ | $\mathbf{1 8 . 9}$ | $\mathbf{1 2 . 1}$ | $\mathbf{1 7 . 3}$ | $\mathbf{3 7 . 6}$ |


| Total Valid | Missing Data |
| :---: | :---: |
| $[\mathbf{9 2 5 ]}$ | $\mathbf{( 4 0 )}$ |

## Std Dev $\quad \mathbf{1 . 8}$

\{P18Q714\} I would not touch any tax scheme or shelter like
an agricultural scheme unless I believed it to be completely
legitimate.
Mean $\quad 5.90$
Std Dev 1.49

|  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { rongly } \\ & \text { sagree } \end{aligned}$ | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Strongly agree 1 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| n | 228 | 126 | 99 | 256 | 90 | 55 | 72 |
| \% | 24.6 | 13.6 | 10.7 | 27.6 | 9.7 | 5.9 | 7.8 |


| Total Valid | Missing Data |
| :---: | :---: |
| $[\mathbf{9 2 6}]$ | $\mathbf{( 3 9 )}$ |
| $[\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0}]$ | $\mathbf{( 4 . 0 )}$ |


|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 23 | 17 | 16 | 139 | 102 | 195 | 435 |
| 2.5 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 15.0 | 11.0 | 21.0 | 46.9 |


| Total Valid | Missing Data |
| :---: | :---: |
| $[\mathbf{9 2 7}]$ | $\mathbf{( 3 8 )}$ |
| $[\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0}]$ | $\mathbf{( 3 . 9 )}$ |

$7.2\{\mathbf{P 1 8 Q 7 2 \}}$ Compared with five years ago do you think people are more prepared or less prepared to go in for tax schemes?

|  |  |  | in | n | \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Much more prepared | 1 | 135 | 14.5 |
|  |  | A little more prepared | 2 | 162 | 17.5 |
|  |  | About the same.. | 3 | 180 | 19.4 |
|  |  | A little less prepared. | 4 | 81 | 8.7 |
|  |  | Much less prepared | 5 | 75 | 8.1 |
|  |  | Don't know..... | ........ 6 | 295 | 31.8 |
| Mean | 3.74 |  | Total Valid | [928] | [100.0] |
| Std Dev | 1.87 |  | Missing Data | (37) | (3.8) |

7.3 A real situation: From the early 1990s thousands of Australians invested in tax effective schemes after receiving advice from their tax agents that they were legitimate. In 1998 the Tax Office ruled that many of these schemes were in fact designed to defraud the tax system. As a result, the Tax Office asked investors to pay back tax and to pay appropriate interest and penalties.

1. $\{\mathbf{P 1 8 Q 7 3 1}\}$ The Tax Office's decision to pursue investors up to six years after they invested was fair. Mean 3.19
Std Dev 2.04
2. $\{\mathbf{P 1 8 Q 7 3 2}\}$ The Tax Office should only penalise investors who invested in schemes after 1998.

| Mean | 5.14 |
| :--- | :--- |
| Std Dev | $\mathbf{1 . 9 3}$ |

3. $\{P 18 Q 733\}$ People who invested in tax schemes are tax cheats...
Mean

| Mean | 3.28 |
| :--- | :--- |
| Std Dev | 1.87 |

4. $\{\mathbf{P 1 8 Q 7 3 4}\}$ Tax scheme investors deserve to be fined and charged interest on owed tax.

|  | Strongly disagree L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | trongly agree $\xrightarrow{1}$ |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| n | 282 | 146 | 128 | 139 | 71 | 69 | 99 | [934] | (31) |
| \% | 30.2 | 15.6 | 13.7 | 14.9 | 7.6 | 7.4 | 10.6 | [100.0] | (3.2) |
|  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ل |  |  |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| n | 83 | 42 | 49 | 133 | 123 | 187 | 314 | [931] | (34) |
| \% | 8.9 | 4.5 | 5.3 | 14.3 | 13.2 | 20.1 | 33.7 | [100.0] | (3.5) |
|  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ل |  |  |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| n | 218 | 157 | 119 | 223 | 76 | 55 | 79 | [927] | (38) |
| \% | 23.5 | 16.9 | 12.8 | 24.1 | 8.2 | 5.9 | 8.5 | [100.0] | (3.9) |
|  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | $\downarrow$ |  |  |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Dat |
| n | 168 | 133 | 123 | 227 | 94 | 67 | 113 | [925] | (40) |
| \% | 18.2 | 14.4 | 13.3 | 24.5 | 10.2 | 7.2 | 12.2 | [100.0] | (4.1) |


| 5. $\{\mathbf{P 1 9 Q 7 3 5 \}}$ Investors should not be punished if they were |  |  | disagree |  |  |  |  | agree |  |  | ta |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| advised b | heir tax |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid |  |
| Mean | 5.41 | n | 42 | 40 | 54 | 122 | 139 | 174 | 361 | [932] | (33) |
| Std Dev | 1.74 | \% | 4.5 | 4.3 | 5.8 | 13.1 | 14.9 | 18.7 | 38.7 | [100.0] | (3.4) |
| 6. $\{\mathbf{P 1 9 Q 7 3 6 \}}$ The Tax Office took too long to identify that therewas a problem with tax schemes................................................... |  |  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 |  | 1 | ل |  |  |
|  |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 6.04 | n | 19 | 5 | 13 | 82 | 118 | 221 | 475 | [933] | (32) |
| Std Dev | 1.31 | \% | 2.0 | 0.5 | 1.4 | 8.8 | 12.6 | 23.7 | 50.9 | [100.0] | (3.3) |
| 7. $\{\mathbf{P 1 9 Q 7 3 7}\}$ Tax agents who advised their clients to invest in tax schemes should be penalised. |  |  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ل |  |  |
|  |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 5.06 | n | 70 | 35 | 55 | 173 | 158 | 158 | 284 | [933] | (32) |
| Std Dev | 1.83 | \% | 7.5 | 3.8 | 5.9 | 18.5 | 16.9 | 16.9 | 30.4 | [100.0] | (3.3) |
| 8. $\{\mathbf{P 1 9 Q} \mathbf{Q 3 8}\}$ The promoters and designers of tax schemes should be penalised |  |  | L | 1 | , | 1 | L | 1 | ل |  |  |
|  |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 5.57 | n | 42 | 18 | 41 | 142 | 121 | 163 | 406 | [933] | (32) |
| Std Dev | 1.68 | \% | 4.5 | 1.9 | 4.4 | 15.2 | 13.0 | 17.5 | 43.5 | [100.0] | (3.3) |

7.4 For years, investors have been lobbying the government to abolish the penalty and interest component owed on their scheme related tax debts. In February 2002, the Tax Office announced that, for ordinary investors, the penalty and interest component would not have to be paid.

1. $\{\mathbf{P 1 9 Q 7 4 1}\}$ The Tax Office's decision to waive interest and penalties on scheme related debts is right

| Mean | 4.96 |
| :--- | :--- |
| Std Dev |  |

Std Dev 1.74
2. $\{\mathbf{P 1 9 Q 7 4 2}\}$ This decision is unfair for other taxpayers who still owe interest and penalties for their tax debts............................... Mean $\quad 4.54$ Std Dev 1.73
3. $\{\mathbf{P 1 9 Q 7 4 3}\}$ The Tax Office should have stood its ground and not backed down
$\begin{array}{ll}\text { Mean } & 3.73 \\ \text { Std Dev } & \mathbf{1 8 9}\end{array}$
4. $\{\mathbf{P 1 9 Q 7 4 4 \}}$ This decision makes the Tax Office look weak........

Mean 3.54
Std Dev 1.88
\{P19Q745\} This decision would make me angry if I had a
different tax debt for which I still had to pay interest and
penalities..........
Mean
$\mathbf{4 . 9}$

Std Dev 1.75
6. $\{\mathbf{P 1 9 Q 7 4 6 \}}$ This decision may make other groups challenge
the Tax Office...
Mean 5.03
Std Dev 1.52
7. $\{\mathbf{P 1 9 Q 7 4 7}\}$ Have you followed the media coverage
surrounding this situation?
$\begin{array}{ll}\text { Mean } & \mathbf{2 . 8 2} \\ \text { Std Dev } & \mathbf{1 . 7 5}\end{array}$

|  | Strongly disagree L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Strongly agree $-1$ |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| n | 57 | 31 | 65 | 224 | 150 | 151 | 245 | [923] | (42) |
| \% | 6.2 | 3.4 | 7.0 | 24.3 | 16.3 | 16.4 | 26.5 | [100.0] | (4.4) |
|  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ل |  |  |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| n | 67 | 47 | 105 | 251 | 159 | 130 | 159 | [918] | (47) |
| \% | 7.3 | 5.1 | 11.4 | 27.3 | 17.3 | 14.2 | 17.3 | [100.0] | (4.9) |
|  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ل |  |  |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| n | 160 | 104 | 118 | 266 | 90 | 71 | 109 | [918] | (47) |
| \% | 17.4 | 11.3 | 12.9 | 29.0 | 9.8 | 7.7 | 11.9 | [100.0] | (4.9) |
|  |  | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| n | 182 | 121 | 131 | 240 | 82 | 72 | 89 | [917] | (48) |
| \% | 19.8 | 13.2 | 14.3 | 26.2 | 8.9 | 7.9 | 9.7 | [100.0] | (5.0) |


|  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ل |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| n | 57 | 34 | 74 | 204 | 144 | 171 | 235 | [919] | (46) |
| \% | 6.2 | 3.7 | 8.1 | 22.2 | 15.7 | 18.6 | 25.6 | [100.0] | (4.8) |
|  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | $\downarrow$ |  |  |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| n | 36 | 18 | 47 | 243 | 204 | 173 | 197 | [918] | (47) |
| \% | 3.9 | 2.0 | 5.1 | 26.5 | 22.2 | 18.8 | 21.5 | [100.0] | (4.9) |


|  | that all | 1 | Very much |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Dat |
| n | 322 | 144 | 110 | 186 | 102 | 28 | 36 | [928] | (37) |
| \% | 34.7 | 15.5 | 11.9 | 20.0 | 11.0 | 3.0 | 3.9 | [100.0] | (3.8) |

## 8. YOU AND THE TAX SYSTEM

8.1 Where do you position yourself within the tax system? When you think about tax, do you see yourself primarily...

2. $\{\mathbf{P 2 0 Q 8 1 2}\}$ In terms of your occupational group.......................... $\begin{array}{ll}\text { Mean } & 3.81 \\ \text { Std Dev } & \mathbf{1 . 9 1}\end{array}$
3. $\{\mathbf{P 2 0 Q 8 1 3}\}$ As a member of the Australian community ................ $\begin{array}{ll}\text { Mean } & 5.22 \\ \text { Std Dev } & 1.74\end{array}$
Std Dev 1.74

Std Dev 1.78
5. $\{\mathbf{P 2 0 Q 8 1 5}\}$ As an honest taxpayer ................................................ Mean $\quad 6.26$
Std Dev 1.08
8.2 What is important to you?

1. $\{\mathbf{P 2 0 Q 8 2 1}\}$ Your individuality
Mean $\quad \mathbf{5 . 8 9}$
$\begin{array}{ll}\text { Mean } & 5.89 \\ \text { Std Dev } & \mathbf{1 . 3 5}\end{array}$
2. $\{\mathbf{P 2 0 Q 8 2 2}\}$ Your occupational group.

Mean 4.27
Std Dev 1.83
3. $\{\mathbf{P 2 0 Q 8 2 3}\}$ The Australian community.

Mean 5.58
Std Dev 1.43
4. $\{\mathbf{P 2 0 Q 8 2 4}\}$ Your income group

Mean 4.48
Std Dev 1.82
5. $\{\mathbf{P 2 0 Q 8 2 5}\}$ Being an honest taxpayer ...........................................

Mean 6.16
Std Dev 1.14
8.3 What do you feel pride in?


\{P20Q832\} Belonging to you occupational group......................... | Mean | 4.42 |
| :--- | :--- |
| Std Dev |  |
| 1.83 |  |

Std Dev 1.83
3. $\{\mathbf{P 2 0 Q 8 3 3}\}$ Being a member of the Australian community ........... $\begin{array}{ll}\text { Mean } & 5.95 \\ \text { Std Dev }\end{array}$




| Total Valid | Missing Data |
| :---: | :---: |
| $[\mathbf{9 2 9}]$ | $\mathbf{( 3 6 )}$ |
| $[\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0}]$ | $\mathbf{( 3 . 7 )}$ |


| Total Valid | Missing Data |
| :---: | :---: |
| $[919]$ | $(\mathbf{4 6 )}$ |
| $[\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0}]$ | $\mathbf{( 4 . 8 )}$ |

Total Valid Missing Data

| $[936]$ | $(29)$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| $[100.0]$ |  |

(3.0)


Total Valid Missing Data
[914] (51)
(5.3)

Total Valid Missing Data
[932]
(33)
(3.4)

8.6 The following statements are possible opinions about the tax system and the Tax Office. Indicate how much you disagree or agree with the statement.


Std Dev $\mathbf{1 . 6 1}$
2. $\{\mathbf{P 2 1 0 8 6 2}\}$ The Tax Office tries to be fair when making their

| Mean | 4.03 |
| :---: | :---: |
| Std Dev | 1.50 |


Office even if they go against what they think is right........................

| Mean | 4.16 |
| :--- | :--- |
| Std Dev | 1.75 |

\{P21Q864\} The Tax Office treats all societal
groups equally...
Mean
$\mathbf{3 . 0 0}$

Std Dev 1.72

|  | Strongly disagree | 1 | 1 | 1 |  | 1 | Strongly agree $\perp$ $\qquad$ |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| n | 195 | 182 | 206 | 189 | 92 | 49 | 31 | [944] | (21) |
| \% | 20.7 | 19.3 | 21.8 | 20.0 | 9.7 | 5.2 | 3.3 | [100.0] | (2.2) |
|  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ل |  |  |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| n | 67 | 78 | 138 | 340 | 164 | 93 | 59 | [939] | (26) |
| \% | 7.1 | 8.3 | 14.7 | 36.2 | 17.5 | 9.9 | 6.3 | [100.0] | (2.7) |
|  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | $\downarrow$ |  |  |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| n | 95 | 80 | 127 | 257 | 154 | 124 | 106 | [943] | (22) |
| \% | 10.1 | 8.5 | 13.5 | 27.3 | 16.3 | 13.1 | 11.2 | [100.0] | (2.3) |
|  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |  |  |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| n | 244 | 162 | 171 | 201 | 53 | 60 | 41 | [932] | (33) |
| \% | 26.2 | 17.4 | 18.3 | 21.6 | 5.7 | 6.4 | 4.4 | [100.0] | (3.4) |


8.7 People who evade tax probably do so for many different reasons. Even if you would never evade tax, we are asking you to imagine why you might do it if you did. In other words, if you were to ever evade tax, what would be a likely reason for doing so?
"If I ever evaded tax, I would do so because..."

1. $\{\mathbf{P 2 2 Q 8 7 1}\}$ I would want to compensate myself for being $\begin{array}{ll}\text { unfairly disadvantaged by the tax system.......................................... } \\ \text { Mean } & \mathbf{4 . 5 5}\end{array}$ Std Dev 1.89 五
\{P22Q872\} I would look after my own interests first, as everybody else does

| Mean | 4.37 |
| :--- | :--- |
| Std Dev | 1.82 |

3. $\{\mathbf{P 2 2 Q 8 7 3}\}$ I would be in financial need

Mean 5.20
Std Dev 1.68

|  | Strongly disagree $\qquad$ | 1 | 1 | 1 |  | 1 | Strongly agree $\qquad$ |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| n | 103 | 70 | 69 | 157 | 195 | 179 | 159 | [932] | (33) |
| \% | 11.1 | 7.5 | 7.4 | 16.8 | 20.9 | 19.2 | 17.1 | [100.0] | (3.4) |
|  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ل |  |  |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| n | 96 | 77 | 90 | 191 | 202 | 146 | 126 | [928] | (37) |
| \% | 10.3 | 8.3 | 9.7 | 20.6 | 21.8 | 15.7 | 13.6 | [100.0] | (3.8) |
|  |  | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| n | 56 | 25 | 45 | 146 | 192 | 221 | 251 | [936] | (29) |
| \% | 6.0 | 2.7 | 4.8 | 15.6 | 20.5 | 23.6 | 26.8 | [100.0] | (3.0) |


|  |  | Strongly disagree |  | 1 | 」 | 1 | 1 | Strongly agree$\qquad$ |  | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 4．$\{\mathbf{P 2 3 Q}$ | 4）I w |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |  |  |
| Mean | 2.26 | n | 413 | 209 | 120 | 109 | 36 | 23 | 24 | ［934］ | （31） |
| Std Dev | 1.53 | \％ | 44.2 | 22.4 | 12.8 | 11.7 | 3.9 | 2.5 | 2.6 | ［100．0］ | （3．2） |
| 5．$\{\mathbf{P 2 3 Q 8 7 5}\}$ I would want to express my protest against |  |  | L | 1 |  | । | 1 | 1 | － |  |  |
| injustices | the tax |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 3.52 | n | 211 | 141 | 110 | 158 | 136 | 83 | 93 | ［932］ | （33） |
| Std Dev | 1.98 | \％ | 22.6 | 15.1 | 11.8 | 17.0 | 14.6 | 8.9 | 10.0 | ［100．0］ | （3．4） |
|  |  |  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ل |  |  |
| 6．$\{\mathbf{P 2 3 Q 8 7 6}\}$ I would see it as a game against the Tax Office ．．．．．．．． |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 2.29 | n | 418 | 203 | 104 | 114 | 46 | 20 | 27 | ［932］ | （33） |
| Std Dev | 1.58 | \％ | 44.8 | 21.8 | 11.2 | 12.2 | 4.9 | 2.1 | 2.9 | ［100．0］ | （3．4） |
| 7．$\{P 23 Q 877\}$ I would find it rational to try and get the most out of any situation |  |  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | － |  |  |
|  |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 3.64 | n | 190 | 113 | 97 | 213 | 139 | 107 | 70 | ［929］ | （36） |
| Std Dev | 1.90 | \％ | 20.5 | 12.2 | 10.4 | 22.9 | 15.0 | 11.5 | 7.5 | ［100．0］ | （3．7） |
| 8．$\{\mathbf{P 2 3 Q 8 7 8}\}$ I would feel irritated about the rich getting away with paying hardly any tax |  |  | L | 1 | 」 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ل |  |  |
|  |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 5.27 | n | 82 | 46 | 43 | 98 | 119 | 203 | 348 | ［939］ | （26） |
| Std Dev | 1.94 | \％ | 8.7 | 4.9 | 4.6 | 10.4 | 12.7 | 21.6 | 37.1 | ［100．0］ | （2．7） |
| 9．$\{\mathbf{P 2 3 Q 8 7 9}\}$ I would want to defy the powers of the Tax Office ．．． |  |  | L | ， | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ل |  |  |
|  |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 2.53 | n | 354 | 196 | 121 | 159 | 46 | 18 | 40 | ［934］ | （31） |
| Std Dev | 1.65 | \％ | 37.9 | 21.0 | 13.0 | 17.0 | 4.9 | 1.9 | 4.3 | ［100．0］ | （3．2） |
| 10．$\{\mathbf{P 2 3 Q 8 7 1 0}\}$ I would feel the government wastes my taxes anyway |  |  | L | 1 |  | 1 |  | 1 | ， |  |  |
|  |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 4.31 | n | 110 | 87 | 100 | 187 | 171 | 117 | 163 | ［935］ | （30） |
| Std Dev | 1.92 | \％ | 11.8 | 9.3 | 10.7 | 20.0 | 18.3 | 12.5 | 17.4 | ［100．0］ | （3．1） |
| 11．$\{\mathbf{P 2 3 Q 8 7 1 1}\}$ I would have had a bad experience with the |  |  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ل |  |  |
|  |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 2.74 | n | 319 | 170 | 111 | 189 | 65 | 33 | 38 | ［925］ | （40） |
| Std Dev | 1.72 | \％ | 34.5 | 18.4 | 12.0 | 20.4 | 7.0 | 3.6 | 4.1 | ［100．0］ | （4．1） |
| 8．8 How much information about tax issues do you receive from the following sources？ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | None |  |  |  |  |  | A lot |  |  |
| 1．$\{\mathbf{P 2 3 Q 8 8 1}\}$ The |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 3.10 | n | 224 | 182 | 135 | 206 | 107 | 40 | 45 | ［939］ | （26） |
| Std Dev | 1.72 | \％ | 23.9 | 19.4 | 14.4 | 21.9 | 11.4 | 4.3 | 4.8 | ［100．0］ | （2．7） |
|  |  |  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ل |  |  |
| 2．$\{\mathbf{P 2 3 Q 8 8 2}\}$ Tax practition |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 3.52 | n | 246 | 110 | 96 | 157 | 131 | 105 | 88 | ［933］ | （32） |
| Std Dev | 2.04 | \％ | 26.4 | 11.8 | 10.3 | 16.8 | 14.0 | 11.3 | 9.4 | ［100．0］ | （3．3） |
|  |  |  | L | 1 | ， |  | 1 | 1 | ل |  |  |
| 3．\｛P23Q883\} Work-related publications..................................... |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 2.71 | n | 338 | 149 | 115 | 174 | 96 | 34 | 22 | ［928］ | （37） |
| Std Dev | 1.69 | \％ | 36.4 | 16.1 | 12.4 | 18.8 | 10.3 | 3.7 | 2.4 | ［100．0］ | （3．8） |
|  |  |  | L | 1 |  | ， | 1 | 1 | ل |  |  |
| 4．\｛P23Q884\} TV, radio, newspapers......................................... |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 3.59 | n | 124 | 141 | 169 | 236 | 146 | 69 | 52 | ［937］ | （28） |
| Std Dev | 1.66 | \％ | 13.2 | 15.0 | 18.0 | 25.2 | 15.6 | 7.4 | 5.5 | ［100．0］ | （2．9） |
|  |  |  | L | 1 |  | 1 |  | 1 | ل |  |  |
| 5．$\{\mathbf{P 2 3 Q 8 8 5}\}$ Friends／neig |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 2.67 | n | 296 | 195 | 140 | 178 | 83 | 17 | 22 | ［931］ | （34） |
| Std Dev | 1.57 | \％ | 31.8 | 20.9 | 15.0 | 19.1 | 8.9 | 1.8 | 2.4 | ［100．0］ | （3．5） |
|  |  |  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 |  | 1 | 」 |  |  |
| 6．$\{$ P23Q886 $\}$ Fam |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 2.90 | n | 273 | 169 | 137 | 186 | 94 | 40 | 33 | ［932］ | （33） |
| Std Dev | 1.70 | \％ | 29.3 | 18.1 | 14.7 | 20.0 | 10.1 | 4.3 | 3.5 | ［100．0］ | （3．4） |
| 8．9 Think about the source that you considered most informative．How much information did you receive on．．． |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | None |  |  |  | 1 | 1 | $\underset{~ A ~ l o t ~}{\text { A }}$ |  |  |
| 1．$\{$ P23Q891\} H |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 4.33 | n | 119 | 77 | 91 | 198 | 153 | 142 | 157 | ［937］ | （28） |
| Std Dev | 1.93 | \％ | 12.7 | 8.2 | 9.7 | 21.1 | 16.3 | 15.2 | 16.8 | ［100．0］ | （2．9） |
| 2．\｛P23Q892\} Wh |  |  | L | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ل |  |  |
|  |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 2.76 | n | 322 | 177 | 94 | 178 | 76 | 47 | 33 | ［927］ | （38） |
| Std Dev | 1.75 | \％ | 34.7 | 19.1 | 10.1 | 19.2 | 8.2 | 5.1 | 3.6 | ［100．0］ | （3．9） |
| 3．$\{\mathbf{P 2 3 Q 8 9 3}\}$ What the Tax Office is not able to detect ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． |  |  | L | 1 | $\ldots$ | 1 | 1 | 1 | ل |  |  |
|  |  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean | 2.17 | n | 459 | 174 | 97 | 129 | 37 | 16 | 18 | ［930］ | （35） |
| Std Dev | 150 | \％ | 49.4 | 18.7 | 10.4 | 13.9 | 4.0 | 1.7 | 1.9 | ［100．0］ | （3．6） |

4. $\{\mathbf{P 2 4 Q 8 9 4}\}$ What the Tax Office is able to detect.........................
Mean
Mean
Std Dev
1.92

5. $\{\mathbf{P 2 4 Q 8 9 5}\}$ People having problems with the Tax Office ............. Mean 2.84


| Total Valid | Missing Data |
| :---: | :---: |
| $[\mathbf{9 1 5}]$ | $\mathbf{( 5 0 )}$ |
| $[\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0}]$ | $\mathbf{( 5 . 2 )}$ |

Total Valid Missing Data
[914] (51)
[100.0] (5.3)
\%

|  | n | \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 590 | 72.6 |
| Please continue | 145 | 17.8 |
|  | 18 | 2.2 |
|  | 13 | 1.6 |
| -- Skip to Question 9.15 | 47 | 5.8 |
| Total Valid | [813] | [100.0] |
| Missing Data | (152) | (15.8) |

9.2 \{P24Q92\} Have you any income tax returns from before 2001/2002 that have not yet been completed?

|  |  | n | \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Yes | ........... 1 | 58 | 6.7 |
| No.. | ......... 2 | 802 | 93.3 |
|  | Total Valid | [860] | [100.0] |
|  | Missing Data | (105) | (10.9) |

9.3 \{P24Q93\} The Tax Office provides systems for electronic lodgment. Was your most recent income tax return lodged electronically?

|  |  | n | \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Yes | 1 | 501 | 58.5 |
| No. | 2 | 236 | 27.5 |
| Don't Know . | ........ 3 | 120 | 14.0 |
|  | Total Valid | [857] | [100.0] |
|  | Missing Data | (108) | (11.2) |

9.4 People earn income from many different sources (e.g. wages and salaries, bank interest, dividends, honorariums, allowances, tips, bonuses, director's fees). Think about each of the sources of income listed below, and select the response that best describes your most recent income tax return.
Received

none \begin{tabular}{c}
Did not <br>
declare it

 

Declared <br>
some

 

Declared <br>
most

$\quad$

Declared <br>
all
\end{tabular}


9.5 \{P25Q95\} As far as you know, did you exaggerate the amount of deductions or rebates in your most recent income tax return?

|  |  |  |  | n | \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | A lot. | 1 | 2 | 0.2 |
|  |  | Quite a bit | 2 | 4 | 0.5 |
|  |  | Somewhat | 3 | 19 | 2.2 |
|  |  | A little | 4 | 80 | 9.2 |
|  |  | Not at all | 5 | 763 | 87.9 |
| Mean | 4.84 |  | Total Valid | [868] | [100.0] |
| Std Dev | 0.48 |  | Missing Data | (97) | (10.1) |

$9.6\{\mathbf{P 2 5 Q 9 6}\}$ Think of the deductions and rebates you claimed in your most recent income tax return. Would you say you were ... (Circle the answer that best describes you)

|  |  |  |  | n \% |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Absolutely confident that they were all legitimate.. | $\ldots . . . . . . . . .11$ | 707 | 81.8 |
|  |  | A bit unsure about some of them ...................... | ........... 2 | 95 | 11.0 |
|  |  | Pretty unsure about quite a lot .... | -........ 3 | 8 | 0.9 |
|  |  | Haven't a clue, someone else did it | ........... 4 | 54 | 6.3 |
| Mean | 1.32 |  | Total Valid | [864] | [100.0] |
| Std Dev | 0.78 |  | Missing Data | (101) | (10.5) |

9.7 \{P25Q97\} As far as you know, did you report all the money you earned in your most recent income tax return?

|  |  | n | \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Yes. | 1 | 838 | 97.0 |
| No | 2 | 26 | 3.0 |
|  | Total Valid | [864] | [100.0] |
|  | Missing Data | (101) | (10.5) |

$9.8\{\mathbf{P 2 5 Q 9 8}\}$ Think about your most recent income tax return. For that financial year, how much of your income did you get paid in cash?

9.9 \{P25Q99\} How much of your cash income did you declare in your most recent income tax return? (please circle a number)

$9.10\{\mathbf{P 2 5 Q 9 1 0}\}$ Some people put in a lot of effort to plan their financial affairs in order to legally pay as little tax as possible. How much effort did you or your family devote to this objective in preparing for your most recent income tax return?

|  |  |  |  | n | \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | A lot. | .. 1 | 72 | 8.5 |
|  |  | Quite a bit | 2 | 75 | 8.9 |
|  |  | Some. | 3 | 144 | 17.1 |
|  |  | A little | ... 4 | 152 | 18.0 |
|  |  | None | . 5 | 400 | 47.4 |
| Mean | 3.87 |  | Total Valid | [843] | [100.0] |
| Std Dev | 1.32 |  | Missing Data | (122) | (12.6) |

9.11 \{P25Q911\} In preparing for your most recent income tax return, did you look at several different ways of arranging your finances to minimise your tax?

|  |  | n | \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Yes | 1 | 172 | 20.0 |
| No. | 2 | 686 | 80.0 |
|  | Total Valid | [858] | [100.0] |
|  | Missing Data | (107) | (11.1) |

9.12 Below is a list of investment strategies that may provide for tax minimisation. In preparing for your most recent income tax return, were you able to minimise your tax through ...

|  |  | Yes | No | Don't know what that is |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1. $\{\mathbf{P 2 6 Q 9 1 2 1 \}}$ Negative gearing (property/shares). |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean 1.92 | n | 127 | 661 | 60 | [848] | (117) |
| Std Dev 0.46 | \% | 15.0 | 77.9 | 7.1 | [100.0] | (12.1) |
| 2. $\{\mathbf{P 2 6 Q 9 1 2 2}$ ] Employee share arrangements |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean 2.11 | n | 25 | 690 | 120 | [835] | (130) |
| Std Dev 0.40 | \% | 3.0 | 82.6 | 14.4 | [100.0] | (13.5) |
| 3. $\{\mathbf{P 2 6 Q 9 1 2 3}\}$ Salary packaging |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean 2.00 | n | 90 | 655 | 92 | [837] | (128) |
| Std Dev 0.47 | \% | 10.8 | 78.3 | 11.0 | [100.0] | (13.3) |
| 4. $\{\mathbf{P 2 6 Q 9 1 2 4 \}}$ Superannuation planning. |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean 1.83 | n | 204 | 575 | 62 | [841] | (124) |
| Std Dev 0.54 | \% | 24.3 | 68.4 | 7.4 | [100.0] | (12.8) |
| 5. $\{\mathbf{P 2 6 Q 9 1 2 5}\}$ Warrants or leveraged investments ... |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean 2.24 | n | 6 | 620 | 208 | [834] | (131) |
| Std Dev 0.45 | \% | 0.7 | 74.3 | 24.9 | [100.0] | (13.6) |
| 6. $\{\mathbf{P 2 6 Q 9 1 2 6}\}$ Schemes to convert income into capital gains .................. |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean 2.19 | n | 9 | 655 | 168 | [832] | (133) |
| Std Dev 0.42 | \% | 1.1 | 78.7 | 20.2 | [100.0] | (13.8) |
| 7. \{P26Q9127\} Tax shelters; e.g. film schemes, agricultural schemes ........ |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean 2.13 | n | 8 | 708 | 117 | [833] | (132) |
| Std Dev 0.36 | \% | 1.0 | 85.0 | 14.0 | [100.0] | (13.7) |
| 8. $\{\mathbf{P 2 6 Q 9 1 2 8 \}}$ Off-shore tax havens or other international tax planning ... |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | Total Valid | Missing Data |
| Mean 2.14 | n | 3 | 710 | 121 | [834] | (131) |
| Std Dev 0.36 | \% | 0.4 | 85.1 | 14.5 | [100.0] | (13.6) |

9.13 \{P26Q913\} Did you rely on a tax agent or advisor (tax accountant or lawyer) in preparing your most recent income tax return?

|  |  | n | \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Yes. | ........ 1 | 647 | 74.5 |
| No | 2 | 222 | 25.5 |
|  | Total Valid | [869] | [100.0] |
|  | Missing Data | (96) | (9.9) |

9.14 \{P26Q914\} What would be your MAIN reason for using a tax agent? (Please circle only one.)

|  |  | n | \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Fear of making a mistake. | 1 | 172 | 20.0 |
| The tax system is too complex. | 2 | 445 | 51.7 |
| Insufficient time to prepare my own return | 3 | 67 | 7.8 |
| To legitimately minimise the tax I had to pay | 4 | 168 | 19.5 |
| To avoid paying tax. | ..... 5 | 8 | 0.9 |
|  | Total Valid | [860] | [100.0] |
|  | Missing Data | (105) | (10.9) |

9.15 Assume you have a tax agent who is unsure about whether one of your expenses is deductible on your tax return, as the tax law relating to this expense is ambiguous. Your tax agent tells you that if you claim the deduction there is a low probability that your tax return will be audited, and that if you are audited, the taxpayer penalty would be mild. After thinking about the situation, your agent advises you NOT TO CLAIM the deduction on your return.

1. $\{\mathbf{P 2 6 Q 9 1 5 1}\}$ Would you agree with the advice your tax agent has given you?

2. \{P26Q9152\} Based on your tax agent's advice NOT TO CLAIM the ambiguous deduction, would you continue to use this agent?


Think again of the scenario presented above. Now assume that your tax agent does advise you to CLAIM the ambiguous deduction on your return.
3. $\{\mathbf{P 2 7 Q 9 1 5 3}\}$ Would you agree with the advice your tax agent has given you?

4. $\{\mathbf{P 2 7 Q 9 1 5 4 \}}$ Based on your tax agent's advice to CLAIM the ambiguous deduction, would you continue to use this agent?

9.16 In 1986, the Tax Office introduced a self-assessment system to taxation. The following questions are designed to explore your understanding of this system.

1. $\{\mathbf{P 2 7 Q 9 1 6 1 \}}$ Assume you submit a tax return where you have claimed a deduction. You then receive a refund from the Tax Office for this deduction. Does this signal to you that the Tax Office has approved your deduction?

|  |  | n | \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Yes. | 1 | 624 | 66.4 |
| No | ....... 2 | 185 | 19.7 |
| Don't know. | .... 3 | 131 | 13.9 |
|  | Total Valid | [940] | [100.0] |
|  | Missing Data | (25) | (2.6) |

2. $\{\mathbf{P 2 7 Q 9 1 6 2}\}$ Did you know that the Tax Office can come back to you up to 6 years after you have lodged a tax return to disallow a deduction? (this is not the same as an audit)

|  |  | n | \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Yes. | 1 | 488 | 51.9 |
| No | 2 | 452 | 48.1 |
|  | Total Valid | [940] | [100.0] |
|  | Missing Data | (25) | (2.6) |

## 10 BACKGROUND INFORMATION

The final section asks questions about yourself and your family background. These characteristics are very important to our research on how different people in different circumstances feel about tax issues.
$10.1\{\mathbf{P 2 7 Q 1 0 1}\}$ Firstly, what is your sex?

|  |  | n \% |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Male | ......... 1 | 512 | 54.2 |
| Female . | 2 | 433 | 45.8 |
|  | Total Valid | [945] | [100.0] |
|  | Missing Data | (20) | (2.1) |

$10.2\{\mathbf{P 2 7 Q 1 0 2 \}}$ What is your age in years? Years See Appendix Seven
10.3 \{P27Q103\} Do you identify as an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander?

|  |  | n | \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Yes | ............ 1 | 11 | 1.2 |
| No. | .......... 2 | 929 | 98.8 |
|  | Total Valid | [940] | [100.0] |
|  | Missing Data | (25) | (2.6) |

$10.4\{\mathbf{P 2 7 Q 1 0 4 \}}$ What language do you mainly speak at home? (Please circle one number)

$10.5\{\mathbf{P 2 8 Q 1 0 5 \}}$ What was the highest level of education you completed?

10.8 \{P28Q108\} All in all, what was your family's income last year - about how many thousand dollars? (Please circle a number)

See Appendix Eight

10.9 \{P28Q109\} And your own personal income - about how many thousand dollars? (Please circle a number)

See Appendix Eight


## THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR FILLING OUT THE QUESTIONNAIRE!!

We know that it was a long questionnaire and that there have been some hard questions. But they were important and we really appreciate your dedication in seeing it through to the end.


Please put it in the return envelope and mail it back to us at the Australian National University. Your co-operation has been a great help. Thanks again!

If you have any comments which you would like to add, please write them below.

## APPENDIX ONE

\{P2Q19B\} Which tax rates would you consider fair for these four income brackets?
\{P2Q19B1\} - All income between $\$ 6,000$ and $\$ 20,000$ :

| Value Label | Value | Frequency |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 0 | 125 | 14.1 |
|  | 2 | 3 | 0.3 |
|  | 3 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 5 | 47 | 5.3 |
|  | 6 | 2 | 0.2 |
|  | 7 | 8 | 0.9 |
|  | 8 | 11 | 1.2 |
|  | 9 | 2 | 0.2 |
|  | 10 | 307 | 34.7 |
|  | 11 | 2 | 0.2 |
|  | 12 | 39 | 4.4 |
|  | 13 | 9 | 1.0 |
|  | 14 | 9 | 1.0 |
|  | 15 | 180 | 20.4 |
|  | 17 | 87 | 9.8 |
|  | 18 | 2 | 0.2 |
|  | 19 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 20 | 34 | 3.8 |
|  | 21 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 25 | 3 | 0.3 |
|  | 30 | 5 | 0.6 |
|  | 33 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 50 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 90 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 100 | 3 | 0.3 |
| Total |  | [884] | [100.0] |
| Missing |  | (81) | (8.4) |
| Mean | 11.15 | 10.84* |  |
| Std Dev | 8.33 | 6.53* |  |
| Median | 10.00 |  |  |

* without the implausible answer $100 \%$.
\{P2Q19B2\} - All income between $\$ 20,001$ and $\$ 50,000$ :
Value Label

| Value | Frequency | Valid $\%$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 0 | 4 | 0.5 |
| 4 | 1 | 0.1 |
| 5 | 8 | 0.9 |
| 6 | 1 | 0.1 |
| 7 | 1 | 0.1 |
| 9 | 1 | 0.1 |
| 10 | 69 | 7.8 |
| 12 | 6 | 0.7 |
| 13 | 1 | 0.1 |
| 14 | 1 | 0.1 |
| 15 | 110 | 12.5 |
| 16 | 2 | 0.2 |
| 17 | 69 | 7.8 |
| 18 | 5 | 0.6 |
| 19 | 1 | 0.1 |
| 20 | 258 | 29.3 |
| 21 | 1 | 0.1 |
| 22 | 10 | 1.1 |


|  | 23 | 5 | 0.6 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 24 | 2 | 0.2 |
|  | 25 | 173 | 19.6 |
|  | 26 | 3 | 0.3 |
|  | 27 | 9 | 1.0 |
|  | 28 | 10 | 1.1 |
|  | 29 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 30 | 115 | 13.0 |
|  | 31 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 32 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 33 | 4 | 0.5 |
|  | 34 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 35 | 4 | 0.5 |
|  | 40 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 42 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 50 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 100 | 1 | 0.1 |
| Total |  | [882] | [100.0] |
| Missing |  | (83) | (8.6) |
| Mean | 20.85 | 20.76* |  |
| Std Dev | 6.88 | 6.35* |  |
| Median | 20.00 |  |  |
| * without the implausible answer $100 \%$. |  |  |  |
| [P2Q19B3 - All income between $\$ 50,001$ and $\$ 60,000$ : |  |  |  |
| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Valid \% |
|  | 0 | 2 | 0.2 |
|  | 5 | 2 | 0.2 |
|  | 8 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 10 | 25 | 2.9 |
|  | 11 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 12 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 13 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 15 | 27 | 3.1 |
|  | 17 | 10 | 1.1 |
|  | 18 | 2 | 0.2 |
|  | 20 | 121 | 13.8 |
|  | 21 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 22 | 3 | 0.3 |
|  | 23 | 2 | 0.2 |
|  | 25 | 92 | 10.5 |
|  | 27 | 2 | 0.2 |
|  | 28 | 2 | 0.2 |
|  | 29 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 30 | 246 | 28.1 |
|  | 32 | 2 | 0.2 |
|  | 33 | 8 | 0.9 |
|  | 34 | 4 | 0.5 |
|  | 35 | 104 | 11.9 |
|  | 36 | 5 | 0.6 |
|  | 37 | 5 | 0.6 |
|  | 38 | 12 | 1.4 |
|  | 39 | 3 | 0.3 |
|  | 40 | 83 | 9.5 |
|  | 41 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 42 | 40 | 4.6 |
|  | 43 | 3 | 0.3 |


|  | 44 | 2 | 0.2 |  | 100 | 1 | 0.1 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 45 | 40 | 4.6 | Total |  | [879] | [100.0] |
|  | 47 | 7 | 0.8 | Missing |  | (86) | (8.9) |
|  | 48 | 1 | 0.1 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 50 | 11 | 1.3 | Mean | 38.36 | 38.29* |  |
|  | 55 | 1 | 0.1 | Std Dev | 11.15 | 10.96* |  |
|  | 60 | 1 | 0.1 | Median | 40.00 |  |  |
| Total |  | [875] | [100.0] | * withou | answe | 00\%. |  |

\{P2Q19B4\} - All income over $\$ 60,000$ :
Value Label

| Value | Frequency | Valid \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 0 | 2 | 0.2 |
| 5 | 2 | 0.2 |
| 6 | 1 | 0.1 |
| 10 | 15 | 1.7 |
| 12 | 1 | 0.1 |
| 13 | 1 | 0.1 |
| 15 | 15 | 1.7 |
| 17 | 3 | 0.3 |
| 18 | 2 | 0.2 |
| 20 | 39 | 4.4 |
| 23 | 1 | 0.1 |
| 24 | 2 | 0.2 |
| 25 | 38 | 4.3 |
| 26 | 2 | 0.2 |
| 27 | 2 | 0.2 |
| 28 | 2 | 0.2 |
| 30 | 132 | 15.0 |
| 31 | 1 | 0.1 |
| 32 | 1 | 0.1 |
| 33 | 11 | 1.3 |
| 35 | 75 | 8.5 |
| 37 | 4 | 0.5 |
| 38 | 7 | 0.8 |
| 39 | 4 | 0.5 |
| 40 | 145 | 16.5 |
| 42 | 44 | 5.0 |
| 43 | 2 | 0.2 |
| 44 | 2 | 0.2 |
| 45 | 81 | 9.2 |
| 47 | 74 | 8.4 |
| 48 | 16 | 1.8 |
| 49 | 14 | 1.6 |
| 50 | 100 | 11.4 |
| 51 | 2 | 0.2 |
| 52 | 4 | 0.5 |
| 54 | 2 | 0.2 |
| 55 | 11 | 1.3 |
| 57 | 1 | 0.1 |
| 60 | 10 | 1.1 |
| 64 | 1 | 0.1 |
| 66 | 1 | 0.1 |
| 70 | 4 | 0.5 |
| 80 | 1 | 0.1 |

## APPENDIX TWO

\{P2Q110B1\} What would you consider fair? How much tax (in Dollars) should somebody pay who earns $\$ 20,000$ income:

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Valid \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 0 | 99 | 12.8 |
|  | 150 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 200 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 250 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 400 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 500 | 7 | 0.9 |
|  | 600 | 3 | 0.4 |
|  | 700 | 3 | 0.4 |
|  | 750 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 800 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 900 | 2 | 0.3 |
|  | 1000 | 71 | 9.2 |
|  | 1190 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 1200 | 6 | 0.8 |
|  | 1300 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 1380 | 3 | 0.4 |
|  | 1400 | 27 | 3.5 |
|  | 1500 | 63 | 8.2 |
|  | 1600 | 4 | 0.5 |
|  | 1662 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 1680 | 2 | 0.3 |
|  | 1700 | 3 | 0.4 |
|  | 1750 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 1800 | 9 | 1.2 |
|  | 1900 | 5 | 0.6 |
|  | 1950 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 1960 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 2000 | 288 | 37.3 |
|  | 2100 | 21 | 2.7 |
|  | 2150 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 2200 | 5 | 0.6 |
|  | 2300 | 7 | 0.9 |
|  | 2380 | 44 | 5.7 |
|  | 2400 | 9 | 1.2 |
|  | 2450 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 2500 | 11 | 1.4 |
|  | 2800 | 4 | 0.5 |
|  | 3000 | 28 | 3.6 |
|  | 3400 | 3 | 0.4 |
|  | 3500 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 3600 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 4000 | 13 | 1.7 |
|  | 5000 | 7 | 0.9 |
|  | 6000 | 5 | 0.6 |
|  | 9000 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 12000 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 20000 | 2 | 0.3 |
| Misunderstood Q |  | 52 | 5.4 |
| Total |  | [822] | [100.0] |
| Missing |  | (141) | (14.6) |


| Mean | 1778.35 | $1731.02^{*}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Std Dev | 1418.72 | $1073.42 *$ |
| Median | 2000 |  |

* without the implausible answer $\$ 20,000$.
\{P2Q110B2\} What would you consider fair? How much tax (in Dollars) should somebody pay who earns $\$ 40,000$ income:

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Valid \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 0 | 3 | 0.4 |
|  | 400 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 420 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 600 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 800 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 1000 | 5 | 0.7 |
|  | 1200 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 1500 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 1600 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 1700 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 1800 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 2000 | 15 | 2.0 |
|  | 2380 | 5 | 0.7 |
|  | 2400 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 2500 | 3 | 0.4 |
|  | 2750 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 2800 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 3000 | 12 | 1.6 |
|  | 3200 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 3500 | 6 | 0.8 |
|  | 3600 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 3650 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 3700 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 4000 | 84 | 11.2 |
|  | 4100 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 4190 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 4380 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 4400 | 3 | 0.4 |
|  | 4500 | 6 | 0.8 |
|  | 4600 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 4700 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 4760 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 4800 | 2 | 0.3 |
|  | 4900 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 5000 | 88 | 11.7 |
|  | 5100 | 3 | 0.4 |
|  | 5200 | 2 | 0.3 |
|  | 5280 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 5380 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 5400 | 6 | 0.8 |
|  | 5500 | 6 | 0.8 |
|  | 5600 | 2 | 0.3 |
|  | 5700 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 6000 | 122 | 16.2 |
|  | 6100 | 2 | 0.3 |
|  | 6120 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 6250 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 6380 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 6400 | 2 | 0.3 |
|  | 6500 | 12 | 1.6 |
|  | 6600 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 6700 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 6800 | 18 | 2.4 |



|  | 14300 | 1 | 0.1 |  | 4500 | 1 | 0.1 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 14400 | 2 | 0.3 |  | 5600 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 14500 | 4 | 0.5 |  | 6000 | 7 | 0.9 |
|  | 14560 | 1 | 0.1 |  | 6800 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 14800 | 1 | 0.1 |  | 7000 | 2 | 0.3 |
|  | 14999 | 1 | 0.1 |  | 8000 | 34 | 4.5 |
|  | 15000 | 105 | 13.9 |  | 8001 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 15100 | 1 | 0.1 |  | 8400 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 15280 | 1 | 0.1 |  | 8800 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 15300 | 1 | 0.1 |  | 9000 | 4 | 0.5 |
|  | 15380 | 1 | 0.1 |  | 9520 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 15500 | 2 | 0.3 |  | 10000 | 16 | 2.1 |
|  | 15580 | 22 | 2.9 |  | 10500 | 2 | 0.3 |
|  | 15600 | 2 | 0.3 |  | 12000 | 20 | 2.6 |
|  | 15640 | 1 | 0.1 |  | 12490 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 15700 | 1 | 0.1 |  | 12900 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 16000 | 20 | 2.6 |  | 13000 | 4 | 0.5 |
|  | 16100 | 1 | 0.1 |  | 13080 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 16200 | 2 | 0.3 |  | 13200 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 16300 | 1 | 0.1 |  | 13300 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 16500 | 7 | 0.9 |  | 14000 | 3 | 0.4 |
|  | 16800 | 1 | 0.1 |  | 14400 | 2 | 0.3 |
|  | 17000 | 11 | 1.5 |  | 14800 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 17500 | 4 | 0.5 |  | 14900 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 18000 | 50 | 6.6 |  | 15000 | 39 | 5.2 |
|  | 18900 | 1 | 0.1 |  | 15500 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 19000 | 1 | 0.1 |  | 15580 | 4 | 0.5 |
|  | 19760 | 1 | 0.1 |  | 15900 | 4 | 0.5 |
|  | 20000 | 25 | 3.3 |  | 16000 | 32 | 4.2 |
|  | 20500 | 1 | 0.1 |  | 16100 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 21000 | 5 | 0.7 |  | 16200 | 2 | 0.3 |
|  | 22000 | 3 | 0.4 |  | 16500 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 22200 | 1 | 0.1 |  | 16600 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 24000 | 5 | 0.7 |  | 16790 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 25000 | 1 | 0.1 |  | 16900 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 25200 | 2 | 0.3 |  | 17000 | 4 | 0.5 |
|  | 25380 | 1 | 0.1 |  | 17500 | 2 | 0.3 |
|  | 27000 | 2 | 0.3 |  | 17750 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 30000 | 3 | 0.4 |  | 17900 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 31200 | 1 | 0.1 |  | 18000 | 20 | 2.6 |
| Misunderstood Q |  | 67 | 6.9 |  | 18400 | 1 | 0.1 |
| Total |  | [822] | [100.0] |  | 18500 | 1 | 0.1 |
| Missing |  | (143) | (14.8) |  | 18700 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  |  |  |  |  | 18800 | 1 | 0.1 |
| Mean | 12648.41 |  |  |  | 18900 | 1 | 0.1 |
| Std Dev | 4588.95 |  |  |  | 19000 | 4 | 0.5 |
| Median | 12000 |  |  |  | 19200 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  |  |  |  |  | 19400 | 1 | 0.1 |
| \{P2Q110B4\} What would you consider fair? How much tax (in Dollars) should somebody pay who earns $\$ 80,000$ income: |  |  |  |  | 19600 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  |  |  |  |  | 19980 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  |  |  |  |  | 20000 | 135 | 17.9 |
| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Valid \% |  | 20300 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 0 | 3 | 0.4 |  | 20400 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 1000 | 1 | 0.1 |  | 20500 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 1800 | 1 | 0.1 |  | 20800 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 2000 | 3 | 0.4 |  | 20980 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 2380 | 1 | 0.1 |  | 21000 | 4 | 0.5 |
|  | 2400 | 1 | 0.1 |  | 21013 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 3500 | 1 | 0.1 |  | 21100 | 2 | 0.3 |
|  | 4000 | 2 | 0.3 |  | 21400 | 1 | 0.1 |


| 21700 | 1 | 0.1 |  | 26660 | 1 | 0.1 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 21980 | 1 | 0.1 |  | 27000 | 12 | 1.6 |
| 22000 | 10 | 1.3 |  | 28000 | 29 | 3.8 |
| 22050 | 1 | 0.1 |  | 28100 | 1 | 0.1 |
| 22100 | 3 | 0.4 |  | 28500 | 1 | 0.1 |
| 22400 | 2 | 0.3 |  | 29000 | 1 | 0.1 |
| 22500 | 1 | 0.1 |  | 29500 | 1 | 0.1 |
| 22590 | 1 | 0.1 |  | 29600 | 1 | 0.1 |
| 22800 | 2 | 0.3 |  | 29760 | 1 | 0.1 |
| 22980 | 1 | 0.1 |  | 30000 | 55 | 7.3 |
| 23000 | 4 | 0.5 |  | 30400 | 1 | 0.1 |
| 23080 | 1 | 0.1 |  | 31000 | 1 | 0.1 |
| 23100 | 1 | 0.1 |  | 32000 | 16 | 2.1 |
| 23400 | 1 | 0.1 |  | 32400 | 1 | 0.1 |
| 23500 | 2 | 0.3 |  | 33300 | 1 | 0.1 |
| 23900 | 1 | 0.1 |  | 33600 | 1 | 0.1 |
| 23980 | 1 | 0.1 |  | 35000 | 6 | 0.8 |
| 23999 | 1 | 0.1 |  | 36000 | 6 | 0.8 |
| 24000 | 51 | 6.8 |  | 37000 | 2 | 0.3 |
| 24100 | 1 | 0.1 |  | 37600 | 7 | 0.9 |
| 24200 | 1 | 0.1 |  | 40000 | 17 | 2.3 |
| 24500 | 2 | 0.3 |  | 41500 | 1 | 0.1 |
| 24890 | 1 | 0.1 |  | 48000 | 1 | 0.1 |
| 24980 | 22 | 2.9 |  | 56000 | 1 | 0.1 |
| 25000 | 46 | 6.1 |  | 76000 | 1 | 0.1 |
| 25100 | 1 | 0.1 | Misunderstood Q |  | 66 | 6.8 |
| 25200 | 1 | 0.1 | Total |  | [821] | [100.0] |
| 25360 | 1 | 0.1 | Missing |  | (144) | (14.9) |
| 25380 | 1 | 0.1 |  |  |  |  |
| 25500 | 3 | 0.4 | Mean | 21413.61 |  |  |
| 25800 | 1 | 0.1 | Std Dev | 8166.34 |  |  |
| 25900 | 2 | 0.3 | Median | 20000 |  |  |
| 26000 | 18 | 2.4 |  |  |  |  |
| 26400 | 2 | 0.3 |  |  |  |  |
| 26500 | 3 | 0.4 |  |  |  |  |

## APPENDIX THREE

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \{P10Q545\} Imagine the company director was to be fined. In your opinion, what would be an appropriate fine in dollars? |  |  |  | Depends |  | 1 | 0.1 |
|  |  |  |  | Relative to wage |  | 9 | 1.0 |
|  |  |  |  | Unclear |  | 5 | 0.6 |
| \$ $\qquad$ <br> Value Label |  |  |  | Misunderstood |  | 3 | 0.3 |
|  | Value | Frequency | Valid \% |  |  | [903] | [100.0] |
|  | 0 | 13 | 1.4 | Missing |  | (62) | (6.4) |
|  | 100 | 2 | 0.2 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 200 | 3 | 0.3 | Mean of numeric | 219650.08 |  |  |
|  | 400 | 1 | 0.1 | answers |  |  |  |
|  | 1000 | 5 | 0.6 | Std Dev of numeric | 294632.03 |  |  |
|  | 2000 | 5 | 0.6 | Median of numeric | 120000 |  |  |
|  | 3000 | 1 | 0.1 | answers |  |  |  |
|  | 4000 | 1 | 0.1 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 5000 | 8 | 0.9 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 8000 | 1 | 0.1 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 10000 | 35 | 3.9 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 15000 | 3 | 0.3 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 16000 | 1 | 0.1 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 19000 | 1 | 0.1 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 20000 | 81 | 9.0 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 20001 | 1 | 0.1 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 25000 | 12 | 1.3 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 30000 | 3 | 0.3 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 40000 | 14 | 1.6 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 50000 | 105 | 11.6 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 55000 | 1 | 0.1 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 60000 | 4 | 0.4 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 66000 | 1 | 0.1 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 71000 | 1 | 0.1 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 75000 | 1 | 0.1 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 80000 | 2 | 0.2 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 90000 | 2 | 0.2 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 100000 | 126 | 14.0 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 115000 | 1 | 0.1 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 120000 | 1 | 0.1 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 150000 | 9 | 1.0 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 200000 | 187 | 20.7 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 200001 | 11 | 1.2 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 202000 | 1 | 0.1 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 210000 | 1 | 0.1 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 220000 | 1 | 0.1 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 240000 | 1 | 0.1 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 250000 | 12 | 1.3 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 300000 | 11 | 1.2 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 320000 | 1 | 0.1 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 350000 | 2 | 0.2 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 400000 | 69 | 7.6 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 400001 | 2 | 0.2 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 500000 | 69 | 7.6 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 600000 | 12 | 1.3 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 700000 | 1 | 0.1 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 750000 | 1 | 0.1 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 800000 | 7 | 0.8 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 1000000 | 33 | 3.7 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 1000001 | 1 | 0.1 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 2000000 | 2 | 0.2 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 5000000 | 1 | 0.1 |  |  |  |  |
| Don't know |  | 12 | 1.3 |  |  |  |  |
| ATO rates |  | 2 | 0.2 |  |  |  |  |

## APPENDIX FOUR

\{P10Q546\} Imagine the company director was to be sent to prison. In
your opinion, what would be an appropriate sentence in months?
 months

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Valid \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 0 | 88 | 9.7 |
|  | 0.2 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 0.5 | 2 | 0.2 |
|  | 1 | 73 | 8.1 |
|  | 1.5 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 2 | 36 | 4.0 |
|  | 3 | 99 | 11.0 |
|  | 4 | 12 | 1.3 |
|  | 4.5 | 2 | 0.2 |
|  | 5 | 3 | 0.3 |
|  | 6 | 184 | 20.4 |
|  | 7 | 2 | 0.2 |
|  | 8 | 3 | 0.3 |
|  | 9 | 12 | 1.3 |
|  | 10 | 3 | 0.3 |
|  | 11 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 12 | 168 | 18.6 |
|  | 15 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 18 | 29 | 3.2 |
|  | 20 | 5 | 0.6 |
|  | 24 | 77 | 8.5 |
|  | 30 | 2 | 0.2 |
|  | 36 | 32 | 3.5 |
|  | 40 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 48 | 8 | 0.9 |
|  | 60 | 32 | 3.5 |
|  | 72 | 2 | 0.2 |
|  | 96 | 2 | 0.2 |
|  | 100 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 108 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 120 | 10 | 1.1 |
|  | 200 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 240 | 1 | 0.1 |
| Years |  | 1 | 0.1 |
| Alternative sanction |  | 1 | 0.1 |
| Unclear |  | 2 | 0.2 |
| Judge to decide |  | 1 | 0.1 |
| Depends |  | 1 | 0.1 |
| Don't know |  | 2 | 0.2 |
| Total |  | [903] | [100.0] |
| Missing |  | (62) | (6.4) |


| Mean of numeric | 13.46 |
| :--- | :---: |
| answers | 21.11 |
| Std Dev of numeric <br> answers | 6.00 |
| Median of numeric <br> answers |  |

Std Dev of numeric answers
Median of numeric
answers

Value Label

| Valabl | $0$ | $13$ | $1.5$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 100 | 6 | 0.7 |
|  | 200 | 2 | 0.2 |
|  | 250 | 2 | 0.2 |
|  | 500 | 26 | 2.9 |
|  | 1000 | 115 | 12.8 |
|  | 1500 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 2000 | 75 | 8.4 |
|  | 2500 | 29 | 3.2 |
|  | 3000 | 13 | 1.5 |
|  | 3500 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 4000 | 6 | 0.7 |
|  | 4500 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 5000 | 149 | 16.6 |
|  | 5001 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 5700 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 6000 | 2 | 0.2 |
|  | 7000 | 3 | 0.3 |
|  | 7500 | 2 | 0.2 |
|  | 8000 | 2 | 0.2 |
|  | 9000 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 10000 | 205 | 22.9 |
|  | 10001 | 8 | 0.9 |
|  | 10100 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 11000 | 5 | 0.6 |
|  | 12000 | 3 | 0.3 |
|  | 15000 | 26 | 2.9 |
|  | 17500 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 19000 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 20000 | 91 | 10.2 |
|  | 20001 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 25000 | 16 | 1.8 |
|  | 30000 | 10 | 1.1 |
|  | 40000 | 6 | 0.7 |
|  | 50000 | 25 | 2.8 |
|  | 60000 | 2 | 0.2 |
|  | 72000 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 100000 | 13 | 1.5 |
|  | 200000 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 250000 | 3 | 0.3 |
|  | 500000 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 1000000 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 2000000 | 1 | 0.1 |
| Don't know |  | 11 | 1.2 |
| ATO rates |  | 3 | 0.3 |
| Depends |  | 1 | 0.1 |
| Relative to wage |  | 2 | 0.2 |
| Unclear |  | 4 | 0.4 |
| Misunderstood |  | 1 | 0.1 |
| Total |  | [895] | [100.0] |
| Missing |  | (70) | (7.3) |

\{P11Q565\} Imagine the tradesperson were to be fined. In your opinion, what would be an appropriate fine in dollars? \$


Mean of numeric answers
15902.42
$\square$

## ApPENDIX SIX

\{P11Q566\} Imagine the tradesperson were to be sent to prison. In your
opinion, what would be an appropriate sentence in months?

## months

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Valid \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 0 | 197 | 22.6 |
|  | 0.1 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 0.2 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 0.25 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 0.5 | 14 | 1.6 |
|  | 0.7 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 1 | 219 | 25.2 |
|  | 1.5 | 3 | 0.3 |
|  | 2 | 70 | 8.0 |
|  | 2.5 | 2 | 0.2 |
|  | 3 | 127 | 14.6 |
|  | 4 | 11 | 1.3 |
|  | 5 | 3 | 0.3 |
|  | 6 | 104 | 12.0 |
|  | 7 | 2 | 0.2 |
|  | 8 | 3 | 0.3 |
|  | 9 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 10 | 6 | 0.7 |
|  | 11 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 12 | 54 | 6.2 |
|  | 15 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 18 | 6 | 0.7 |
|  | 20 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 24 | 10 | 1.1 |
|  | 36 | 15 | 1.7 |
|  | 48 | 2 | 0.2 |
|  | 60 | 4 | 0.5 |
|  | 100 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 120 | 1 | 0.1 |
| Alternative sanction |  | 1 | 0.1 |
| Unclear |  | 2 | 0.2 |
| Judge to decide |  | 1 | 0.1 |
| Depends |  | 1 | 0.1 |
| Don't know |  | 3 | 0.3 |
| Total |  | [870] | [100.0] |
| Missing |  | (95) | (9.8) |
| Mean of numeric answers | 4.28 |  |  |
| Std Dev of numeric answers | 9.01 |  |  |
| Median of numeric answers | 1.00 |  |  |

## APPENDIX SEVEN

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Valid \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 18 | 2 | 0.2 |
|  | 19 | 7 | 0.8 |
|  | 20 | 9 | 1.0 |
|  | 21 | 10 | 1.1 |
|  | 22 | 9 | 1.0 |
|  | 23 | 10 | 1.1 |
|  | 24 | 8 | 0.9 |
|  | 25 | 13 | 1.4 |
|  | 26 | 11 | 1.2 |
|  | 27 | 9 | 1.0 |
|  | 28 | 3 | 0.3 |
|  | 29 | 8 | 0.9 |
|  | 30 | 11 | 1.2 |
|  | 31 | 19 | 2.1 |
|  | 32 | 16 | 1.7 |
|  | 33 | 10 | 1.1 |
|  | 34 | 15 | 1.6 |
|  | 35 | 19 | 2.1 |
|  | 36 | 9 | 1.0 |
|  | 37 | 17 | 1.8 |
|  | 38 | 13 | 1.4 |
|  | 39 | 9 | 1.0 |
|  | 40 | 23 | 2.5 |
|  | 41 | 31 | 3.4 |
|  | 42 | 26 | 2.8 |
|  | 43 | 25 | 2.7 |
|  | 44 | 20 | 2.2 |
|  | 45 | 28 | 3.0 |
|  | 46 | 24 | 2.6 |
|  | 47 | 21 | 2.3 |
|  | 48 | 29 | 3.2 |
|  | 49 | 28 | 3.0 |
|  | 50 | 30 | 3.3 |
|  | 51 | 25 | 2.7 |
|  | 52 | 20 | 2.2 |
|  | 53 | 15 | 1.6 |
|  | 54 | 19 | 2.1 |
|  | 55 | 27 | 2.9 |
|  | 56 | 25 | 2.7 |
|  | 57 | 23 | 2.5 |
|  | 58 | 13 | 1.4 |
|  | 59 | 20 | 2.2 |
|  | 60 | 23 | 2.5 |
|  | 61 | 11 | 1.2 |
|  | 62 | 14 | 1.5 |
|  | 63 | 14 | 1.5 |
|  | 64 | 16 | 1.7 |
|  | 65 | 13 | 1.4 |
|  | 66 | 17 | 1.8 |
|  | 67 | 8 | 0.9 |
|  | 68 | 13 | 1.4 |
|  | 69 | 8 | 0.9 |
|  | 70 | 6 | 0.7 |
|  | 71 | 2 | 0.2 |
|  | 72 | 10 | 1.1 |


|  | 73 | 6 | 0.7 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 74 | 7 | 0.8 |
|  | 75 | 5 | 0.5 |
|  | 76 | 11 | 1.2 |
|  | 77 | 2 | 0.2 |
|  | 78 | 6 | 0.7 |
|  | 79 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 80 | 7 | 0.8 |
|  | 81 | 2 | 0.2 |
|  | 82 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 83 | 2 | 0.2 |
|  | 84 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 85 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 86 | 2 | 0.2 |
|  | 87 | 1 | 0.1 |
|  | 88 | 1 | 0.1 |
| Total |  | [920] | [100.0] |
| Missing |  | (45) | (4.7) |
| Mean | 48.48 |  |  |
| Std Dev | 14.67 |  |  |
| Median | 48.00 |  |  |

## Appendix Eight

\{P28Q108\} Family's income last year

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Valid \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 0 | 22 | 2.5 |
|  | 5 | 11 | 1.2 |
|  | 10 | 30 | 3.4 |
|  | 15 | 48 | 5.4 |
|  | 20 | 65 | 7.3 |
|  | 25 | 49 | 5.5 |
|  | 30 | 50 | 5.6 |
|  | 35 | 32 | 3.6 |
|  | 40 | 44 | 5.0 |
|  | 45 | 42 | 4.7 |
|  | 50 | 78 | 8.8 |
|  | 60 | 113 | 12.7 |
|  | 75 | 131 | 14.8 |
|  | 100 | 148 | 16.7 |
|  | 250 | 24 | 2.7 |
| Total |  | [887] | [100.0] |
| Missing |  | (78) | (8.1) |
| Mean | 57.69 |  |  |
| Std Dev | 43.50 |  |  |
| Median | 50.00 |  |  |

\{P28Q109\} Own personal income

| Value Label | Value | Frequency | Valid $\%$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 0 | 42 | 4.6 |
|  | 5 | 63 | 6.9 |
|  | 10 | 114 | 12.4 |
|  | 15 | 83 | 9.0 |
|  | 20 | 70 | 7.6 |
|  | 25 | 68 | 7.4 |
|  | 30 | 82 | 8.9 |
|  | 35 | 57 | 6.2 |
|  | 40 | 52 | 5.7 |
|  | 45 | 31 | 3.4 |
|  | 50 | 80 | 8.7 |
|  | 60 | 68 | 7.4 |
|  | 75 | 51 | 5.5 |
| Total | 100 | 45 | 4.9 |
| Missing | 250 | 13 | 1.4 |
|  |  | $[919]$ | $[100.0]$ |
|  |  | $(46)$ | $(4.8)$ |


| Mean | $\mathbf{3 6 . 3 3}$ |
| :--- | ---: |
| Std Dev | 35.75 |
| Median | $\mathbf{3 0 . 0 0}$ |

## THE CENTRE FOR TAX SYSTEM INTEGRITY WORKING PAPERS

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[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ Datacol Research Pty Ltd.

[^1]:    ${ }^{2}$ Completed surveys were in fact sent to Datacol Research Pty Ltd for survey management and data entry purposes.
    ${ }^{\frac{1}{3}}$ Thirty-four respondents had removed the ID label from their completed survey booklets and therefore would have received all reminder letters.

[^2]:    ${ }^{4}$ Such low response rates are not unusual in the tax context, with some arguing that tax surveys of the general population cannot be expected to yield higher than a $30 \%$ to $40 \%$ response rate (for example, Wallschutzky, 1984; 1996). For the Centre for Tax System Integrity's earlier tax survey of the general population, Braithwaite et al. (2001) achieved a response rate of $29 \%$. A more recent Centre for Tax System Integrity survey of the general population also only obtained a $32 \%$ response rate (Braithwaite, 2002).

[^3]:    ${ }^{5}$ Meaning it was done by only one operator.

[^4]:    ${ }^{6}$ This open-ended question invited respondents to provide any additional thoughts they may have about the tax system in Australia.

[^5]:    ${ }^{7}$ At this first stage of data analysis, we need to put issues of scale reliabilities to the side.

[^6]:    ${ }^{8}$ Unfortunately, for those taxpayers who had not lodged their 2001/2002 tax return, it was unclear whether or not there was a requirement for them to do so.

[^7]:    ${ }^{9}$ Scenario was taken from Hite and McGill (1992).

[^8]:    b) $\{\mathbf{P 2 Q 1 1 0 B}\}$ What would you consider fair? How much tax (in Dollars) should somebody pay who earns...

